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Introduction 
The following literature review addresses the effects of various stressors on cognition. While 
attempting to be as inclusive as possible, the review focuses its examination on the relationships 
between cognitive appraisal, attention, memory, and stress as they relate to information processing 
and human performance. The review begins with an overview of constructs and theoretical 
perspectives followed by an examination of effects across attention, memory, perceptual-motor 
functions, judgment and decision making, putative stressors such as workload, thermals, noise, and 
fatigue and closes with a discussion of moderating variables and related topics. In summation of the 
review, a conceptual framework for cognitive process under stress has been assembled. As one might 
imagine, the research literature that addresses stress, theories governing its effects on human 
performance, and experimental evidence that supports these notions is large and diverse. In 
attempting to organize and synthesize this body of work, I was guided by several earlier efforts 
(Bourne & Yaroush, 2003; Driskell, Mullen, Johnson, Hughes, & Batchelor, 1992; Driskell & Salas, 
1996; Handcock & Desmond, 2001; Stokes & Kite, 1994). These authors should be credited with 
accomplishing the monumental task of providing focused reviews in this area and their collective 
efforts laid the foundation for this present review. Similarly, the format of this review has been 
designed in accordance with these previous exemplars. However, each of these previous efforts either 
simply reported general findings, without sufficient experimental illustration, or narrowed their scope 
of investigation to the extent that the breadth of such findings remained hidden from the reader. 
Moreover, none of these examinations yielded an architecture that adequately describes or explains 
the inter-relations between information processing elements under stress conditions. It is the author’s 
hope that this review may provide an initial step toward this end. 
What is Stress? 
It’s a question that has beguiled many prominent researchers of this era. The term itself is amorphous 
and sustains the difficulty in discerning its meaning. Definitions of stress range from metallurgical 
strain to one’s emotional wits end. Although convergence on a common definition of stress is highly 
desirable, the scientific community has not been able to do so. Instead, the research literature reflects 
wide and divergent opinions concerning stress. 
Stokes and Kite (2001) suggest that the term’s versatility (its range of application), is its undoing as a 
useful scientific term or concept, and they are not alone in this assertion (Tepas & Price, 2001). 
Accordingly, stress can be viewed as, “...an agent, circumstance, situation, or variable that disturbs the 
‘norrnal’ functioning of the individual ... stress [is also] seen as an effect-that is the disturbed state 
itself.. .this bifurcation of meaning is arguably the most fundamental source of the confusion 
surrounding the stress concept.” (p. 109). Stokes and Kite contend that there are no psychological 
stressors in any absolute, objective sense. 
In their review of the construct and its evolution, they assert that there are two traditional models of 
psychological stress, stimulus-based and response-based. The stimulus-based stress approach assumes 
certain conditions to be stressful and dubs these stressors (i.e., workload, heat and cold, time pressure, 
etc.). Historically this has resulted in researchers selecting such exogenous variables, applying them 
experimentally, and concluding that the outcome witnessed was likely the result of a “stress” 
manipulation. The approach is based on an engineering analogy (mechanical stress and emotional 
strain) that Stokes and Kite contend is inadequate. They argue that this model ignores individual 
differences, does not evaluate circumstances, and leaves out emotion-we are not just machines that 
react to environmental stimuli. 
The response-based stress approach holds that stress is defined by the pattern of responses (i.e., 
behavioral, cognitive, and affective) that result from exposure to a given stressor. In contrast to the 
stimulus-based approach, these variables can be considered endogenous or coming from within the 
individual. This model has relied heavily on the work of Yerkes and Dodson (1908) and later Selye 
(1956) and found its emphasis in physiological dimensions (this evolution is described in more detail 
in the following section). 
Stokes and Kite (2001) suggested that physiological measures have failed to provide a complete 
understanding of the human stress response and do not necessarily equate to psychological stress, and 
thus a third approach to understanding the human stress response has emerged-the transactional 
model. Transactional models view stress as the interaction between the environment and individual, 
emphasizing the role of the individual’s appraisal of situations in shaping their responses. From the 
transactional approach, stress is defined as, “...the result of a mismatch between individuals’ 
perceptions of the demands of the task or situation and their perceptions of the resources for coping 
with them.” (p. 116). The fundamental assumptions underlying this approach are discussed in 
greater detail during a review of the cognitive appraisal literature. 
There seem to be as many definitions of stress as there are stress researchers. Adding to the difficulty 
in finding an adequate definition for stress is the fact that the term is used in association with so many 
different constructs. For instance, Tepas and Rice (2001) suggested that stress is commonly 
connected to the following concepts: adaptation, anxiety, arousal, burnout, coping, exertion, 
exhaustion, exposure, fatigue, hardiness, mental load, repetitiveness, strain, stressor, and tension. Given 
the formidable breadth of the domain it is not difficult to see why stress as a construct has become 
unwieldy for most researchers. 
For the sake of simplicity and coherence, I have selected a definition proposed by McGrath (1976) 
that seems to be broad enough to incorporate most of the current assumptions about what stress is 
and is not, yet focused enough to be meaningful. McGrath conceptualized stress as the interaction 
between three elements: perceived demand, perceived ability to cope, and the perception of the 
importance of being able to cope with the demand. Unlike many previous definitions of stress, this 
formulation distinctly incorporates the transactional process believed to be central to current 
cognitive appraisal theories. No longer is stress seen merely as a mismatch between demand and 
ability; on the contrary, one’s perception of these two elements, and more importantly the desire or 
motivation one experiences to meet the demand, is central to the construct. 
While McGrath’s (1976) definition of stress provides a high-level concept of stress, it says little if 
anything about how stress affects human performance. To do so requires a theory of underlying 
mechanisms. Unfortunately, no unitary framework has gained consensus by the scientific 
community. Instead, several theories have been proposed and debated. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Arousal, Activation, and Energetical Theories 
Yerkes-Dodson and Arousal Theory 
One of the earliest theories that attempted to provide a comprehensive framework was arousal theory. 
Razmjou (19%) provided us with a definition for arousal that seems to encompass most perspectives: 
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“Arousal is a hypothetical construct that represents the level of central nervous system activity along 
a behavioral continuum ranging from sleep to alertness.” (p. 530). Stokes and Kite (2001) have also 
suggested that arousal be considered, “the basic energetic state of an organism.” (p. 113). 
Combined, these definitions provide an adequate foundation for understanding the rather general and 
nonspecific nature of arousal as it is typically discussed in the research literature. As this theory states, 
arousal mobilizes and regulates the human stress response. Everyday living informs us that various 
events and conditions elicit a response. This response frequently incorporates physiological, 
cognitive, behavioral, and emotional dimensions. As arousal theory would assert, what facilitates this 
response is an energetical or activation system that is general and nonspecific. Although the arousal 
response is multidimensional, historically, physiological markers have dominated its measurement. 
To understand how the scientific community first came to support arousal theory we must go back to 
the turn of the twentieth century, specifically to the work of Yerkes and Dodson (1908). 
Yerkes and Dodson examined mice involved in a simple learning task. The task put before the mice 
was to learn to discern a white from a black doorway and pathway (and to refrain from walking down 
the black pathway). Thus performance was measured by how many attempts the mice made prior to 
learning that exploring the dark pathway was not a good idea. Electric shock was the aversive 
stimulus used to shape the animals’ behavior. Although it is unclear as to how well these shocks were 
calibrated, different intensities of shock were used to study the effect they had on, the mice’s learning. 
The results of this study suggested that when mice are shocked with high-intensity electricity, they are 
quicker to go the other way, in this case through the white doorway and down the white path, than 
when one uses low-intensity shocks. This became the first Yerkes-Dodson principle, later becoming a 
“law” of performance. 
Over time this finding, and others, led to the postulate that moderate levels of arousal (often used 
synonymously with stress) will result in optimal performance, whereas too little arousal or too much 
arousal will degrade performance -- a curvilinear relationship sometimes termed an inverted U. This 
general assertion seems to make intuitive sense to most people. In fact, this notion, and arousal theory 
in general, have likely gained such success for this very reason-it seems as though that’s the way it 
should be. After all, if one lacks motivation or even the most modest amount of arousal to stay 
focused and get going, one’s performance on various tasks is likely to suffer. The inverse of that is 
equally compelling, with too much exertion or strain, our performance is likely to decrease. But does 
it accurately portray what science says about stress and performance? The answer is.. .not exactly. 
The Infamous Inverted U 
The Yerkes and Dodson experiments later became the foundation on which the curvilinear 
relationship between arousal and performance was based. The belief in this relationship became so 
popular and widespread that it has taken its critics the better part of the last three decades to fully 
challenge it. There have been numerous criticisms of Yerkes and Dodson’s experiments, not the least 
of which concerns the mice-to-man extension of their findings as well as the generalizability of their 
simple laboratory learning paradigm to real-world complex performance issues. A further criticism 
concerns Yerkes and Dodson’s failure to measure stress (or even arousal) in these mice. Instead, they 
administered different levels of shock (which, incidentally, have also been criticized for their poor 
calibrations) that were later interpreted as resulting in arousal or stress in the mice. Certainly, one 
could argue that electric shock would in many instances increase arousal (surprisingly this is not 
always the case) and might even constitute stress, but Yerkes and Dodson did not themselves make 
this claim. However, a large portion of the psychological community concluded that electric shock 
increased the arousal in the mice, acting as a stressor of different intensities, motivating the mice to 
learn faster-a contentious and hotly debated issue to this day. The reality is that we don’t actually 
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know how aroused, stressed, motivated, anxious, or upset the mice were. This was never measured 
physiologically or behaviorally. It is interesting to note that subsequent research has found that mild 
to moderate electric shocks do not necessarily cause arousal in different animals and can be rapidly 
habituated to in laboratory settings (Hancock & Ganey, 2002; Hancock, Ganey, & Szalma, 2002). 
Reviews of this claim (Banich, Stokes, & Elledge, 1987; Stokes & Kite, 1994) report that replication 
attempts using a variety of animals have repeatedly failed to find comparable results. During Brown’s 
(1965) early critique of the Yerkes-Dodson law (focused mostly on methodological flaws in their 
design), the author asserted that the “law” should be silenced. Landers (1980) also criticized the 
hypothesis, noting, “In actuality, the inverted-U hypothesis is not an explanation for the arousal- 
performance relationship; it merely posits that this relationship is curvilinear without explaining what 
internal state or process produces it.” (p. 346). Further concerns have been raised about the 
methodology required to either prove or refute the hypothesis since arousal can not be generated in 
the laboratory per se (it tends to result from some event or condition). That is to say, researchers 
typically measure physiological reactions to workload and stressful conditions, linking them to 
arousal as supposed markers, since arousal itself is a theoretical construct. Neiss (1988) suggested that 
the current research literature in support of the Y erkes-Dodson principle of arousal and performance, 
“is psychologically trivial” (p. 353). In his review of the inverted-U hypothesis, Neiss disputed the 
relationship between arousal and motor performance and instead explored a reconceptualization of 
arousal into specific psychobiological states (an interdependence model between affect, cognition, 
and such states). Neiss recommended that any investigation of these psychobiological states should 
optimally include measures that have historically been associated with arousal: respiration, heart rate, 
electroencephalography, electromyography, etc. (as well as other measures that may discriminate 
between states). 
It should be pointed out that the direction taken with Yerkes and Dodson’s work (1908) should not 
be blamed on those authors themselves. On the contrary, they were rather modest in their conclusions 
about what they had found. In fact, the field of psychology remained silent on the topic for half a 
century before Broadhurst (1957) unearthed the finding and raised it to its lawful status. Hancock et 
al. (2002) point out that during the intervening decades, the curvilinear function of these two 
. 
Performance improves as 
arousal increases until a point 
at which time it decreases 
properties (arousal and performance) remained untouched by the scientific literature. So why is it 
that this figure (see figure 1) is found in many introductory psychology texts and most books that 
reference stress, arousal, or performance? There are several reasons, not the least of which is that 
many researchers found parallels between their work and that of Yerkes and Dodson. 
Early on, two competing hypotheses evolved to take the place of emotion literature in the explanation 
of performance outcome. The first, drive theory (Hull, 1943; Spence, 1951) held that the relationship 
between arousal and performance was positive and linear. The Hull-Spence drive theory specifically 
states that an increase in drive (that has become linked by many to arousal) will increase the 
likelihood that a well-learned response will occur (likely improving performance); whereas arousal 
will decrease performance of a task that is not well-learned (Spence & Spence, 1966). However, this 
position gradually fell out of favor due to its lack of empirical support, the difficulty in testing the 
hypothesis, and the robust anecdotal evidence to the contrary (Neiss, 1988). This allowed the 
inverted-U hypothesis to gain further support as the predominant framework. 
Duffy is cited as one of the major early proponents of arousal and activation constructs (Duffy 1941, 
1957). She conjectured that humans organize responses to achieve and maintain equilibrium (based 
heavily on Cannon’s hypotheses). Moreover, she suggested that we tend to be selective in our 
response to various stimuli and that our attention is directed as a result of our personal goals. She 
indicated that after evaluating the relationship of elements within the environment ‘we mobilize an 
energetical system (Cannon, 1915) to meet the demands presented. Duffy implicated arousal in the 
activation of this system and indicated that it supplied the energy for the organism’s behavioral 
response. Driven by the desire to reduce the number of psychological concepts required to explain 
such a response, she further contended that these three qualities: directional response, relational 
evaluation, and energy mobilization, were common to all human responses (Duffy, 1941). In later 
work, Duffy (1957) provided a review of the experimental support for arousal as a unitary function 
in the human response system. Taking this notion and the original work of Yerkes and Dodson a step 
fuither, she asserted, “In general, the optimal degree of activation appears to be a moderate one, the 
curve which expresses the relationship between activation and quality of performance taking the form 
of an inverted U.” (p. 268). Thus, the desire for an organizing force and the reduction of 
unnecessary levels of psychological explanation appear to have fueled early investigations into the 
role of arousal as the underlying energy system in human performancte. 
Duffy was certainly not alone in her assertions. During the middle of the last century, Hebb (1955) 
was examining the relationship between motivation and the nervous system. He characterized this 
relationship as roughly curvilinear. Falk and Bindra (1954) found that performance on simple tasks, 
like time estimation, was enhanced through modest increases in arousal (inferred from the threat of 
pain). Broadhurst (1957) attempted to expand Yerkes and Dodson’s principle to include different 
motivational influences (air deprivation instead of electric shock) and a different population, using 
rats instead of mice. His findings appear consistent with the curvilinear principle-rats swimming 
speed while immersed under water increased based on the amount of time submerged up to a point, at 
which it decreased. Broadhurst concluded that learning has an optimal level of motivation or drive 
associated with it, and that when motivation exceeds this level, performance suffers. Shortly afterward, 
Easterbrook (1959), in his seminal paper on the relationship between stress and performance (the 
effects of emotion on cue utilization), argued that there is an optimal level of stress associated with 
cue sampling (attention allocation) as one scans and absorbs the various stimuli in his or her 
environment. Easterbrook (1959) proposed that the effects of arousal under stress were motivational 
in nature, serving to better organize a course of action, as opposed to emotional, leading to a 
disruption in performance. This too seemed to adhere to the Yerkes-Dodson principle. 
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A large body of work by Hans Selye (1956) furthered this concept. Selye published over 1,500 
articles and 30 books on the subject of stress and coping, and his work on the Global Adaptation 
Syndrome (GAS) propelled beliefs in the ubiquitous inverted U. Other authors encouraged the 
field’s adoption of the hypothesis as well. Teichner, Arees, and Reilly (1963) proposed a distraction- 
arousal theory. They contended that stressors have two primary mechanisms for negatively affecting 
performance: they either distract the operator, drawing attention away from the primary task or they 
increase the operator’s level of arousal past optimal levels. Turning their focus to affective processes, 
Schachter and Singer (1962) devised an ingenious experiment aimed at determining the relationship 
between arousal and cognition in the creation of emotional states. They injected subjects with 
epinephrine to induce physiological arousal and then exposed them to various social conditions using 
confederates that provided a model for their cognitive and emotional experience (i.e., acting agitated 
or joyful). They suggested that emotions were nothing more than generalized arousal added to 
context-based cognitions. Specifically, they found evidence for the assertion that physiological 
arousal was necessary but not sufficient for emotion. Similarly, cognition was not enough alone to 
enact an emotional state either. However, when provided with physiological arousal and explanatory 
cognitions, individuals experienced emotional states that were congruent with that of confederates. 
While these findings were later challenged by others (Plutchik & Ax, 1967), they demonstrate the 
widespread acceptance and propagation of the theory. 
During the course of arousal theory’s evolution, many have come to view its definitive expression as 
a physiological one. Given the apparently inseparable state of arousal and stress, researchers 
commonly link physiologic reactivity to the human stress response. However, Stokes and Kite (2001) 
report on the misperception of various physiological measures (Le., corticoids or skin temperature) as 
necessarily indicators of stress. They note that such measures need not co-vary and are often 
associated with a variety of positive and negative affective states. Roscoe (1978), in his investigation 
of this alignment, stated that physiological markers are not accurate measures of emotional stress. 
This connection has fused in large measure due to Cannon’s (1915) efforts to detail the human fight 
or flight response and Selye’s (1956) work on the Global Adaptation Syndrome (GAS). Stokes and 
Kite (2001) cite Selye’s contention that the human response to stress is a nonspecific systemic 
reaction. This view closely resembles elements in arousal theory and served to support volumes of 
experimental work in this joint direction. They argue that although nonspecific physiological arousal 
has become inextricably linked with psychological stress, it is inadequate in its explanation of the 
human stress response. 
Stokes and Kite propose, as Lazarus suggested earlier (1991), that the human stress response may be 
best envisioned within the context of emotions. In concert with this perspective, they promote the 
Affect Program Theory (Ekman, 1977) as an empirically grounded framework for the relationship 
between emotions and stress. This approach suggests that when an event or condition is experienced 
that is deemed significant to the organism, its features are matched to a pre-packaged template or 
pattern of adaptations. Specifically, any pattern encountered elicits a prepared physiological 
response. Each emotion corresponds with, or is contained within, this pre-packaged response. This 
line of thinking is consistent with that of many emotion researchers who have come to view emotional 
response as a preparatory step to formulate action. Emotions are seen as managing both motivational 
resources and regulating behavioral and cognitive activation (Frijda, 1986; 1996; Panksepp, 1996). 
Stemmler, Heldmann, Pauls, and Scherer (2001) extended this view in their exploration of 
psychophysiological responses to fear and anger under real-world and imaginal states. They suggest 
that emotion exists in context-deviation specificity. Specifically, they concluded that each individual 
has response components within a greater somatovisceral response organization that directs resource 
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allocation based on situational circumstances. Examples of such responses are the activation of 
behavioral inhibition, approach and avoidance responses, the alerting response, and the defense 
reflex. According to Stemmler and colleague’s framework, these response components would 
naturally be followed by an, “emotion signature proper” whose primary function is “. . .to prepare 
the organism for the emotion-specific, upcoming need to act and to protect itself with a hardwired, 
fixed somatovisceral adaptation.” (p. 290). The authors suggested that Cannon’s (1915) fight or 
flight model would be best reconceptualized as a defensive reflex given the proposed organization 
described above. 
These views are consistent with the work of Thackray (Thackray, 1988; Thackray & Touchstone, 
1983) who examined the startle response. and its impact on performance. Thackray reported that the 
startle reflex immediately follows an initial orienting response to an unexpected stimulus, typically 
within 100 milliseconds after the event. Accordingly, he and others (Landis & Hunt, 1939) have 
suggested that this reflexive response is likely to be pre-emotional. The authors asserted that the 
response includes physiological and subjective dimensions. Physiologically, the startle reflex includes 
a full a m y  of autonomic and central nervous system activation that has been characterized as general 
and non-specific. The authors theorized that the subjective feeling state induced by the startle reflex 
is related to fear or anger; however, being pre-emotional, the reaction is believed to be different, in 
some yet undefined way, than these more advanced affective states. Research on the startle response 
has convincingly demonstrated its effects on performance (May & Rice, 1971; Sternbach, 1960; 
Thackray, 1965) and is discussed in a further section of the review. 
Certainly there is no consensus concerning emotion’s role in the human stress response, nor has there 
been a more dominant voice than that of arousal theory. There are a variety of inverted-U designs 
that are depicted in the stress literature, but they all resemble a bell curve or normal distribution 
curve. Some texts use the term arousal (as the x-axis seen in figure 1) while others choose to call it 
motivation, stress or even anxiety. However, these are all different constructs and none are definitively 
tied to Yerkes and Dodson’s original work (1908) nor are they explicitly connected to all of the 
subsequent studies “confirming” the utility of arousal theory. To make the situation worse, much of 
the time the graphic (the inverted U) fails to make explicit the nature of the performance or stressor 
in the model. Readers are simply left to assume that this model must apply generically across the 
gamut of performance possibilities. 
Yet the majority of the scientific community today says that this isn’t so. Christianson (1992) 
conducted a rigorous review of the literature on arousal’s role in memory function and suggested 
that it was time to retire the inverted U as it no longer was useful in describing the relationship 
between stress or arousal and memory performance. Other authors have similarly rejected the 
common use of this model within a variety of cognitive and physical domains (Stokes & Kite, 1994). 
Broadbent (1963) argued that since the effects of stressors are different, there may not be a singular 
mechanism that mediates an individual’s reactions to stress. He found that various putative stressors 
resulted in differing patterns of behavior. For example, loss of sleep affected the speed of 
performance but not the accuracy of that performance and only typically at the end of a task. Noise 
affected accuracy but not speed and also only typically at the end of a task. However, heat affected 
accuracy but not speed and it did so generally at the beginning of a task. Thus, when holding the task 
constant, these putative stressors revealed different patterns of decrement in performance, which may 
hint toward different underlying mechanisms- something inconsistent with a unitary arousal 
explanation. Broadbent’s later work (1971) asserted that noise increased arousal which in turn 
resulted in a narrowing of attention leading to a restriction in the range of information processed. 
This position is consistent with Easterbrook’s earlier hypothesis regarding restricted cue sampling. 
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This suggests that arousal may have a role to play, perhaps simply as a covariate, in the moderation of 
information processing that relates to changes in performance under stress. 
Although research in this area has supported a number of different conclusions, research specific to 
cognitive performance generally suggests more of a linear trend under arousal and stress (Broadbent 
& Broadbent, 1988). Giesbrecht, Arnett, Vela, and Bristow (1993) found that performance on 
complex tasks like public speaking or math calculations was degraded through increases in arousal, 
and similar results were reported by Lovallo (1997). However, even this area of study is not immune 
to divergence. Brookhuis and de Waard (2001) provided support for a curvilinear relationship 
between stress and performance. They drew a distinction between underload-a condition leading to 
a reduction in alertness and lowered attention, and overload-leading to distraction and diverted 
attention. Other research indicates that an idiographic performance profile, tied to the specific stressor 
and the specific dimension of performance being measured, is most appropriate. Sullivan and Bhagat 
(19%) reviewed the research literature pertaining to relational models. They suggested that there are 
a number of different relationships that have empirical support. Some of these resemble skewed 
versions of the inverted U, others are non-inverted Us, many show linear patterns, and some are even a 
straight line, showing very little effect of arousal across different intensities and performance 
Figure 2. Positive and negative linear relationships are depicted above, the absence of a 
relationship is shown by the straight line, while a combination of research findings (positive, 
negative and null) are mapped alongside the curvilinear model proposed by the Yerkes-Dodson 
principle. 
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dimensions (see figure 2). Westman and Eden (1996) examined the relationship between stress and 
performance across a variety of mental domains. These authors tested for the inverted-U hypothesis 
and the negative linear trend hypothesis. Their results demonstrated support for the latter and not the 
former. In other words, the research literature addressing this issue remains conflicted. 
In any case, the Yerkes-Dodson law and the infamous inverted U seem to have outlived their 
usefulness as an absolute and unitary theory in human performance. However, if not an overarching 
theory of arousal, then how should the relationship between stress, the various demands one faces, and 
human performance be explained? Several authors have approached this question in an attempt to 
create an adequate replacement for arousal theory. A brief summary of recent frameworks, models, 
and theories follows. 
Theoretical Perspectives of Resource Theory and Activation 
Welford ( 1973) explored three models of stress and performance (arousal theory, signal-detection 
theory, and the Yerkes-Dodson law) in an attempt to unify them under a new framework. He posited 
that stress arises when an organism departs from an optimal condition. Drawing upon stress 
definitions from McGrath (1970) and Sells (1970), he suggested that motivation plays a role in 
spumng action against this deviation from an optimal state. Welford has not been alone in asserting 
the strong role motivation may play in performance outcome. Lovallo (1997) sug,gested that the 
greater the arousal, the greater the motivation and confirmed this notion with research conducted on 
the stress or anxiety imposed by public speaking. Welford's observation of an imbalance in the 
organism's state has been furthered by Hammond (2000) who asserted the Cognitive Continuum 
theory. This framework is based on two prevailing perspectives, one of Coherence (behavior results 
from an interaction between cognitive processes and environmental demands), and one of 
Correspondence (behavior results directly from the demand and the outcome of the response to that 
demand). According to this theory, stress is viewed as something that breaches the homeostatic 
relationship between cognition and the environmental demand (the task). 
Pribram and McGuiness (1975; McGuiness & Pribram, 1989) proposed that arousal was one of two 
cortical regulatory systems in the body. According to their framework, arousal is the externally 
oriented system while activation is the internally oriented system. These authors further delineated 
three brain-based attentional mechanisms that ground the model in empirically derived 
neuroanatomical relationships. They posited that the first regulates arousal based on input values 
(externally oriented). The authors suggested this control function is best associated with the 
amygdala. This assertion is heavily based in a review of amygdalectomy research that has found a 
consistent pattern of the amygdala's role in both facilitating and inhibiting physiological arousal. 
The second mechanism is located within the basal ganglia and has been implicated in the control of 
the organism's preparatory response system-referred to as activation. This connection draws on the 
voluminous literature detailing the orienting response. Finally, Pribram and McGuiness' third 
mechanism coordinates the former two, arousal and activation. This final system is believed to be 
associated with the hippocampus (based at least in part on a review of hippocampalectomy research 
findings). One of its primary functions is to separate the stimulus and its response through the re- 
organization of amygdala and basal ganglia mechanisms. The authors suggested that this process is 
best described as the application of effort. Their investigation provides a detailed description of the 
neuronal systems and corresponding research that offer support for the relationships described 
above. 
Hancock and Warm (1989) formulated their own arousal replacement framework. In their model 
these authors described the "trinity of stress" as consisting of input features (environmental stressors), 
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adaptation features (cognitive appraisal), and output features (changes in bodily functions and 
ultimately performance efficiency). After reviewing the stress and human performance literature, 
Hancock and Warm concluded that every stressor produced a unique array of effects on both 
cognition and performance. This led them to agree with Broadbent (1963) surmising that it may not 
be possible to find a unitary governing theory. Wofford and Daly (1997) also defined the human 
stress response as constituting three domains: physiological arousal (i.e., heart rate, blood pressure, 
temperature, etc.), psychological responses (Le., dissatisfaction, anxiety, sleep problems, depression, 
irritation, etc.), and behavioral responses (i.e., job performance, drug abuse, eating disorders, 
aggression, poor relations, etc.). Although not attempting to apply a unitary model, their division of 
the stress response represents a convergence among many researchers-outlining physical, cognitive 
or psychological, and behavioral or performance characteristics. 
One traditional theory of cognitive science dictates that there are three levels of explanation that can 
be used to understand cognitive phenomena: biological, symbolic processing, and adaptive (Newell, 
1980; Pylyshyn, 1984). For example, noise may be seen as affecting cortical arousal, causing the 
redistribution of processing resources, or it may affect the personal meaning of the task leading to a 
change in motivation (Matthews, 2001). One theory that has been linked to all three of these levels is 
resource theory. Resource theory suggests there is a general reservoir of mental resources that can be 
drawn from to assist the organism in completing task demands. From a theoretical perspective, this 
pool of resources is believed to vary in amount based on the arousal of the individual (Kahneman, 
1973; Mandler, 1979). Szalma and Hancock (2002) provided an overview of the concept and its 
development. They point out that various metaphors have been used to describe resources, hydraulic 
and thermodynamic principles have been the most common. It has been suggested that the cognitive 
structures responsible for information processing are in fact the resources described although this can 
not be established given the state of current research capabilities. 
Kahneman (1973) is frequently cited as the progenitor of the limited-capacity resource model, 
although Norman and Bobrow (1975) are typically credited with coining the term. Specifically, 
Kahneman posited that there is a limited pool of mental resources that can be divided across tasks. 
Thus, when considering concurrent task management, Kahneman suggested there is likely to be an 
attentional conflict created between the demands of the competing tasks. He asserted that this conflict 
is due to the dual demand on resource allocation (from the primary to the secondary task). Wickens 
(1984) suggested that resources can be considered synonymous with a number of terms such as 
capacity, attention, and effort. He indicated that these concepts all refer to the “...underlying 
commodity, of limited availability, that enables performance of a task.” (p. 67). Kinsbourne and 
Hicks (1978) argued that resources can be construed as competing for actual cerebral space. Others 
have tied the brain’s metabolism of glucoproteins and changes in blood flow to resource 
management and consumption (Gur & Reivich, 1980; Sokoloff, 1975). 
Fairclough (2001), in his review of compensatory models of effort (related to fatigue), indicated that 
Kahneman (1973) was the first to conclusively link mental effort to attention control within an 
information processing model. He asserted that Kahneman’s basic premise was that task demands 
were defined by the amount of effort required and that failure to provide that level of effort resulted 
in performance decrements. Fairclough suggested that the regulation of mental effort at the principle 
level is performed on the basis of subjective appraisals of the task demands, the individual’s current 
performance level, and a self-appraisal of stress and comfort. Evidence supports the notion that this 
self-assessment becomes more inaccurate with greater stress: “the appropriate regulation of mental 
effort hinges on the reliability of feedback by self-monitoring and appraisal.” Fairclough argued 
that “an increase of mental effort is associated with an increased fidelity of self-monitoring, effective 
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memory retrieval, and analytical processing of a problem space.” (p. 491). From this perspective, 
then, mental effort is a finite resource that is regulated (invested or conserved) and may be 
synonymous with the regulation of attention. 
Yeo and Neal (2004) have also examined the relationship between effort (how hard someone tries to 
do something) and performance. Although little is known about how effort and performance are 
directly related, the authors state that “motivation is assumed to affect performance by influencing 
the way that individuals allocate effort to tasks. The majority of motivation research has concentrated 
on assessing the predictive strength of motivational interventions, such as goal setting, or constructs, 
such as valence and self-efficacy, that are thought to influence the allocation of effort to tasks.” (p. 
231). The authors note several assumptions that underlie this view of effort and performance. For 
instance, task difficulty is believed to relate to the amount of effort that is allocated to the task 
(assuming that the more difficult the task, the greater the effort allocation). Yeo and Neal’s review of 
this literature highlighted several key findings: 1) an individual’s employment of effort depends on 
his level of skill on a task and his rate of learning, 2) when faced with novel tasks, effort tends to 
initially increase until greater familiarity with the task is achieved, 3) perceived task difficulty and 
effort are highly correlated which may suggest they share an underlying construct, and finally, 4) 
effort changes throughout skill acquisition and these changes appear related to cognitive ability and 
goal orientation. 
Resource theory has found support among a large cross-section of the research community. While 
attempting to create a power function to predict psychophysical workload, Gopher and Braune 
(1984) found a strong correlation between the task difficulty index (based on task characteristics) 
and a measurement of invested resources (based on subjective measures). They concluded that their 
data strongly supported Kahneman’s (1973) resource model. Consistent with this perspective, 
Neuberg and Newsom (1993) asserted a cognitive structuring model that explains the effects of stress 
on various elements of cognition. They indicated that the creation and use of schemas, prototypes, 
scripts, attitudes, and stereotypes helps to reduce cognitive load, which draws upon this finite pool of 
resources. 
Wickens (1984; 1991; 1992) has worked extensively on both attentional capacity theory and an 
expansion of this framework as a revision of resource theory. Wickens (1991) defined resources as 
“ ... a small set of scarce commodities within the human information processing system, which is 
associated with a distinct physiological structure, and with physiological arousal changes as increased 
demands are placed on it.” (p. 22). He has also asserted that resources can be mobilized voluntarily 
and allocated in regulated quantities as needed for task completion. Describing the specific 
mechanism and structures under which these processes function is a bit more difficult; however, based 
on earlier resource capacity frameworks, Wickens (1991) introduced a multiple resources model: 
“the resource concept is founded on the underlying assumption that the human operator has a 
limited capacity for processing resources that may be allocated to task performance.” (p. 4). He 
illustrated this model using concurrent task management. Wickens suggested that three possible 
factors were engaged in concurrent task management performance outcomes. The first was 
confusion. He defined the confusion of task elements as a condition where similar tasks often 
interfere with performance while more distinct tasks degrade performance less often. The second 
potential outcome is cooperation. The cooperation between task processes can be seen when high task 
similarity yields combined results (Le., tracking a ball as you prepare to hit it with a racquet). Finally, 
there also can be competition between demands. Competition for resources, specifically resource 
allocation to one task versus another, results in diminishing resources from the other task@) being 
managed. Wickens has argued that timesharing (cooperation) improves between tasks to the extent 
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that they use separate versus shared resources. Wickens (1991) has drawn a very distinct parallel 
between mental effort and resources. In diagramming the relationship between performance, task 
difficulty, and resources, he asserted that Performance = Resources / Task Difficulty. Thus ultimate 
performance can be described (not predicted) by assessing the amount of resources remaining after 
having been divided by the difficulty of the task. 
Several theorists have attacked the suggestion that there is a general reservoir of resources (Allport, 
1980; Neisser, 1976) used for information processing and others have suggested there may be 
multiple pools of resources as opposed to s single pool (Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2004). Navon (1984) 
examined the notion of resources and the assumptions made by resource theory. He challenged the 
idea that such resources were limited in nature, stating, “...the existence of resources of limited 
quantity serving as mental input to processing is a theoretical claim that should be put to empirical 
test.” (p. 217). During his review of the theory, Navon pointed out the many enticing features of 
resource theory that frame the various effects found in the research literature. For instance, he 
observed that motivational level can be readily seen as a regulatory agent involved in the allocation of 
resources to a task, that task difficulty can been seen as a modulator of the efficiency of a resource in 
its production or output, and that task complexity, “...may be regarded as tapping the load imposed 
by the task and thereby the amount of resources.” (p. 219). Furthermore, from this perspective, dual- 
task deficits may be viewed as degrading performance on the primary task as a result of a reduction 
in the resources activated. In addition, bolstering the priority given to the concurrent thsk may also 
reduce the resources available to the primary task and a similar effect may be incurred by varying the 
concurrent task’s difficulty. It is generally assumed that the more complex the task, the more 
resources it consumes (Gopher & Braune, 1984). 
All of this said, Navon contends that there are many limitations and difficulties with the theory that 
have not been resolved. For instance, there are no reliable tools at our disposal to validate the claims 
listed above. Also, the theory as posited is unfalsifiable. The author concluded that a limited-capacity 
resource theory is no more explanatory than an unlimited-capacity resource theory. Thus, without 
clear empirical validation of its explanations or predictions, Navon stated resource theory “. ..may 
turn out to be excess baggage.” (p. 216). 
Matthews (2001) also provided a critique of resource models, concluding that they tend to be 
somewhat ambiguous at an explanatory level, suggesting that their usefulness remains descriptive. He 
proposed that there are three potential bases for the relationship between the resource model and the 
outcomes it describes. First, there may be an actual change in the parameters of the information 
processing architecture. That is to say, stressors may change the total quantity of resources available 
at any given moment. Resource loss may occur as a result of changes in biological or neural 
functioning (Le., thermal stress leads to a breakdown in thermal regulation). Second, changes in task 
demands may occur. Specifically, a processing distraction may interfere with task-related 
performance (Le., multiple tasks may overload the processing of information). Finally, changes in 
strategy may occur. The suggestion here is that the strategic allocation of resources across different 
task components may change. Matthews indicates that this type of change is likely a consequence of 
emotion-focused coping. 
Energetical Models 
Hockey (1984; 1997) presented a framework for the analysis of the effects of stress and high 
workload on human performance based on Broadbent’s (1971) and Kahneman’s (1973) models, 
combining energetical and informational processes. Hockey proposed that activation or energetical 
processes are allocated, controlled, and subjected to resource management decisions. His model 
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assumes that behavior is goal-directed and self-regulated and that this regulation incurs costs to other 
parts of the system. 
Gaillard and Wientjes (1994) presented their own conceptual framework for mental load (objective 
demands imposed by a task or subjective ratings of task demands) and stress (input demands or 
environmental factors, output responses, state feelings, or processes). These authors identified two 
different types of energy mobilization systems: effort (dominated by the adrenal-medullary system 
and catecholamines) and distress (dominated by the adrenal-cortical system and cortisol). This 
formulation is similar to Karasek and Theorell’s (1990) model of activity and strain. From this 
perspective, mental load-related energy mobilization is associated with activation states while stress- 
related mobilization is associated with disorganized states. 
Gaillard (2001) put forth a theory of energetic mechanisms that focuses on the way in which our 
body regulates states of activation needed to perform and process. Unlike the various resource 
theories (Kahneman, 1973; Sanders, 1983; Wickens, 1991; 1992), this model is focused on regulatory 
processes and not the availability of supplies. Gaillard’s perspective on the role of a regulated energy 
mobilization process is shared by many others (Dyregrov, Solomon, & Bassoe, 2000). Consistent with 
the Gaillard and Wientjes’ (1994) framework, Gaillard (2001) views arousal as an activating or 
energizing force. He favors the term energetics in describing the regulation of information 
processing, prefemng it over arousal, effort, fatigue, and activation because it does not have any 
specific theoretical connotations. Gaillard believes that these energy mobilizations typically occur 
under one of the following conditions: 1) task-induced situations-in which activation results from 
the stimulation of the task or environment itself, 2) internally guided mental effort-a voluntary 
mobilization under a given mental load, or 3) under periods of emotional arousal-during stressful 
or threatening situations. 
Gaillard (2001), after reviewing the research literature, concluded that stress had several dimensions, 
including 1) an input function (work demands, emotional threat, or adverse environment), 2) an 
output function (pattern of behavioral, subjective, and physiological responses- strain), 3) an 
affective state (in which one feels strained and threatened subjectively), and 4) a process (resulting in 
a degraded work capacity). He also argued that complex or novel tasks require greater resources than 
do simple, well-trained tasks. His research has helped to reveal that a1“try harder” effortful response 
can sustain performance for brief periods prior to incurring high physiological and psychological 
costs (measured via strain and fatigue). He has also found that intense and negative emotions have a 
deleterious impact on performance in three ways: they disrupt state regulation, they distract the 
processing of task information, and they cause psychosomatic complaints that demand attention. For 
example, anxiety is an emotion that takes, in Gaillard’s language, “control 
precedence” -continually begging for attention, reducing the capacity available for processing task- 
relevant information. 
Gaillard (2001) distinguished between mental load and stress. In terms of energy mobilization, 
mental load manifests itself as normal mental effort (a healthy coping strategy) while stress is seen as 
enhanced activation that fails to improve performance. Similarly, state regulation, when viewed 
relative to mental load, is seen as a temporary condition that assists task completion and then returns 
to normal. On the other hand, stress’s activation is not controlled by the task demands and fails to 
facilitate recovery. Gaillard viewed one’s mood as arising from the positive emotions associated with 
challenges under mental load versus stress’s negative affectivity which results from threat perceptions. 
Finally, the author asserted that coping strategies also differ significantly between these two processes. 
Under mental load, coping tends to be task-focused while under stress it tends to be emotion-focused. 
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Direct and Zndirect Effects of Putative Stressors 
There is significant inconsistency among researchers concerning the direct and indirect effects of 
various putative stressors. Direct stress effects are those incurred by the task load alone irrespective of 
any psychological stress that may also be generated, Accordingly, indirect stress effects are those that 
evolve out of psychological factors associated with the task load demands. There is a fine line that 
separates these two, and they can be indistinguishable at times. This fact has made their separation 
and measurement particularly difficult. There are several issues at the heart of the inconsistencies 
found in the literature. For example, is the application of some task demand (Le., workload or time 
pressure) an application of stress? Many would argue that it is while others would contend the 
contrary. Proponents of the former typically offer one of two arguments. The first argument states 
that stress is a term that can be applied to any demand on a system. Therefore, any task that requires 
mental resources qualifies as a stressor-it places a demand on the system. This argument meets the 
criteria of early stress definitions (stimulus-based approaches); however, it is no longer as accepted 
given the widespread belief that stress is transactional in nature. The second argument proposes that 
demands incur a psychological cost in addition to their direct effects. That is to say, these demands 
trigger a psychological response such as frustration, anxiety, or psychological discomfort. This 
response often contains both physiological and mental components that vie for resources. In this way, 
stress acts as a secondary workload factor drawing resources away from the primary demand, 
devoting them instead to secondary psychological processes. 
On the other hand, a compelling argument can be made that workload is a demand that does not 
require, nor regularly incur, a secondary psychological cost. In applying the stated definition of 
stress-the interaction between three perceptions: a demand, an ability to cope with that demand, and 
the importance of being able to cope (McGrath, 1976), it’s difficult to see how demand 
characteristics alone qualify as stressors. For example, in some circumstances time pressure and/or 
workload would trigger anxiety or frustration that might further distract or interfere with 
performance. However, it is not clear that this would necessarily be so in most, let alone all, situations. 
If we agree that subjective experience and specifically cognitive appraisal (a transactional model 
assumption) is elemental in defining stress, then one must assume it plays a significant role in 
answering questions about whether workload, time pressure, or other putative stressors carry both 
direct and indirect effects. Does this suggest that when a demand is deemed stressful or upsetting it is 
necessarily a stressor, regardless of the objective outcome? If an increase in workload does not impair 
performance yet is viewed as stressful by the operator, does this indicate that it should be considered a 
stressor? Reasonable arguments can be made to support both positions, and the research literature, in 
its current state, is a reflection of this fact. Although it can be argued that each “stressor” involves 
direct effects, each may also carry indirect effects as well. For example, time pressure limits the time 
available to perform a given task. This limit is a physical boundary that does not require any 
psychological explanation in understanding its direct effects on performance. However, this limitation 
often evokes a corresponding psychologieal reaction such as anxiety that has secondary or indirect 
effects on performance. The ability to separate these two dimensions has proven difficult for the 
research community. The research that addresses various putative stressors discussed in the review 
(e.g., workload, time pressure, heat and cold, noise, and fatigue) rarely makes the distinction between 
these two dimensions, given the inherent difficulty in doing so. Therefore, discussions of these factors 
in this review comprise both direct and indirect effects, without distinguishing between them. 
Workload as a Substitute for Stress 
Several researchers have attempted to side-step the inter-relationship between direct and indirect 
effects by relying on descriptions of workload alone, ignoring potentially related psychological stress 
(Hancock & Desmond, 2001). In doing so, they have circumvented a direct discussion of stress and 
its role in performance degradation or enhancement. However, in leaving this issue unaddressed, these 
authors have left the reader to infer a stress effect in many instances, correctly or not. I have not 
attempted to resolve this issue but to make the reader aware of it. 
Andre (2001) defined workload as, “ ... a hypothetical construct that represents the cost incurred by a 
human operator to achieve a particular level of performance.” (p. 377). Kahneman (1973) 
considered workload to be a primary source of resource depletion and defined it as ‘‘. ..the 
proportion of the capacity an operator spends on task performance.” Kantowitz and Simsek (2001) 
defined it as, “an intervening variable that modulates the tuning between the demands of the 
environment and the capabilities of the organism.” They indicated that this variable, being theoretical 
in nature, “. . .cannot be directly observed but must be inferred from changes in performance.” (p. 
405). The central purpose of workload as a construct was provided by Gopher and Donchin (1986) 
who suggested that it was “...intended to capture limitations on the operator’s information 
processing apparatus as.. .viewed from the perspective of some assigned tasks.” Lastly, Wickens 
(2001) favored Moray’s (1979) definition of mental workload; “...an inferred construct that 
mediates between task difficulty, operator skill, and observed performance.” (pp. 443). These 
definitions of workload are very similar to early conceptions of stress-an interaction between 
demands and resources (the stimulus-based approach). The most noticeable feature here is the 
absence of any explicit cognitive function such as appraisal. However, one shouldn’t conclude that 
workload simply constitutes the demands of a given task. On the contrary, the dominant perspectives 
in the field cited above provide ample evidence that workload is believed to be much more than that. 
Unfortunately, once researchers go beyond the most elementary description of the term, confusion 
over its meaning rises rapidly. 
In response to this confusion, Hilburn and Jorna (2001) differentiated between workload and task 
load. They suggested that task load should be defined as the demand imposed by the task itself, and 
they conceive of workload as the subjective experience of the task demand. Parasuraman and 
Hancock (2001) made a similar differentiation in their dynynic and adaptive model of workload: 
“Workload may be driven by the task load imposed on human operators from external 
environmental sources but not deterministically so, because workload is also mediated by the 
individual response of human operators to the load and their skill levels, task management strategies, 
and other personal characteristics.” (p. 306). The authors defined task load as what the work or tasks 
bring as environmental loads on the organism or system while workload concerns what is experienced 
by the organism or system as it attempts to adapt accordingly. These two sets of definitions illustrate 
the continued overlap between direct and indirect stress effects in the research literature. 
Hendy, Farrell, and East (2001) presented an information processing model of operator stress 
(defined by time pressure) and performance. These authors posit that the underlying stressor that 
determines operator performance, error production, and judgments of workload is time pressure. In 
fact, according to Hendy et al. (2001) all factors affecting workload are reduced to this variable. 
These authors have proposed the following algorithm for the theoretical calculation of the 
relationship between any given task load and its corresponding time pressure: 
Task load + processing rate = decision time 
Decision time + time available = time pressure. 
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Hendy et al. suggest three possibilities by which human information processing can reduce 
information processing load mismatch. The first is a reduction in task load or the amount of 
information. The second is an increase in the time available to complete the task, and the third is an 
increase in channel capacity (regulating the rate and volume of information processing). Hendy et al. 
are certainly not alone in their alignment of time pressure and workload. O’Donnell and Eggemeier 
(1986) also drew a direct connection between workload and time pressure which they believed was 
likely to lead to load-shedding (this topic is addressed further in a later section of the review). 
Measurement of Stress and Workload 
Muscio (1921) stated that to define any phenomenon one must be able to measure it first. Thus a 
reliable and valid tool of measurement must exist a priori; however, it is difficult to create such a 
measure without knowing what you are trying to measure. This quandary has led many researchers to 
conclude that the pursuit of task-demand measurements is more feasible; however, others have 
decidedly tackled the amorphous construct of stress itself. 
Gopher and Braune (1984) discussed the use of subjective measurements of workload. Their review 
of research in this area showed it to be consistently undecided. Some research demonstrated a strong 
relationship between subjective ratings and objective indices and others a very weak relationship. For 
example, Shostak and Peterson (1990) failed to find any significant correlation between 
physiological arousal induced from mental arithmetic and self-reported feelings of akxiety while 
Zeier (1 994) found significant correlations between workload and cortisol release. Krausman, 
Crowell, and Wilson (2002) reported finding physiological arousal measures that corresponded to 
both the perceptions of exertion and cognitive performance decrements. In light of the inconsistent 
connection between objective and subjective measures, Stokes and Kite (2001) have cautioned against 
the presumption that physiological indicators are necessarily related to stress. Kantowitz and Casper 
(1988) suggested, “We may never be able to create a meaningful and valid scale for mental workload 
equivalent to kilocalories per minute in terms of its utility, generality, and formal measurement 
properties.” (p. 164). 
Backs (2001) modeled physiological markers of workload (Le., heart rate and respiration period) 
patterned after the work of Cacioppo and Tassinary (1990) who addressed the potential problems that 
exist in linking physiological and other data together in causal relationships. Based on their review, 
they concluded scientists in various fields desire to use physiology as a measurable index of the state 
of the organism. However, they caution that when there is a relationship between a process or event 
and a concomitant physiological change, there are numerous possible causal explanations. 
Furthermore, underlying causal explanations of relationships are rarely presented. Rarer yet is the 
demonstration that physiological variation reliably predicts psychological variation. These authors 
provided a framework to help establish such relationships. This framework constitutes four classes of 
psychophysiological relations, each of which is integrated into a multi-dimensional matrix consisting 
of configural, temporal, specific, and general forms of relational elements. A given relationship (e.g., 
pupillary dilation and workload) can be analyzed using this matrix. For example, if greater pupil 
dilation occurs under increasing workload, one could characterize the relationship as concomitant 
and corollary according to Cacioppo and Tassinary’s model. However, the relationship would be 
characterized differently if, for instance, pupil dilation did not consistently increase as workload 
increased, or if dilation increased differently between conditions or individuals. The authors’ 
framework accommodates context-specific relationships across a number of dimensions in the hope 
of capturing the possible range of relations, including those considered to be unrelated elements to 
those that are causal in nature. 
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Hancock, Mechkati, and Robertson (1985) also explored various measurement methodologies of 
mental workload during which they stated, “ . . .mental workload presumably affects the activity of the 
CNS [central nervous system], measures may variously reflect processes such as demand for increased 
energy, progressive degradation of the system, or homeostatic action of mechanisms designed to 
restore system equilibrium disturbed by such cognitive task requirements.” (p. 1 1  10). These authors 
defined mental workload as the result of CNS activity that is purposeful. Beatty (1982) found 
evidence that pupil dilations were closely related to changes in information processing, and 
presumably, increased resource mobilization (changes correlated with increases in task difficulty). 
Hancock and colleagues (1985) suggest that there are two useful dimensions in considering 
measurements of mental workload. The first refers to the workload‘s practicality-how practical is 
the measure under working conditions. The second dimension concerns spatial and systemic 
congruence-how proximal is the measurement to the site of the mental activity. In their analysis of 
various physiological measures, these authors investigated the research findings associated with the 
following covariates: auditory canal temperature, event related potentials, flicker fusion frequency, 
critical fusion frequency, galvanic skin response, electrocardiogram, heart rate variability, 
electromyography, muscle tension, electroencephalographic activity, eye/eyelid movement, pupillary 
dilation, respiration analysis, and body fluid analysis. Of these measures, event related potentials were 
determined to have the greatest spatial congruence (they were the most proximal to the site of mental 
activity) and were relatively practical while heart rate variability was deemed to be the most practical 
with reasonable spatial congruence. It should be noted that these authors did not attempt to 
independently validate these measures experimentally, nor demonstrate their relative predictive 
nature. 
Brookhuis and de Waard (2001) suggested that there were three major categories of measurement 
information in the field on transportation human factors: task performance, subjective report, and 
physiological data. In their review of measurement tools they found the SWAT (subjective workload 
assessment technique) and the NASA-TLX (task load index) were the most commonly used self- 
report indices of mental workload. Further, they indicated that electrocardiogram was the most 
commonly used physiologic data point (measuring heart rate and heart rate variability). In addition, 
they found that facial muscles as well as brain activity measures (electroencephalography) and blood 
assays of catecholamines have emerged as reliable covariates of mental effort. According to the 
authors, this evidence supports the notion that such measures can serve as indices of mental effort 
during task performance. 
Andre (2001) preferred the measurement of task demands as opposed to stress per se (side stepping 
the complication of the construct all together). He outlined various measures for workload listed 
below (Table 1 is a modified reproduction from Andre, 2001). 
Table 1. Andre’s Measurements of Task Demands. 
Category Dimension Measurement method 
Physical 











































Hilburn and Jorna (2001) explored the subjective and objective workload ’of Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) personnel. In their analyses, they found that the best predictor of workload for ATC was the 
traffic load, specifically, the number of aircraft managed by the controller. Other factors that they 
believed to contribute to ATC workload and the overall airspace complexity of ATC tasks included: 
the number of flight altitude transitions, mean airspeed of the aircraft, the mix of aircraft, direction 
variations, the proximity of aircraft, and finally, the weather. These authors also generated a list of 
workload measures used in ATC research (subjective, behavioral, and psychophysiological). Table 2 
from the authors’ work has been reproduced below. The authors found that most ATC measures have 
relied upon subjective report. 
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Table 2. Hilburn and Jorna’s Air Traffic Control workload measures. 
Subjective 
NASA-TLX (Brookings, Wilson, & Swain, 1996; Hooijer & Hilburn, 1996) 
Air Traffic Workload Input Technique (ATWIT: Leighbody, Beck, & Amato, 1992) 
Subject matter expert / Over-the-shoulder ratings (Schaffer, 1991) 
Instantaneous Self Assessment (ISA) technique (Eurocontrol, 1997; Whittaker, 1995) 
Behavioral 
Number of control actions (Mogford, Murphy, & Guttman, 1993) 
Communications efficiency (Leplat, 1978) 
Communication time, message length (Stein, 1992) 
Flight data management (Cardosi & Murphy, 1995) 
Intersector coordination (Cardosi & Murphy, 1995) 
Psychophysiological 
EEG, EMG, and EOG (Costa, 1993) 
Heart rate measures (Brookings, Wilson, & Swain, 1996; Hooijer & Hilburn, 1996) 
Eye blink rate (Brookings, Wilson, & Swain, 1996; Stein, 1992) r 
Respiration (Brookings & Wilson, 1994) 
Biochemical activity (Costa, 1993; Zeier, 1994) 
Pupil diameter (Hilburn, Jorna, & Parasuraman, 1995) 
Eye scanning randomness (entropy: Hilburn, Jorna, & Parasuraman, 1995) 
Visual fixation frequency (Hilburn, 1996; Stein, 1992) 
Note. Reproduced with permission of the author/publisher 
Hilburn and Jorna (2001) also constructed a framework of system and operator factors contributing 




Experience 0 -I I 
OPERATOR FACTORS 
Figure 3. Reproduced from Hilburn and Jorna (2001, figure 2.9.1, p. 386). 
Note. Reproduced with permission of the authodpublisher 
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Summary of Findings and Limitations to the Literature 
Stress will likely remain an amorphous concept used diversely across popular culture and the 
scientific community. The theoretical mechanisms that underpin assumptions concerning activation, 
arousal, effort, motivation, and the like converge in general terms yet diverge rapidly when discussed 
in detail. Furthermore, statements regarding these processes and systems at the level of 
neuroanatomical structures and biology are currently tentative at best. Given these difficulties and the 
limitations of our science for the measurement and study of these constructs, it would be a mistake to 
suggest that we are now able to measure what we yet struggle to define. 
Various models and frameworks attempting to describe, and in some cases predict, human 
performance under stress continue to be published. The range of these contributions is large and 
incorporates mathematical models, estimations of cognitive architecture and workload (Leiden, 
Laughery, Keller, French, Warwick, & Wood, 2001; Neufeld, 1999) as well as theoretical frameworks 
including social and cognitive moderators, schemas, scripts, and attitudes (Hancock, Ganey, Mouloua, 
Salas, Gilson, Greenwood-Ericksen, Parasuraman, Harris, Leon, & Smith, 2002; Hancock, Ward, 
Szalma, Stafford, and Ganey, 2002; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). However, it is unclear to what extent 
these models are propelling the scientific community further or simply repeating and repackaging 
previous contributions to the literature. 
In summation of the review, a framework has been constructed that attempts to addresk the processes 
and mechanisms associated with cognition under stress. Prior to the presentation of this model, a 
review of the literature on the effects of stressors on human performance is provided. 
Evaluation and Appraisal Systems 
Cognitive Appraisal and the Transactional Model 
Increasingly, transactional models that incorporate cognitive appraisal as a necessary element in 
human performance and information processing are becoming widely accepted. Many studies have 
demonstrated that evaluations of threat and/or controllability are, clearly related to the experience of 
subjective distress. To what degree these evaluations are also directly related to improvements or 
decrements in performance is less clear. In general, appraisal affects performance the way we might 
expect it would-negative evaluation often leads to negative outcome while positive evaluation 
appears to improve task performance (it reduces subjective distress as well as objective performance). 
When this evaluation occurs and at what level of cognition remains under some debate. However, 
much of the research seems to point to an initial early evaluation followed by a more involved 
higher-order cognitive process. The main purpose of this initial evaluation appears to be a 
preparatory one, facilitating the quick orientation and organization of the individual’s response to the 
stimulus. 
. 
The Evaluative Reflex 
Neuroscience and biopsychology have transformed our understanding of brain behavior, and 
stimulated our thinking about the evolutionary functions of neural systems. Crawford and Cacioppo 
(2002) examined the asymmetrical and negative bias that humans have toward the automatic 
processing of information. They assert that, “affective responses organize experience by directing 
attention and processing resources to those aspects of the environment that have important 
implications for the perceiver. Experiences that evoke affective responses are often better 
remembered than neutral, nonaffective experiences.” (p. 449). Such assertions directly relate to the 
way in which we perceive and appraise situations and have a strong part to play in the transaction 
between person and situation. Their argument, grounded in bio-evolutionary psychology, points out, 
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“where positive affect may signal opportunity, negative affect may signal danger. In terms of 
survival, it is more important to escape from danger than to pursue an opportunity, and it is easier to 
recover from a missed opportunity than from a failed escape.” (p. 449). Thus, these authors 
conclude that humans are spring-loaded to evaluate the environment and that this evaluation likely 
takes place subcortically, prior to any conscious awareness of emotion or higher-order cognition 
occurring. 
They are not alone in their beliefs concerning this early evaluative process. Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, 
and Chaiken (2002) assert that individuals engage in a process of initial appraisal that precedes more 
developed cortical evaluation: “. ..evaluative responding can be immediate, unintentional, implicit, 
stimulus based, and linked directly to approach and avoidance motives.” (p. 513). This notion is not 
new. Zajonc (1980) suggested that evaluative processing is independent of cognition. Decades earlier, 
Osgood (1953) stated that such initial evaluation was a preparatory move by the organism in order to 
establish an appropriate behavioral response. The research literature has provided demonstrable 
support, suggesting that stimuli are evaluated automatically (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, Pratto, 1992; 
Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). It is the 
speed at which these evaluations (to both novel and well-learned stimuli) occur that has led most 
researchers to conclude that such responses occur too quickly to result from retrieval processing 
(300-500ms). 
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Schupp, Junghofer, Weike, and Hamm (2003) came to similar conclusions after investigating 
electrocortical activity during the processing of emotional images using ERP (event related potentials) 
and fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging). Their findings suggest that processing of 
emotional images is related to the degree to which individuals are emotionally engaged by the 
stimuli. Those with strong affective cues were processed more, for both pleasant and unpleasant 
images. It was determined that selective attention to the stimulus’ location occurred within 100ms and 
that attention to its features such as color, orientation, and shape occurred between 150 and 200ms. 
Thus it would seem that such discrimination is not the result of voluntary orienting, but instead a 
process of reflexive attention. 
Dijksterhuis and Aarts (2003) explored the idea that human perception evolved to preferentially 
detect negative stimuli over positive stimuli. Their work appears to confirm this notion. Specifically, 
they found that negative words are detected faster than positive words. In addition, they determined 
that negative words are detected more accurately than positive words and categorized accordingly. 
Finally, their results suggest that individuals are better able to detect negative words than positive 
words based on the affective response detected and not based on the superiority of semantic 
processing. Additionally, it was found that negative stimuli demand more attention than positive 
stimuli (presumably taking greater time to process due to the depth at which they are processed), yet 
individuals appear to require, “less stimulus input to detect a negative stimulus than to detect a 
positive stimulus.” (p. 17). 
Higher-order Cognition and Stress 
Assuming that some form of early evaluative reflex does occur, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
this process is followed by a higher-order cognitive evaluation. Lazarus (1966) is credited as one of 
the first to assert the notion that psychological stress occurs in individuals who view situations or 
circumstances as threatening or negative. He and his colleagues further suggested that events 
themselves do not actually create stress until they are appraised as threatening (Lazarus, 1990; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Moreover, Lazarus argued that psychological stress required one to 
perceive one’s ability to cope with the demand as insufficient. Given the interaction between the 
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situation and the person’s perception of that situation, this notion has become integrated into what is 
known as the transactional model. 
Park and Folkman (1997) extended these ideas, addressing the issue of meaning - what makes events 
or experiences meaningful in the context of stress and coping? They suggested that both global and 
situational meaning factors lead to appraisals and various coping strategies. Zakowski, Hall, Cousino- 
Klein, and Baum (2001) found that the coping strategies chosen by individuals tended to match their 
appraisals of stress controllability. Skinner and Brewer (2002) echoed these statements, asserting that 
viewing an event as challenging rather than threatening generally results in improved emotion-coping 
styles, positive feelings, and greater confidence. Janis (1983) examined medical patients prior to 
operations and found that those with moderate amounts of anticipatory anxiety, having appraised 
their pending operations as serious and concerning, had better medical outcomes than those with 
either much lower or much higher pre-operative anxiety. This suggests that what leads individuals 
toward successful psychological coping may not be blind optimism, but instead, a realistic qppraisal 
of the situation. 
There is some evidence that one’s selective attention shapes their appraisal. Zohar and Brandt (2002) 
found that the stressor perceived to be most salient captures the individual’s attention and 
subsequently mediates how the individual appraises the situation. This is discussed further under the 
attention section of this report. I 
Matthews (2001) has developed an extensive model of driving performance, using a transactional 
concept of stress based on Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) work. Matthews asserted that cognition 
plays two important roles in the mediation process between person and situation. The first role 
concerns the appraisal of the situation and second, the choice and regulation of coping strategies. 
Specifically, Matthews suggested three types of coping that are typically used by drivers performing 
under stressful conditions: 1) problem or task-focused coping - attempts to change the external 
reality of the situation, 2) emotion-focused coping - attempts to deal with the stressor through its 
reappraisal, and 3) avoidance coping - attempts to ignore the stressor through distraction. Other 
authors have concurred with this division of coping strategies (kancock & Desmond, 2001; Weaver, 
Bowers, & Salas, 2001). For example, a driver might notice that he or she is ving at higher speeds 
than normal. This recognition may trigger an appraisal of one’s self as careless or reckless which in 
turn would lead to a task-focused coping response of speed reduction. This might also be 
accompanied by an emotion-focused coping response of reappraisal, justifying speeding because of 
being in a hurry or by having the skills necessary to handle the increased speeds. Another possibility 
is an avoidance coping response whereby one might turn up the car radio for distraction from further 
recognition of the speed. This would have the effect of both interrupting thinking and drowning out 
any subvocalization of concern. 
Several investigators have demonstrated a relationship between appraisal and resulting stress or its 
amelioration (separate from performance degradation or enhancement). Abela and Alessadro (2002) 
confirmed the common perception that attitude was directly related to an individuals’ risk of 
developing depressive moods following negative events. Individuals whose attitude was positive, 
compared to those with more negative attitudes, were less likely to experience such negative 
affectivity following negative events. Endler, Speer, Johnson, and Flett (2001) found individuals’ 
ratings of self-efficacy, their perception of their own ability to affect change, was a better predictor of 
felt-anxiety than their perception of control over the stressful situation. Dandoy and Goldstein (1990) 
asserted that intellectualization, a cognitive tool used to emotionally distance oneself from a situation 
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or feeling, was instrumental in positive coping (defined by a reduction in subjective distress ratings) 
both during and after viewing a threatening or disturbing video presentation. 
Raggatt and Morrissey (1997) studied the effects of fatigue and stress on truck drivers. After 
measuring levels of arousal and anxiety during different stages in truck drivers’ routes, they found 
that the expectation of the end of the shift resulted in a release in tension (although no performance 
decrements were noted). Slaven and Windle (1999) examined the effects of thermal stressors 
(extreme cold) on workers and found that the presence of peers raised motivation. They concluded 
that motivation was likely a mediating factor in improving perceptions of the worker’s experience 
and that this resulted in sustained performance. From these and other studies it seems clear that 
effective cognitive coping often masks the conditions of high workload and stress. 
Biological and Neurological Bases 
Several authors have explored the biological bases for the appraisal system, specifically as it relates to 
the human stress response. Biondi and Picardi (1999) have provided the most thorough review of 
research examining the relationship between stress, cognitive appraisal, and neuroendocrine function. 
They found that one’s subjective perception resulted in various psycho-endocrine response patterns, 
specifically, modulations among the pituitary-adrenocortical, adrenomedullary, and the 
sympathoneural systems. In general, the neuroendocrine system is believed to goyern an organism’s 
homeostatic state by regulating hormone secretion from the pituitary. The structure itself is located 
within the hypothalamus and consists of several subsystems, including the three mentioned above. 
These subsystems are believed to play a major role in the organism’s adaptation to trauma and other 
stressful conditions (Selye, 1956) and previous research on humans and animals has shown that 
measures of these subsystems are sensitive to various indices of stress. Current neuroendocrine 
research suggests that during stressful conditions, the hypothalamus releases different types of 
hormones to either inhibit or stimulate the body’s glands in order to perform various functions. The 
hypothalamus and pituitary regulate basic physiological functions such as heart rate, blood pressure, 
body temperature, and circadian sleep rhythms through the glandular release of stress hormones such 
as cortisol, dopamine, and norepinephrine. 
Biondi and Picardi reported that mental arithmetic was perhaps the most commonly examined 
stressor among this literature and that it has been demonstrated repeatedly to induce elevations in 
plasma catecholamine levels such as epinephrine and norepinephrine. More specifically, their review 
of the literature suggested that these elevations resulted primarily from adrenal medulla and 
sympathetic nerve terminal releases. Mental arithmetic stress has frequently been paired sequentially 
with that of public speaking. This combination has been found to result in the addition of an 
adrenocortical activation (typically measured in salivary cortisol levels) as well. Similar results have 
been reported in Stroop color-word conflict examinations and under prolonged laboratory cognitive 
tasks. In fact, various investigations have shown that the more demanding the cognitive task, the 
greater the elevations of epinephrine and cortisol released. However, this pattern has not been 
observed among more pleasant emotional experiences. For example, under conditions of videogame 
playing, significant adrenomedullary activation does not occur, although some increases in 
norepinephrine have been measured. 
Although there has been some concern over the generalizability of laboratory physiology findings to 
real-world experience (Dimsdale, 1984), Biondi and Picardi (1999) concluded that a consistent 
pattern of increased adrenaline, noradrenaline, and cortisol secretions have been found in both 
laboratory and naturalistic settings. In summarizing the findings associated with bereavement, these 
authors reported general agreement with the notion that adrenocortical activity is altered in many 
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cases (Le, increased levels of cortisol release). This appears to be the case particularly in instances 
where levels of anxiety and depression are greatest. Periods of student test and examination have also 
been studied and this literature also points to altered levels of catecholamines as is the case with 
research on the anticipation of surgical interventions. The nature of this change in catecholamine 
levels (whether it increases or decreases) interacts with the age of the subject and the chronicity of the 
stressor. In studies examining the immediate anxiety associated with parachute jumping, researchers 
have found a consistent pattern of an initial increase in cortisol levels as well as ACTH 
(adrenocorticotropic hormone) prior to the jump with an equal or greater release of adrenocortical 
activation following the jump. 
According to Biondi and Picardi (1999) several lines of research have investigated the influence of 
coping strategies on hormone response. There is some data to support the notion that problem- 
focused interventions reduce psychoendocrine activity while avoidant or denial coping strategies 
actually tend to increase this response. The authors point out that these findings are modulated by the 
effectiveness of each strategy, implying that avoidant styles may in fact be less effective at dealing 
with stress than those that attempt to fix the problem directly. They concluded that these patterns 
appeared to suggest that one’s appraisal is a, “main determinant of the psychoendocrine 
response.. .” (p. 139). Ennis, Kelly, Wingo, and Lambert (2001) also examined neuroendocrine 
activity and its relationship to cognitive appraisal. They determined that the sympathetic 
neuroendocrine system (measured in urine) increased differentially in individuals WHO perceived a 
test as threatening compared to those who viewed it as a challenge. 
Leino, Leppaluoto, Ruokonen, and Kuronen (1999a; 1999b) studied psychophysiological stress 
reactions under high workload flying conditions. Their investigations supported an inverted-U 
relationship between neuroendocrine (adrenocorticotropic hormone-ACTH) function and mental 
workload, “A certain level of neuroendocrine activation in response to a psychological workload 
evidently increases a pilot’s ability to perform.. ..However, very high anticipatory levels of ACTH 
have been shown to correlate negatively with psychomotor performance.” (1999a, p. 565). Their 
results indicated that plasma ACTH increased prior to (anticipatory stress reaction) and immediately 
after the IFR (instrument flight rules) flight simulation and these increases correlated significantly 
with performance on psychological tests. Plasma prolactin also increased following the flight, but not 
prior to it. This may suggest that prolactin is better suited as a neuroend0,crine stress measure than 
ACTH (since it did not have an anticipatory stress function). Poor performance on the IFR simulation 
correlated with high plasma adrenaline immediately following the flight. Moreover, these authors also 
found that “subjects who have a higher need to perform well are likely to have higher 
neuroendocrine activation.” (1999b, p. 575). This was also true of subjects who were rated as 
emotionally sensitive. The authors proposed that neuroendocrine activity following high workload 
could be used as a personnel selection tool, predicting stress reactivity and tolerance. 
Bohnen, Nicholson, Sulon, and Jolles (1991) investigated whether salivary cortisol secretion, as an 
index of stress on mental task performance, reflected individual differences in coping styles. Their 
findings suggested that cortisol levels were in fact a useful index of subjective stress and coping 
strategy. Furthermore, these authors determined that using cognitive affirmations and cognitive 
reframing strategies was useful in the reduction of cortisol levels as well as corresponding subjective 
distress ratings. Other physiological dimensions have been studied in their relationship to 
performance and stress as well. Characteristics such as respiration or heart rate, muscle tension, 
perspiration, and skin temperature are quite common in this regard. This is likely due to 1) the fact 
that self-report measures have been criticized for their subjectivity, 2 ) the ease in measuring basic 
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physiological markers, and 3) the historic relationship between stress, performance, and arousal 
theory. 
The relationship between perceived threat and physiological reactivity has been examined using a 
number of real-world stressors. Rachman (1983) found significant physiological changes such as: 
increased heartbeat, labored breathing, and trembling while studying performance under the stress of 
bomb disposal. These symptoms tend to be highly correlated with the subjective experience of 
anxiety and fear. As one might imagine, positive performance expectations correlated with little fear 
and anxiety during such operations. Villoldo and Tarno (1984) replicated these findings. Under 
stress conditions of perceived threat, bomb disposal personnel committed a greater number of errors 
in operational procedures than when under non-stressful conditions. After an examination of novice 
and expert parachutists, MacDonald and Labuc (1982) found similar Performance effects. 
Decrements among all phases of training and across multiple domains (logical reasoning; tracking 
and visual search tasks, decoding map references, etc.) were found as a result of perceived threat. 
Burke (1980) noted related decrements among Army jumpmaster trainees that perceived their 
parachute jumps as threatening as compared to those who did not. Rohrmann, Hennig, and Netter 
(1999) noted that subjects experiencing the stress of public speaking became more physiologically 
aroused when their stress was increased (being told that their heart rate was very high) as well as when 
they were reassured (told that their heart rate was relaxed). It was concluded that feedback of any 
kind tends to raise arousal levels because it requires cognitive processing that may interfere with 
internal coping strategies. It was also suggested that subjects may become frustrated when they are 
told they are relaxed when in fact they feel they are not. 
In a classic study during W.W.II., Reid (1948) examined calculation and plotting errors in measuring 
wind vectors by navigators on operational sorties. He determined that error rates increased 
significantly when bombers crossed into enemy territory, and continued to increase as they 
approached their primary targets. These same error types decreased again on their return journey. 
Larsson (1989) investigated performance on an Army field artillery simulator, finding those that 
appraised the task to be challenging rather than threatening Performed better. It seems likely that 
cognitive appraisal and subsequent felt-anxiety were the essential contributing factors among these 
investigations . 
Predictability and Controllability 
Integrally related to the previous discussion of cognitive appraisal and its effect on human 
performance under stress is the predictability or controllability of the stressor. In many ways, this 
dimension is nothing more than a special case of cognitive appraisal. In general, as would be 
expected, the more a situation or stressor is perceived as within one's control, the less stress provoking 
it appears to be. Similarly, the more predictable a negative event or set of circumstances is, the less 
distress it causes. While this has not been universally accepted (Averill & Rosenn, 1972; Staub, 
Tursky, & Swartz, 1971), in general, both control and predictability appear to be related to subjective 
distress and in many cases, overall performance as well. 
Driskell, Mullen, Johnson, Hughes, and Batchelor (1992) described the nature and theory of 
controllability and defined it as the belief that one has at one's disposal a response that can influence 
the aversiveness of an event. These authors distinguished between behavioral control -the belief that 
a response can influence the aversiveness of the event, and cognitive control-the belief that a 
thought response can lessen the aversiveness of the event. Both are critical to an understanding of 
how appraisal works and each is tied to the two central coping strategies discussed previously, namely 
problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping (Thompson, 198 1). 
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The psychological stress associated with the threat of electric shock can be reduced when an 
individual perceives control over that shock (Le., through behavioral decision making or 
performance; Bowers, 1968). Similarly, individuals report experiencing less anticipatory anxiety 
(Champion, 1950; Houston, 1972) and a corresponding decrease in physiological arousal (Geer, 
Davidson, & Gatchel, 1970; Szpiler & Epstein, 1976) pending this shock when it is believed to be 
controlled. 
Threats due to crowding have been found to diminish when crowding was perceived as controllable 
by the individual (Baum & Paulus, 1987; Epstein, 1982). Similarly, the psychological stress and 
frustration associated with heat is reduced by the perception of controllability (Belle & Greene, 1982) 
as is the stress of perceived environmental toxins (Evans & Jacobs, 1982). Friedland, Keinan, and 
Regev (1992) asserted that stress results in an internal focus to endogenous cognitive processes (Le., 
anxiety-related thoughts). They found that the perception of control over such stressors helped to 
regulate their subject’s emotional responses. 
The ability to exert control is clearly related to the ability to predict, and one could argue that 
predictability is a prerequisite of controllability. That is to say, if one can control an event’s 
occurrence, they certainly can also predict it (the inverse is not necessarily the case). Several authors 
have found evidence that threatening stimuli that are predictable in some way (i.e., a ‘warning signal) 
are less aversive than similar stressors that are unpredictable or unsignaled (Monat, Averill, & Lazarus, 
1972; Weinberg & Levine, 1980). This has been demonstrated for the threat of electric shock (Badia 
& Culbertson, 1970; D’Amato & Gumenik, 1970) and sudden bursts of noise (Burger & Arkin, 
1980). 
In addition to a reduction in distress, performance outcomes have also been directly connected to 
perceived predictability and controllability. For example, Cohen (1978) suggested that the ability to 
predict stressors resulted in lower scanning behavior which in turn reduced task saturation and 
improved performance. Burger and Arkin (1980) found that uncontrollable bursts of noise increased 
errors on a free recall task, while Cohen and Weinstein (1981) studied random intermittent noise, 
finding similar decrements in performance. Salovey (1992) found that unexpected stressors in 
general tended to result in an attentional shift from external to internal pr;ocesses. Thus, individuals 
exposed to unpredicted stress shifted their focus from what was happening to them to how they 
emotionally felt about the experience. Table 1 outlines various studies that have demonstrated the 
effect of cognitive appraisal systems on a range of performance outcomes. 
Cognitive Appraisal and Attentional Bias 
A large body of literature has evolved concluding that high-trait and high-state anxious individuals 
demonstrate an attentional bias toward threatening stimuli. This assertion rests on three theories: Beck 
(1976), who suggested that anxiety vulnerability relates to strong activation of schemas that are 
geared toward the processing of threat-related information: Bower’s (198 l), network theory 
proposed that a given emotional state leads to an activation of memory representations that are mood- 
congruent which in turn results in the selective processing of this information: MacLeod and 
Matthews (1988), suggested that such selective processing for threat-based cues occurs in high-trait 
anxious individuals under certain circumstances (possibly an interaction effect between trait and state 
anxiety). 
Regardless of the theoretical underpinnings, the notion that anxious individuals show a bias toward 
emotionally threatening stimuli has been demonstrated repeatedly (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; 
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Calvo & Castillo, 2001; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1988). In some instances this work has attempted to differentiate state from trait anxiety. Several 
investigations have supported the notion that individuals high on state anxiety measures tend to show 
such preferential processing (slower response rates to Stroop tasks; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). 
Such findings suggest greater time is being taken to process threat-related information. Several 
researchers have concluded that these interference effects occur in subjects who are high in trait 
anxiety as well (Mogg, Matthews, & Weinman, 1989; Mogg, Matthews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 
1990; Pury & Mineka, 2001) while other investigations have found effects across both anxiety 
conditions (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Skosnik, Chatterton, Swisher, & Park, 2000). Egloff and 
Hock (2003) explored individuals’ attention allocation toward threat-related stimuli through a 
comparison of the Stroop task and the attentional probe task. High-anxious individuals (as measured 
by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-STAI) showed an attentional bias toward threat words in each 
task (more time was spent attending to these words) while low-anxious individuals withdrew 
attentional resources in both tasks (less time was spent attending to these words). While overwhelming 
evidence supports the notion that anxious individuals show an attentional bias toward mood- 
congruent words or concepts, Fox (1993) found that under some circumstances state-anxious 
individuals actually shift their attention away from threat stimuli. While this is counter to previous 
findings, Fox believed this was an attempt to use a repressive coping strategy. 
Hertel, Mathews, Peterson, and Kinter (2003) found that when non-anxious adult; practiced a threat- 
related interpretation task (a semantic-judgment word task), threat-related interpretations transferred 
to an otherwise ambiguous word task that followed. Thus a threat-related interpretation of ambiguous 
words was induced in previously non-anxious subjects. The authors assert, “ . . .across unrelated 
situations in the real-world, novel ambiguous cues invite interpretations congruent with previous 
understandings and consequently cause at least momentary increases in anxiety.” (p. 783). Thus, 
individuals may demonstrate a tendency to both selectively encode threatening information but also 
apply a threat-based appraisal onto ambiguous stimuli as well. 
Several researchers have explored the relationship between anxiety and cognition, asserting that 
anxiety-related appraisals significantly effect information processing. MacLeod (1996) stated, 
“. . .recent models of anxiety-linked performance deficits have placed increasing emphasis upon the 
possibility that the critical restriction in information processing capacity occurs centrally within the 
cognitive system, rather than resulting from a peripheral narrowing of attention.” (p. 48). His 
suggestion is that anxiety creates deficits in cognitive performance by allocating mental resources 
toward task-irrelevant information that relates to the perceived threat, thus diverting these resources 
from the task at hand. Wofford and others (Wofford, 2001; Wofford & Goodwin, 2002; Wofford, 
Goodwin, & Daly, 1999) have consistently found that low-trait anxiety individuals were less prone to 
negative performance impact under stress as compared to high-trait anxious individuals (performance 
was measured across a variety of cognitive domains). However, such outcomes may be contingent 
upon various mediating factors. Stokes (1995) found that highly trait-anxious pilots showed 
decrements in performance only when they also were novices; expert pilots were not affected on an 
aeronautical decision making task by stress even when they scored as high-trait anxious. 
Summary of Findings and Limitations to the Literature 
Stress is a concept that we as a scientific community continue to struggle to define. With broad 
variations in descriptions the research literature in this area is often confusing and contradictory. For 
the better part of the last century research has relied on various theories to help explain the 
relationship between stress and performance. These include arousal, activation, energetical, and 
resource models. Each has struggled with its own limitations and the result has been a research 
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community that is factional and disconnected. The lack of agreement between researchers has 
presented additional difficulties in unifying the literature. Furthermore, without an overarching 
theory to draw these elements together, there can be neither hope for a unitary explanation of 
mechanisms nor a sense of cohesion among concepts. This review reflects these disconnects within 
the research community while attempting to coordinate the extant body of diverse material. For the 
sake of simplicity and coherence, I have selected a definition proposed by McGrath (1976) that 
seems to be broad enough to incorporate most of the current assumptions about what stress is and is 
not, yet focused enough to be meaningful. McGrath conceptualized stress as the interaction between 
three elements: perceived demand, perceived ability to cope, and the perception of the importance of 
being able to cope with the demand. Unlike many previous definitions of stress, this formulation 
distinctly incorporates the transactional process believed to be central to current cognitive appraisal 
theories. 
Transactional models that incorporate cognitive appraisal as a necessary element in human 
performance and information processing are the norm, and no longer the exception, in 
understanding the human stress response. Evaluations of threat, controllability, and predictability are 
central to cognitive appraisal and one’s experience of subjective distress. In general, appraisal affects 
performance the way we might expect it would-negative evaluation often leads to negative outcome 
while positive evaluation appears to improve task performance (it reduces subjective distress as well as 
objective performance). How this process occurs, remains somewhat vague; however,’there is gaining 
consensus that implicates an initial early evaluative function followed by a more involved higher- 
order cognitive process. The main purpose of this initial evaluation appears to be a preparatory one, 
facilitating the quick orientation and organization of the individual’s response to the stimulus. 
There continues to be debate within the research community regarding direct and indirect stress 
effects. Direct effects being those incurred by the task load alone irrespective of any psychological 
stress that may also be generated while indirect stress effects are those that evolve out of 
psychological factors associated with the task load demands. Clearly there is a fine line that separates 
these two, and they can be indistinguishable at times. Researchers have been inconsistent in their 
treatment of this issue, equating them in some instances and differentiating them in others. Although 
it can be argued that each stressor involves direct effects, each can also carry indirect effects as well. 
For example, time pressure limits the time available to perform a given task. This limit is a physical 
boundary that does not require any psychological explanation in understanding its direct effects on 
performance. However, this limitation often evokes a corresponding psychological reaction such as 
anxiety that has secondary or indirect effects on performance. Given the difficulty in separating these 
two dimensions and the rarity in which this has been done in the primary literature, I have simply 
tried to make the reader aware of the issue and have not attempted to separate them in this review. 
Research has also explored the relationship between biological and neuro-anatomical elements and 
cognitive appraisal. This research has found that one’s subjective perception results in various 
psycho-endocrine response patterns, specifically, modulations among the pituitary-adrenocortical, 
adrenomedullary, and the sympathoneural systems. 
Finally, the notion that anxious individuals show a bias toward emotionally threatening stimuli has 
been demonstrated repeatedly. Attentional biases toward such stimuli have been found in state and 
trait anxious subjects. Moreover, there is a robust clinical literature supporting the suggestion that 
anxious individuals (state, trait, or disordered) may experience a greater difficulty avoiding encoding 
threatening stimuli than non-anxious individuals. This literature is largely based on the work of Beck 
(196; Beck, 1987) and those among the dominant theoretical schools of cognitive-behavioral 
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psychotherapy. However, due to the limited scope of this review -primarily focusing on non-clinical 
populations and addressing acute stressors-a review of this literature is not provided here. 
Several caveats to the preceding review should be considered. The overwhelming majority of research 
studies mentioned above consisted of laboratory paradigms. In some cases, particularly among the 
cognitive appraisal literature, there are real-world findings consistent with those established 
experimentally and posited theoretically. However, such studies are rare among research examining 
the effect of predictability and controllability on performance and even more so on research 
investigating attentional bias. These issues are discussed further in a later section of this report. 















































The Effect of Stress on Attention 
In previous sections, attention and its role in resource allocation as well as its selectivity have already 
been partially described. In the following discussion, I will review various findings regarding the 
effects of stress and workload on attention. 
In general, under stress, attention appears to channel or tunnel, reducing focus on peripheral 
information and tasks and centralizing focus on main tasks. What determines a main task from a 
peripheral task appears to depend on whichever stimulus is perceived to be of greatest importance to 
the individual or that which is perceived as most salient. Threat-relevance is believed to be strongly 
associated with salience. Therefore, when environmental cues are threat-related, such stimuli are often 
considered to be most salient by the individual. As one can imagine, this tunneling of attention can 
result in either enhanced performance or reduced performance, depending on the nature of the task 
and the situation. For instance, when peripheral cues are irrelevant to task completion the ability to 
tune them out is likely to improve performance. On the other hand, when these peripheral cues are 
related to the task and their incorporation would otherwise facilitate success on the task, performance 
suffers when they are unattended. 
Pre-Attentive Processing and the Orienting Reflex 
Attentional processing is preceded by an initial orientation to the stimuli. This initial orienting 
response occurs immediately and without volition. Rohrbaugh (1984) described the orienting reflex 
as involuntary, immediate, and nonspecific. He suggested that this response was typically elicited 
from stimuli that are novel or intrinsically salient. Rohrbaugh mentions that William James (1890) 
provided a very similar observation over 100 years ago. In fact, there is a long and distinguished 
history of research concerning the orienting reflex in the field of psychology. The earliest 
experimental work was conducted by Pavlov (1927), and this work was expanded significantly by 
many others (Kimmel, Van Olst, & Orlebeke, 1979; Lynn, 1966; Sokolov, 1963; Van Olst, 1971). 
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’ According to Sokolov’s model, once a given stimulus is detected, it enters into a pattern recognition 
system through which it is compared to a pre-existing “library of internal representations (neuronal 
models) of previous stimulations.” (p. 324). Rohrbaugh viewed the significance and general purpose 
of the orienting reflex as preparatory to future stimulus perception. It seems likely that this process is 
related to the evaluative reflex that has been argued to occur prior to higher-order cognitive appraisal 
(Duckworth et al., 2002) and may in fact be a preparatory step that primes the organism for further 
evaluation and, eventually, responsive action. 
In their examination of the relationship between emotion and attentional processing, Ohman, Flykt, 
and Esteves (2001) differentiated between active and passive attention. The former refers to a top- 
down processing while the latter suggests a bottom-up, stimulus-driven process. Top-down processing 
implies a volitional search and organism-directed attentional processing while bottom-up processing 
involves cues in the environment that draw-in attention. In their review of this literature, these authors 
discuss the distinction between preattentive (automatic, parallel processed) and postattentive attention, 
that which is deliberate and serially processed. They noted that several authors have previously 
reported a “pop-out” effect in preattentive detection of threat stimuli (Ohman, 1993; Treisman, 
1988). Complimenting the work of Duckworth and colleagues (2002) and others, Ohman, 
Lundquist, and Esteves (2001) found attentive detection biases toward angry faces over happy, sad, 
and affectively neutral faces. These authors suggest a psychophysiological preference that may be 
linked to the evolutionary significance of a stimulus. 
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Working from a bio-evolutionary model, Ohman and colleagues (2001) explored the role of 
automatic processing of fear-relevant stimuli among visual displays that varied in complexity. These 
authors used two fear-relevant and two fear-irrelevant stimuli. In the first category, images of snakes 
and spiders were employed while the second category relied on flowers and mushrooms. Subjects 
were asked to detect discrepancies between matrices of pictures that either contained all the same 
stimuli (all mushrooms) or the same with a discrepant target (a snake among the mushrooms). The 
researchers hypothesized that subjects would be quicker to detect discrepant images when they were 
fear-relevant as compared to fear-irrelevant. Such findings would support the notion that fear or 
threat-relevance may enhance the saliency of an object, resulting in attentional control and 
processing. The results of their first experiment showed that subjects were faster in their detection of 
fear-relevant stimuli. Furthermore, subjects were fastest when these targets were located toward the 
middle of their visual fields. Upon closer examination, it became clear that this effect was greatest 
when fear-relevant stimuli were present. However, under fear-irrelevant stimulus conditions, subjects 
tended to implement a systematic search pattern, unlike the central-features scan relied on under fear- 
relevant conditions. In order to further test the “pop-out” effect found in their initial experiment, 
Ohman and colleagues (2001) conducted a second experiment increasing the size of the pictoral 
matrix (presumably increasing its visual complexity). The results of the second experiment were 
similar to those reported earlier. Reaction times did increase as complexity of the visual display 
increased. Subjects were found to detect fear-relevant stimuli faster but also removed their attention 
from these stimuli more quickly in their detection tasks. Ohman and colleagues suggksted that this 
finding may reflect an attentional control mechanism that is aligned with an evolutionary response to 
the presence of threat. 
The authors acknowledged that the saliency of the stimuli may have resulted in the subject’s 
preferential attention and not the object’s fear-relevance per se. In one further exploration, these 
authors examined the role of fear perceptions on attentional processing. After distinguishing between 
fearful and nonfearful subjects through self-report, subjects were once again exposed to the 
experimental conditions as prescribed by the first two experiments. The results of the third 
investigation confirmed the previous two and found that subjects who reported being fearful of 
snakes andor spiders were faster than those who were nonfearful in detecting these target stimuli. 
Detection latencies were briefer for both groups when responding to fear-relevant images. These 
findings are certainly consistent with the previous literature concerning the attentional bias 
demonstrated by anxiety (Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1988). The authors concluded that threat-based stimuli tend to be detected under preattentive 
processes that are automatic and processed in parallel. Stimuli that are not threat-based may be 
subject to more systematic postattentive processing strategies. Furthermore, Ohman et al. suggested 
that emotion, ‘ I . .  .involves ‘attention control settings’ that make goal-relevant stimuli salient for the 
person.” (p. 475). This observation further implicates goal structure and motivational influences in 
attentional resource management. This issue is discussed in greater detail later in this review. 
Ohman et al.’s (2001) conclusions have not been universally accepted. Recent work by Ellenbogen, 
Schwartzman, Stewart, and Walker (2002) explored the relationship between stress and selective 
attention as it relates to mood and emotional information processing. They found that individuals 
under stress (a competitive computer task requiring spatial cueing and word recognition) did not 
selectively attend to negative stimuli when exposed to them, but instead rapidly disengaged attention 
from these negatively valenced words (and not from positive or neutral words). This was not the case 
for individuals scoring high on a self-report measure of dysphoric mood. The authors postulated that 
their finding may result from an adaptive strategy to regulate emotional arousal, particularly negative 
affectivity. Given the response time for this attentive withdrawal (est. 35Oms) it may reflect a relatively 
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automatic attention bias toward more positive stimuli for individuals who are not experiencing any 
negative affective state (see previous discussion of Fox, 1993). 
The Tunnel Hypothesis 
The greatest effect found in the research literature concerning attentive processes under stress occurs 
after these initial stages of orienting and evaluating. The majority of the field has converged on the 
notion that stress and workload reduce cue utilization, shrink the perceptive field, or reduce an 
individual’s environmental scan. Much of this perspective has reverberated from Easterbrook’s 
(1959) article that demonstrated the relationship between motivation, drive, arousal, and cue 
utilization, ultimately concluding that there was a restriction in the range of cues attended to under 
stress conditions. This tunneling hypothesis has been echoed by numerous investigators (Baron, 
1986; Broadbent, 1958, 1971; Bundesen, 1990; Bursill, 1958; Cohen, 1980; Combs & Taylor, 1952; 
Cowan, 1999; Davis, 1948; Driskell, Salas, & Johnston, 1999; Hockey, 1970; Hockey, 1978; Hockey 
& Hamilton, 1970; James, 1890; Murata, 2004; Pamperin & Wickens, 1987; Salas, Driskell, & 
Hughes, 1996; Stokes, Wickens, & Kite, 1990; Vroom, 1964; Wickens, 1984; Williams, Tonymon, & 
Anderson, 1990; Zhang, 1989). 
Years prior to Easterbrook’s seminal work, Kohn (1954) addressed the effects of stress on aspects of 
perception and performance. Specifically, he postulated that intense emotion disorganizes perceptual 
relationships, “Under conditions of stress.. .the perceptual field is constricted or narrowed, and the 
scope or span of behavior tends to be restricted to those elements which contribute most to the 
direction of behavior, or to those elements which appear to be the most threatening.” (p. 290). Kohn 
(1954) conducted two experiments using threat of electric shock on social-perception comprehension 
(comic strip analysis) and story comprehension and recall. The results of this study found that recall 
and analysis of details were worse under emotional conditions than under those of low or no threat. 
In addition, he found that recall tended to be selective for main features over peripheral details. This 
outcome seems likely to be related to previous selective attention rather than necessarily a direct 
effect on memory, although this was not examined by the author. 
Kohn (1954) observed that subjects appeared to realize that the threat of shock disrupted their 
concentration on tasks. The author also commented on the cyclical nature of evaluation or appraisal 
and its affective response, “A vicious circle may be effected such that the perception of a poor 
performance results in an emotional experience, which acts to further decrease the efficiency of 
performance. Perception of this performance decrement then again increases emotional 
intensity.. .Emotion, then, is the conscious correlate of the person’s perception of the stresses and the 
strains of the environment, and his perception of his reactions.” (p. 301). 
Callaway and his colleagues (Callaway & Dembo, 1958; Callaway & Thompson, 1953) also studied 
the effect of stress on attention and found a narrowing of attentional processing under emotional 
states such as anxiety. Callaway and Dembo (1958) tested the visual judgment of sizes of objects by 
subjects exposed to one of two different conditions. One group was asked to inhale amyl nitrite. This 
substance, now known as the street drug “rush,” produces a “high” that lasts from a few seconds to 
several minutes. The immediate effects include decreased blood pressure, followed by an increased 
heart rate, flushed face and neck, dizziness, and headache. The purpose of this exposure was to 
examine the effects of various physiological changes in visual perception. The second group of 
subjects was instructed to put their foot into a bucket of ice water simulating stressful conditions 
related to thermal discomfort. 
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The authors found that subjects of both groups tended to judge the objects as larger than controls. 
Due to the fact that size judgments typically require the incorporation of peripheral cues such as 
elements in the foreground (shadow, texture, relative position of other objects, etc.) the authors 
concluded that subjects had not attended to these cues, focusing instead on the central object. These 
judgments did not appear to be related to ophthalmic changes, and Callaway and Dembo (1958) 
surmised that some physiological mechanism seemed to increase the selectivity of an individual’s 
attention. These effects were then replicated using epinephrine and methamphetamine injections 
(Callaway, 1959). Interestingly, in yet another examination of the pharmacological effect on 
attentional processes, Callaway (1959) found that amorbarbital tended to widen attention. 
Amorbarbital is classified as a sedative-hypnotic drug and typically causes a slowing down, or 
depression, of the central nervous system. At low doses, these drugs produce a feeling of calm, 
drowsiness, and well-being. The author asserted that the physiological mechanism at work may lie 
within the reticular activating system and relate to organism alertness. In total, he and his colleagues 
found narrowed attention effects in size matching, muscle response, skin response, and various 
guessing behaviors as a result of their manipulation of stress conditions. 
Baddeley (1972) supported the notion of attentional tunneling through numerous experiments 
primarily in real-world operational studies (Le., underwater diving). He concluded, “danger affects 
performance.. .through its influence on an individual’s breadth of attention.” Furthermore, he 
conjectured that an “increase [in] level of arousal.. .will focus an individual’s attentioh.. .on those 
aspects of the situation he considers most important.” (p. 545). Interestingly, Baddeley found that 
experience mediated this effect. He asserted that it was due to an inhibition of anxiety in the 
dangerous situation, which thereby reduced the impairment on performance. These findings are 
discussed further in a later section concerning the effects of stress on perceptual-motor tasks. 
Bacon (1974) induced arousal in subjects by the threat of electric shock and then judged their 
performance on a pursuit-rotor tracking task. His results tended to support Easterbrook’s hypothesis. 
Bacon indicated that the restricted range attended to by subjects may or may not reflect an 
enhancement toward central cue perception, but that it did appear to reduce the processing of 
peripheral cues. Bacon went on to assert that this restriction in attention likely leads to a disruption in 
memory as well. Not all authors agree with this later assertion. Eysenck and his colleague (Eysenck, 
1979; 1985; Eysenk & Calvo, 1992) have suggested instead, that anxiety caused by a stressor results 
in task-irrelevant cognitions leading to resource allocation that is diverted from working memory 
processes. A similar argument has been posited by Friedland, Keinan, and Regev (1992). In addition 
to the effects on memory, they have asserted that stress also narrows attention, turning one’s focus to 
internal distress and endogenous cognitive processes. They found that the perception of control over 
such stressors helped to regulate their subject’s affective responses. MacLeod (1996) has also argued 
the merits of a direct effect on information processing capability versus an indirect effect via 
attention. 
Several authors have explored the effect of noise on attention and found results consistent with the 
attention tunneling hypothesis (Broadbent, 1978; Houston, 1969). Broadbent provided an extensive 
literature review concerning the effects of noise on attentional processing (mostly signal detection 
and sustained attention tasks in laboratory paradigms). Broadbent identified three deficits resulting 
from noise exposure: 1) reduction in signal detection, 2) increase in inefficient performance leading 
to increases in error rates, and 3) selective attention (focusing on some aspects of an object while 
neglecting others). Dim, Hancock, and Sims (2002) reported a speedaccuracy trade-off, reducing the 
effectiveness of visual search under noise conditions. Houston (1969) found an increase in noise 
resulted in centralized focus that improved performance on the Stroop color-word task while limiting 
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attention to peripheral cues. The Stroop task or one of its variations is perhaps the most widely used 
test for the assessment of attentional interference (MacLeod, 1991). Although there are a number of 
derivations of the Stroop, traditionally this paradigm incorporates a list of color words (i.e., red, blue, 
green) that are printed in colored ink. The subjects are asked to name the print color, ignoring the 
word itself (i.e., the word red might appear in blue ink). There are cases in which the word names its 
color and others in which it does not. The Stroop effect occurs when there is a difference in 
performance on congruent versus incongruent elements; specifically, when the word interferes with 
the naming of its color. On the other hand, the reverse Stroop effect occurs when the color of the 
word interferes with the naming of the word. 
However, not all researchers have reported such robust and directional findings. Lavine, Sibert, 
Gokturk, and Dickens (2002) found that performance on a sustained-attention task requiring signal 
detection and visual scanning decreased as a function of time on task. Conditions of 50 dB of white 
noise appeared to contribute to ratings of fatigue and decrements in visual scan (less dwell time and 
fewer on-target fixations) and an overall performance on the task; however, when subjects were 
exposed to unpredictable bursts of 90 dB of noise, performance improved. The authors suggested 
that this may have been due to increased alertness and attention following the noise bursts. Coates and 
Alluisi (1975), after exposing subjects to the stress of noise, failed to find any decrement in vigilance 
performance. Furthermore, Kirk and Hecht (1963) also found that variable noise facilitated vigilance 
performance. Murata (2004) examined the effects of workload (measured by foveal task complexity) 
on the human visual field. Using an addition task with varying degrees of difficulty, he tested the 
findings of previous investigations (Bursill, 1958; Mackworth, 1965) that suggested increased 
workload would result in a reduction of the functional visual field (the information processed around 
a fixation point that is later used in recollective processes). Murata’s investigations revealed mixed 
results (both in support of previous findings and in conflict with these findings). 
Hancock and Weaver (2002) and others (Hancock, Szalma, & Weaver, 2002) have argued that 
phenomenologically people report experiencing a time distortion under stress. The conclusions of 
these authors suggest that stress does cause a reduction in environmental sampling and that this results 
in distortions in the perception of space and time. These findings are consistent with those asserted by 
Callaway and Dembo (1958) reported earlier. 
Several groups have studied the effects of time pressure on attentional processes. Entin and Serfaty 
(1990) examined the decision-making of military personnel under the stress of time pressure in a 
combat simulation study. Their results suggested a reduction in the frequency and/or amount of 
information sought by decision makers as well as a reduction in the accurate detection of friend or 
foe submarines under high-stress conditions. Ozel (2001) examined how people process 
environmental information for exiting (fire fighting scenarios) under time pressure and the stress and 
threat of fire. Based on the existing research literature, Ozel theorized that when slightly stressed, 
one’s ability to determine the best time to exit was likely to be enhanced while under high levels of 
stress there would probably be a restriction in the range of cues attended to and a distortion of 
information processing. He asserted that the result was likely to be a decrement in performance. 
In addition to the general finding that various stressors appear to result in a tunneling of attentional 
processes, several studies support the idea that attentional tunneling can be reproduced and reversed 
pharmacologically. Caldwell and his colleagues (2001; Caldwell & Caldwell, 1997; Caldwell & 
Gilreath, 2002) have examined this line of research extensively. Caldwell and Gilreath (2002) 
surveyed U.S. Army aviation personnel and clearly demonstrated the widespread prevalence of 
fatigue factors and related stressors in the military aviation community. While Caldwell (1997) 
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addressed these factors and detailed the numerous countermeasures currently available to those in 
aviation, Caldwell and Caldwell (1997) focused their investigation on the use of various 
pharmacological agents in stimulating the very cognitive functions compromised by fatigue and 
associated stressors. For instance, performance on several flight measures was enhanced after the 
introduction of dextroamphetamine (Dexedrine R): airspeed, heading, roll, and turning control. 
Furthermore, self ratings of mood and physiologic measures of alertness and attention 
(predominantly arousal measured by EEG) also improved with pharmacological intervention. Similar 
findings have been obtained by the use of modafinil (Provigil R). This is certainly not a new assertion 
and many researchers have reported such findings in military aviation. For example, 
dextroamphetamine has been used in sustained and continuous flying operations in the military with 
significant success in the past (Cornum, 1992; Emonson & Vanderbeek, 1995; Senechal, 1988). 
Table 4 outlines research studies supporting the attention tunneling hypothesis and lists the 
conditions of study . 
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memory 
Houston (1969) Noise S troop Laboratory 
Houston & Jones Noise 
( 1967) 
Lavine, Sibert, Gokturk, Noise 
& Dickens (2002) 
S troop Laboratory 
Vigilance task Laboratory 
Ozel (2001) Fire & Time pressure Decision to leave a fire Real-world 
Recarte & Nunes Mental workload Driving task & visual Simulation 
(2000; 2003) search discrimination 
Zhang (1989) Workload & Noise Visual displays Laboratory 
Vigilance and Sustained Attention I 
William Shakespeare’s play, The Tempest, Act 3, Scene 3, includes the line “For now they are 
oppress’d with travel, they will not, nor cannot, use such vigilance as when they are fresh.” (quoted in 
Mackworth, 1948). Perhaps the most common form of attentional processes examined in stress 
research is that of vigilance or sustained-attention. Mackworth (1948) explored vigilance 
performance employing several experiments that required prolonged visual search. In doing so, he 
attempted to resolve an age-old controversy over the effect of stress and sustained attention tasks. 
Various authors had waged debate whether the stress of sustained-attention affects the efficiency and 
performance of vigilance or just one’s mood and feeling states. He noted that this debate was argued 
vociferously during the first half of the twentieth century. Mackworth proposed that the stress 
associated with vigilance tasks was the result of, “undue prolongation of the task itself.” (p. 6). 
Moreover, he felt that vigilance was a useful concept in describing the psychological readiness of the 
organism. In his own investigation, Macworth used a clock test, requiring subjects to sustain their 
attention to a rotating arm of the clock. He examined Royal Air Force cadets for different lengths of 
time under two conditions (interruption of the task via a telephone call and no interruption). 
Decrements in vigilance were found when the clock test was prolonged beyond thirty minutes, when 
subjects had recently responded to a signal (movement in the rotating arm of the clock) and were not 
expecting another, and when they expected an auditory stimulus while doing the visual task. 
Performance improved when a short rest of thirty minutes was provided, when they were interrupted 
by a telephone call, when they were provided immediate feedback on their performance, and after 
taking 1Omg of amphetamine sulphate prior to the task. Mackworth concluded that the efficiency in 
performance of the task was degraded not simply by the boredom of the task but instead, by the 
extinction of the subject’s conditioned response (due to the diminished reinforcement provided by a 
loss of expectation). In other words, as the subjects in this study were no longer reinforced with the 
knowledge of their performance results (hearing “Yes” or “No” from the experimentor), they 
became less diligent in pressing the response key (when they heard the long signal tone). Temple, 
Warm, Dember, Jones, LaGrange, and Matthews (2000) also found significant decrements in 
performance after only thirty minutes of sustained attention and revealed that this period of vigilance 
was sufficient to increase subjects’ perception of workload and stress. 
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Sustained attentional processes were examined by Scerbo (2001) as well. He suggested that vigilance 
performance under stress can result in both drops in accuracy and increases in response time. He 
found that subjects experienced greater stress after performing a vigilance task, finding the task itself 
stressful, as compared to an alternative kaleidoscope task. He noted that these subjects also 
experienced greater boredom when they could not terminate the task voluntarily. As a result, he 
postulated that subjects who can terminate a task at will, won’t experience stress because they can quit 
prior to incurring any negative feelings. This assertion is in line with research that identifies 
controllability and cognitive appraisal at the heart of subjective distress. Further, the author found that 
subjects who were provided verbal instructions that emphasized the vigilance task (telling them to 
“pay attention”), rated their workload as higher and more stressful, than those who performed the 
same task without this emphasis. Thus, the stress associated with vigilance tasks may be related to the 
task demands themselves but also to the cognitive appraisal of boredom associated with these 
demands. Scerbo (2001) summarized, “...allowing individuals the freedom to terminate a task at will 
appears to be the only way to keep boredom in check. Increasing stimulus variety can prolong the 
time and individual is willing to work at the task, but it does not prevent boredom; it merely delays its 
onset.” (p. 275). 
The most commonly examined stressors applied to tasks of vigilance are, fatigue and sleep 
deprivation. Baranski, Gil, McLellan, Moroz, Buguet, and Radomski (2002) exposed subjects to 40 
hours of sleep deprivation in an attempt to estimate the impact of fatigue on a host of‘ cognitive 
performance factors. They found decrements equally distributed across all of the domains tested (i.e., 
serial response times, logical reasoning, visual comparison, math, vigilance, and multitasking). Similar 
results have been observed by others as well (Samel, Wegmann, Vejvoda, Drescher, Gundel, Manzey, 
& Wensel, 1997; Wilkinson, 1964; Williams, Lubin, & Goodnow, 1959). Several investigations have 
reported the effect of circadian rhythm desyncrony on performance. Blake (1967) found significant 
decrements in vigilance occurred under these conditions as did Colquhoun (1971). Whether or not 
these effects are due to stress per se (versus a more direct influence) can be debated. Fatigue’s direct 
physiological effects are difficult to separate from its psychological effects. Research has shown that 
the direct effects of various stressors (to include fatigue) can be modulated by individual differences 
and psychological processes (i.e., motivation, effort, etc.). In almost all of the investigations included 
in this review, the researchers fail to discuss this matter, let alone attempt to distinguish between the 
two, within their experimental designs. 
In their review of the literature on stress and performance, Davies and Tune (1970) indicated that 
vigilance tended to be enhanced by moderate levels of arousal; however, sustained attention appeared 
to decrease with fatigue and loss of sleep. These authors reported that noise research showed mixed 
results, with noise enhancing complex tasks but worsening simple tasks. Kjellberg (1990) also 
examined the effect of noise (moderate intensity) on vigilance. He found that workers reported 
experiencing distraction and sleep disturbances due to such exposure and he observed decrements 
across attention tasks as well as decreases in reaction times and performance on verbal comprehension 
tasks. Noise and fatigue are not the only “stressors” implicated in vigilance decrements. Pepler 
(1958) also found that exposure to heat resulted in diminished vigilance. Van Galen and van 
Huygevoort (2000) found that time pressure and workload resulted in more errors, greater movement 
variability and greater cursor control pressure on tracking and vigilance tasks. Wickens, Stokes, 
Barnett, and Hyman (1991) found that under time pressure, noise, and financial risk, individuals 
performed more poorly on tasks of vigilance and attention; however, declarative knowledge tasks 
were not affected. 
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Several researchers have argued that stress leads to hypervigilance, a state of disorganized and 
somewhat haphazard attentional processing, that tends to degrade judgment and decision making 
skills (Janis & Mann, 1977). This has been found to be true for some decision making tasks that 
come under the stress of perceived threat (Janis, Defares, & Grossman, 1983). Keinan (1987) 
reported similar results. Keinan had subjects perform a multiple-choice analogies test to assess the 
range of alternatives they considered prior to making a decision under the threat of electric shock. 
noted that when individuals felt threatened they tended to abandon organized and systematic scan 
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patterns, they examined fewer alternatives, and their examination of options was less systematic than 
those who did not feel threatened. This reduction in scanning for alternatives affected their decision 
making negatively. 
Attentional Workload and Resource Allocation 
Attention has been measured a variety of ways in the research literature; however, most often it is a 
subject’s visual scan and their detection of various objects within their perceptual field, that have been 
used to determine attentional workload. In terms of vigilance research, various authors have suggested 
that the vigilance task itself, without the addition of an external stressor, is considered stressful by 
subjects (Frankenhaueser, Nordheden, Myrsten, & Post, 1971 ; Galinsky, Rosa, Warm, & Dember, 
1993; Hancock & Warm, 1989; Hovanitz, Chin, & Warm, 1989; Scerbo, 2001; Warm, Dember, & 
Parasumraman, 1991). Subjects have rated both visual and auditory vigilance task9 as stressful, 
although auditory attention was rarely examined. It seems likely that these ratings reflect the direct 
influence of mental workload associated with the task. 
Hughes and Cole (1986) explored attentional workload associated with driving a car. They found that 
under non-stress conditions driver’s attention was focused on objects unrelated to the driving task 30- 
50% of the time. This was compared to rates established by Renge (1980) who found only about 20- 
25 % of such “spare capacity” being spent on task-irrelevant activites. Suzuki, Nakamura, and 
Ogasawara (1966) reported that 50% of the time, fixation was directed on objects unrelated to the 
driving task while 1520% of attention (per verbal report) was spent on road traffic control devices. 
Renge (1980) found a similar proportion (18-23%). Hughes, (1989) has also observed that as the 
visual complexity and number of visual stimuli increased during driving, subjects adapted their visual 
gaze frequency and fixation (reducing the duration of their glances). This finding may provide some 
descriptive evidence of how drivers shed tasks when cognitively overloaded. It should be pointed out 
that these results are not universal across the research literature (Rockwell, 1988), but do reflect most 
findings. 
Lansdown (2001) explored driver visual workload and argued that visual inputs are the primary 
source of information for drivers. Sabey and Staughton (1975) estimated that over 90% of 
information received while driving is visual and thus combating this system’s potential overload is 
paramount in preventing accidents (Wall, 1992). Lansdown differentiated performance of novice and 
expert drivers citing that experts tended to be more efficient in their attentive processing. Specifically 
the author cited that experts relied more on peripheral visual cues to maintain lane position as 
compared to novices who relied heavily on foveal fixations. This finding led the author to suggest 
that experts have more attentional resources to devote to other events or situations than novices. Such 
a suggestion is clearly supported by other research on differences in resource management by 
experts versus novices (Burke, 1980; MacDonald & Lubac, 1982; Stokes, 1995). 
Matthews and Desmond (1995) posited that within the context of driving abilities and use of 
automation systems, stress tends to have three effects: it overloads attentional capacity, disrupts 
executive control over selective attention, and disrupts adaptive mobilization of effort. Metzger and 
39 
Parasuraman (2001) found this to be true in their examination of driving behavior under increased 
attentional workload. Matthews, Sparkes, and Bygraves (19%) also studied driving performance 
under various conditions of stress (increased workload via a grammatical reasoning task using both 
visual and auditory inputs). In this instance, drivers adapted to higher levels of demand efficiently. 
This finding is contrary to the authors’ dual-task interference prediction and the attention-resource 
theory that has otherwise found widespread support. Recarte and Nunes (2000; 2003) examined the 
effects of mental workload on visual search and decision making in a simulated driving task. They 
conceived of the subject’s tasks as one of divided attention between the driving task itself, visual 
search discrimination and other cognitive tasks. Using pupil size as a measure of mental load, these 
investigators found that increases in workload during driving increased spatial gaze concentration; 
thus there was less scanning of non-central-features. Furthermore, mental load increased pupil size, 
indicating additional mental effort and spatial gaze concentration on the driving tasks. Mental task 
load resulted in internal distraction (one type of mental activity that disrupted another) affecting 
attentional capacity for visual stimuli as well as a reduction in the number of targets scanned. 
Stress-induced cognitive tunneling or narrowing of attention has also been causally linked to airline 
accidents and crash sequences (Kornovich, 1992). Due to the high workload and inherent stressors 
associated with flying, the design of aviation systems has been a priority of various human factors 
engineers and cognitive scientists. Several authors have explored the relationship between HUD (head 
up display) symbology used in aircraft operations and attentive processes (Dowell, Foyle, Hooey, & 
Williams, 2002; Foyle, Dowell, & Hooey, 2001; Ververs & Wickens, 1998). The results of these 
investigations suggest that such symbology is so compelling that it fosters cognitive tunneling under 
the workload of flying. For instance, it has been found that pilots can fixate attention to HUD 
symbology, focusing on one source of information to the detriment of other sources. The result is a 
decrease in overall situational awareness and a greater vulnerability to error (Wickens, Fadden, 
Merwin, & Ververs, 1998). These authors have also suggested that various design modifications and 
compensatory strategies appear to be available to reduce this risk. For instance, in a similar 
investigation, Wilson, Hooey, Foyle, and Williams (2002) found that situation-guided symbology in 
HUDs led to increased situational awareness, increased taxi speeds, and less workload. They surmised 
that this was at least in part due to a reduction in cognitive tunneliag. Automation and its role in 
simultaneously decreasing and increasing mental workload as well as error has a large and well- 
developed literature of its own and is beyond the scope of this review. The interested reader is 
referred to Mouloua, Deaton, and Hitt (2001) for an overview of these issues. 
Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes (2002) explored the effect of attention on sensorimotor skills. 
They found that well-learned skills do not require deliberate, conscious control of attention and as a 
result dual-task performance is easier. Given that well-learned skills tend to require fewer mental 
resources for their performance, more resources are available to devote to additional tasks 
accordingly. When prompted to focus attention to a particular component of the well-learned task, 
performance was degraded. It appears that the step-by-step attention to tasks is beneficial during 
initial learning stages but that this tends to be detrimental once skills are well-learned. 
Braunstein-Bercovitz, Dimentman-Ashkenazi, and Lubow (2001) examined the effect of stress 
(threats to self esteem) on latent inhibition- the mechanism implicated in attentional processing that 
underlies the ability to separate relevant from irrelevant information. In traditional latent inhibition 
designs, subjects are first exposed to relevant and irrelevant stimuli. In subsequent trials these subjects 
are exposed to the same irrelevant stimuli along with a new set of novel stimuli. Subjects tend to take 
longer in processing the previously-exposed stimuli than they do the novel stimuli. This phenomenon 
has become known as the latent inhibition effect. Braunstein-Bercovitz and colleagues placed subjects 
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under low-stress and high-stress conditions, defined by the difficulty of mathematical calculation 
tasks. Stress was further manipulated by indicating to the subjects that these tasks were highly 
correlated with general intelligence (these manipulations were validated by self-report). Those in the 
high-stress condition were provided very difficult problems including some that were unsolvable. 
Their results suggested that stress caused increases in state anxiety which affected selective attention 
caused by a disruption in attentional inhibition. This may suggest that subjects were unable to discern 
task irrelevant information from task relevant information. On the other hand, it may indicate that 
subjects’ attention was simply drawn or directed toward task irrelevant information to the detriment 
of performance. These findings support the hypothesis that attentional resources are diverted to task 
irrelevant cues under conditions of stress and anxiety. 
In an extension of these initial findings, Braunstein-Bercovitz (2003) attempted to further clarify the 
effects of stress on selective attention. Using two negative priming experiments, the author induced 
stress by threatening subject’s self-esteem (difficult tasks purportedly measuring intelligence). 
Participants experienced a series of trials, each comprised of a pair of displays. Each display 
contained a prime followed by a probe. In the low-load condition, three digits appeared on the 
display screen, the middle was identified as the target stimulus while the two identical digits flanking 
the target were considered distractors (to be ignored). Conditions were similar under the high-load 
displays (although using simple shapes instead of digits); however, one of the randomly assigned 
shapes was superimposed. Following the prime display, subjects experienced a probe display that 
required them to respond either to the previously primed distractor (one of the flanking digits), the 
primed target, or a new target (one that was not previously primed). Negative priming was considered 
present when the subject’s performance was poorer on the primed distractor than on the control 
display (the novel target). On the other hand, positive priming was considered present by superior 
performance on the primed target than the control display. The results of the study confirmed the 
effectiveness of the stress and load manipulations. Moreover, it was found that as stress increased, the 
negative priming effect diminished. This was the case only when the load was considered low. When 
load was high, the negative priming effect was present as expected. The author concluded that stress 
does not improve selective attention. On the contrary, Brauqstein-Bercovitz contended, “ . . .stress 
impairs selective attention by enhancing the amount of attention allocated to the distractors.” (p. 
354). Thus, attentional resources were depleted under the high-load conditions in stressed individuals, 
resources that might otherwise be allocated to the distractors. This conclusion falls in contradiction 
with much of the previous literature reviewed on the effects of stress on attention. However, the 
author’s study demonstrates that there is an interaction effect between workload and psychological 
stress. When workload is relatively low and stress is high, the selective attention effect is present 
(negative priming is attenuated). On the other hand, when both workload and stress are high, support 
for the selective attention hypothesis diminishes and the negative priming effect is strong. 
Attentiond Theories and Perspectives 
Chajut and Algom (2003) reviewed the three main theories of selective attention under stress and the 
literature support for each theory. They indicated that the first, attention approach, states that stress 
depletes an individual’s attentional resources. This narrowing of attention results in greater focus on 
the central task which tends to enhance performance. The second, capacity-resource theory, also 
states that stress narrows attention; however, this is directional in that one attends to whatever is 
proximal, highly accessible, or automatic (be it relevant or irrelevant to task or goal completion). 
Finally, the third approach, thought suppression, states that attention is a conscious pursuit but that 
there is also an unconscious process of automatic search for “to-be-suppressed” material that occurs 
simultaneously (Le., whatever you do, don’t look down). The ironic aspect of this process is that this 
sensitizes the individual unconsciously to monitor what he or she should not. This monitoring results 
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in a draw on attentional resources (amplified under stress) which leads to a hypersensitivity toward 
task-irrelevant cues (the to-be-suppressed thoughts). 
There is support for each perspective in the literature. In order to establish which hypothesis was most 
explanatory, Chajut and Algom (2003) used the Stroop and reverse Stroop effect within the Garner 
speeded classification paradigm (a four block trial of various Stroop tasks). Their experiments were 
conducted under two conditions, low and high stress-task difficulty, using the stress of time pressure 
and threat to ego as their manipulations. While the Stroop task is the most widely used instrument in 
the study of selective attention, this paradigm has been challenged by some (MacLeod, 1991). In 
their review of the Stroop literature, Chajut and Algom cite mixed results-stress facilitates, degrades, 
and has no impact on performance. Howeyer, in their own investigation, these authors found that 
stress reduced interference and improved selective attention (low stress allowed for irrelevant 
information intrusion and significant S troop effects). These findings argue for the attention approach 
and are inconsistent with the other two. The authors note that previous studies examining divided 
attention might well find decrements in performance due to the narrowing of attentional processes 
(the very same phenomenon that makes selective attention better). These authors attempted to 
replicate their findings under the stress of noise and achieved similar results. Once again the authors 
tested the theory by replacing stress with motivation (Le., financial incentive) and increased class 
credit (to ensure that stress was the operant variable). This design found that the motivation used did 
not elicit improvements in selective attention. As a result, the authors concluded that hotivation and 
stress may have different effects on cognitive processes. 
Mack (2003) posits that we frequently encode information beyond our present awareness (implicitly) 
and that this information may or may not have been attended to. For example, objects are present in 
our visual fields that we see without processing them into our consciousness. Mack suggested, 
“...observers generally do not see what they are looking directly at when they are attending to 
something else.” (p. 181). There is some debate as to whether this reflects inattentional blindness or 
amnesia, but there is greater support for the visual inattention than the forgetting hypothesis. As 
Mack points out, unseen items are capable of priming (which can only occur if there is some memory 
of the stimulus even if it is an inaccessible memory). He argues that implicit perception occurs 
outside of awareness and cites empirical evidence that suggests that perceptual processes for grouping 
stimuli in the perceptual field appear to operate outside of attention. This,data seems to indicate that 
attention is captured only after the meaning of a stimulus has been processed. It should be noted that 
this perspective is not widely accepted and there is data supporting the opposite position. Mack 
believes that what unattended stimuli are processed is related to perceptual load. When overloaded 
cognitively, cues are more likely to fall into inattention than otherwise would be the case. 
Table 5 lists research studies on the effects of stress and workload conditions on sustained attention 
and vigilance task performance. 
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Summary of Findings and Limitations to the Literature 
The research literature concerning stress’ effects on attentional processes is relatively clear. 
Psychological stress along with various forms of workload tend to tunnel attention, reducing focus on 
peripheral information and tasks and centralizing focus on main tasks. What distinguishes a main task 
from a peripheral task appears to depend on whichever stimulus is perceived to be of greatest 
importance to the individual or that which is perceived as most salient. Threat-relevance is strongly 
associated with salience. Therefore, when environmental stimuli are threat-related, such stimuli are 
often considered to be most salient by the individual. This tunneling of attention can result in either 
enhanced performance or reduced performance, depending on the nature of the task and the 
situation. For instance, when peripheral cues are irrelevant to task completion the ability to tune them 
out is likely to improve performance. On the other hand, when these peripheral cues are related to the 
task and their incorporation would otherwise facilitate success on the task, performance suffers when 
they are unattended. This finding may apply to both visual attention and auditory attention; however, 
auditory attention has received little study. Experimental designs that incorporate a stress 
manipulation check (assessing the effectiveness of the supposed stress manipulation) are 
unfortunately not common. Researchers often only assume that their manipulations (e.g., increased 
workload, time pressure, physical or emotional threat, etc.) function as psychological stressors. 
Further, most of these studies fail to distinguish possible direct effects of manipulations from indirect 
effects. 
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Later in this report I will present a model that includes postulated mechanisms by which stressors 
might affect attentive processing (refer to appendix C). 
The Effect of Stress on Memory 
The research literature concerning the effects of stress on memory consistently demonstrates that 
elements of working memory are impaired. Although the mechanisms behind these effects are poorly 
understood, it seems likely that encoding and maintanence processes are the most affected. Some 
have concluded that this reflects a reduction in resource capacity. Resources may be eliminated in 
some way, the span of time in which they can be accessed may be reduced, or these resources may be 
drawn away as a result of resource sharing (the absorption of resources by competing demands). 
Furthermore, little is known about what stage in the process this depletion or occupation takes place. 
It may be that resources or capacity are reduced at several points in the process (i.e., encoding, 
rehearsal, or retrieval). Few, if any, studies have attempted to separate these dimensions within 
memory processes while under stress conditions. 
Working Memory Overview 
Prior to a detailed discussion of the putative effects of various stressors on memory function and 
performance, a brief discussion of memory (particularly working memory) is appropriate. Memory 
has long been conceived of as a multicomponent system which includes a long-term memory store 
and a short-term or working memory component. Baddeley (1986) proposed a model of working 
memory that suggests individuals have a limited pool of working memory resources that are available 
to compete for various tasks. Thus, divided attention or dual-tasks draw from this pool, resulting in a 
reduction of resources to devote to any one task. Baddeley has posited a tripartite model of 
supervisory control over memory consisting of a central executive and two slave systems, an 
articulatory loop and a visuospatial sketch pad (specializing in language and spatial material 
respectively). While the central executive function is somewhat ill defined at this time, Baddeley has 
characterized it as, “...an attentional control system.. ..” (p. 486). The essential purpose of working 
memory appears to be the maintenance of a small subset of long-term memory in a readily accessible 
state. 
t t t 
Visual Semantics Episodic LTM Language 
Figure 4: the figure above represents Baddeley’s current model of working memory 
(Baddeley, 2002). 
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Memory, Stress Effects, and Anxiety 
There are a variety of tasks in which memory has been measured under stress. To be more precise, 
these investigations have typically addressed working memory, and unless otherwise specified in the 
text, the reader should consider general references to memory as references to working memory 
(much of the research contained in this review fails to make this distinction explicit). Typically, long- 
term memory remains intact under stress; however, various elements of working memory are more 
vulnerable. 
Anxiety is perhaps the most common stress condition by which memory researchers have examined 
memory performance (Eysenck, 1979; Eysenck, 1985; Wachtel, 1968). Anxiety has been generated 
in a number of ways but most frequently by way of math performance. The negative effects of this 
stressor on working memory are well established (Ashcraft, 2002; Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Eysenck, 
1992; Eysenck, 1997). Ashcraft and Kirk (2001) reported that individuals high in anxiety tend to be 
slower and more deliberate in their processing of various aspects of mathematical functions. For 
example, these individuals seem to have particular difficulty with the carry-over function (Le., adding 
a column of numbers that sum greater than nine). Given the relationship between this function and 
working memory, researchers have conjectured that the additional anxiety present in highly anxious 
subjects likely draws away resources that could otherwise be used in working memory for activation 
and rehearsal (such as that needed for the carry operation). Although it has been contqnded that 
high-math-anxious individuals may simply be less adept at math (deficits owed to ability and not 
anxiety per se), various investigations have provided evidence that math competence is not adequate 
to explain the phenomena (Nembree, 1990). Instead, research has directed our understanding toward 
resource depletion models. Specifically, it has been asserted that worry and intrusive cognitions 
compete for the limited pool of resources. This competition results in fewer resources available to the 
primary task, in this case mathematical calculation. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) have referred to this 
position as processing efficiency theory and have proposed that highly anxious individuals tend to 
demonstrate lower cognitive efficiency accordingly. 
Ashcraft and Kirk (2001) examined the the effect of math-relate6 anxiety on the performance of 
various cognitive tasks, predicting that math anxiety would disrupt working memory, leading to a 
degradation in mathematical and related performance. Specifically, these authors measured the 
degree to which subjects were math-anxious (using a self report index - short Mathematics Anxiety 
Rating Scale) followed by a performance assessment on two measures of working memory (listening 
span and computational span). Their results suggest that individuals scoring high on measures of 
math anxiety tend to perform worse on measures of working memory. While this was true across both 
measures (not necessarily limited to just computational tasks), highly anxious subjects were more 
likely to demonstrate deficits in computational scores than listening scores. These findings led the 
researchers to conclude that working memory capacity was degraded by math anxiety. In a second 
experiment, they examined their hypothesis using an on-line task of mental addition varying in levels 
of difficulty under timed conditions. Furthermore, these were paired with an additional task. The 
reason for examining dual-tasks was based on the assumption of resource competition. The authors 
suggested that error rates or decrements in response times should reflect capacity of working 
memory. Accordingly, they embedded their original addition task with'a memory task requiring 
them to maintain two or six randomized letters in memory. Those subjects reporting the highest 
degrees of math-related anxiety scored worse than those reporting low to moderate levels of anxiety. 
Particular difficulty for math anxious subjects was observed in performing carry operations (using 
the tens column in addition tasks). These deficits were not found with nonnumerical stimuli. 
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To extend these findings, the authors implemented a third experimental paradigm. It has been 
suggested that anxiety’s influence on math performance may differ depending on the degree of 
working memory required for the task. Some calculations are very working memory intensive while 
others rely heavily on math information well-learned previously. Moreover, these authors explored 
whether or not the anxiety incurred is related to mathematical operations specifically or more 
generally to numeric processing. Ashcraft and Kirk (2001) assessed a third group of subjects (similar 
to their first two experiments) using the same self-report measure of anxiety and the listening-span 
and computation-span tasks; however, they added a transformation task requiring subjects to 
transform letters and numbers in a series of trials. Under the letter transformation task, these 
individuals were presented either two or four letters (one at a time) and were asked to transform the 
letter mentally by proceeding forward in the alphabet either two or four positions. These new letters 
were then held in working memory pending a recall phase all the while transforming the next letter. 
Similarly, under the numeric task, a number was presented and subjects were asked to transform it by 
a value of either seven or thirteen. Once transformed these numbers were then held in memory while 
additional operations were conducted. The authors’ results demonstrated that math anxiety 
significantly degraded performance in terms of accuracy and response time on tasks that were heavily 
dependent on working memory. In addition, they showed that arithmetic calculations are not needed 
to replicate the deficits found in math-anxiety research. Such findings can be created by simply using 
a numerical counting task. Ashcraft and Kirk also found that highly anxious subjects spent more time 
on task than subjects with low anxiety yet did not raise the accuracy of their results to the level of 
those with low anxiety. This suggests that although these individuals may have invested more effort in 
the task, this investment did not yield an improved result. 
Ashcraft (2002) provided a 30 year review of the math-anxiety research and in doing so came to 
several conclusions. Investigations have consistently found that simple single-digit calculations (Le., 2 
+ 7 = 9) do not appear to be plagued by anxiety effects. They are unlikely to be effected by anxiety 
because they do not require a substantial investment of working memory resources. However, only 
slightly more complex calculations (Le., 15 + 43 = 58) show rather significant decrements as a result 
of math anxiety. Furthermore, traditional arithmetic is not required to elicit these responses. On the 
contrary, number counting and other tasks that are “math-like” appear to be sufficient to create 
math-anxiety states and result in performance degradation. This degradation takes the form of an 
increase in processing time (on average about three times the amount !required for individuals with 
low anxiety) and accuracy (twice the number of errors found in subjects with high math anxiety). 
Mathematical and numeric tasks that rely heavily on working memory capacity are more sensitive to 
the effects of anxiety than those that do not. 
. 
What Mechanisms Explain the Anxiety-Memory Deficit? 
There is some consensus that anxiety occupies resources or “space” in a limited capacity system, 
thus diverting resources from tasks requiring memory capacity. Ashcraft (2002) found results 
consistent with Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) model that proposed that anxiety (Le., math anxiety) 
disrupts working memory as individuals devote attentional resources to their intrusive thoughts and 
worries rather than to the task at hand. With fewer resources devoted to encoding and rehearsal, fewer 
memories are likely to be available for recall, and the quality of those memories may suffer as well. 
Diminishing resources may impede the rehearsal process used to maintain elements in working 
memory, causing intermediate steps of math problem-solving to be dropped, requiring those steps to 
be repeated or reconstructed for successful performance (this in turn delays performance and would 
require further resources). Tohill and Holyoak (2000) found that anxiety (associated with speeded 
arithmetic) reduces the scope of working memory, affecting abstract analogies more than concrete 
analogies. Dutke and Stober (2001) also asserted that worry occupies more space in working memory 
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in highly anxious individuals, which limits available resources for tasks. They found that making task 
demands sequential rather than concurrent had beneficial effects on performance. The authors 
believe that these represent external processing aids, helping to compensate for restricted memory 
functions-a perspective that is shared by others as well (Matthews, 1996). Kellog, Hopko, and 
Ashcraft (1999) explored the processing efficiency theory put forth by Eysenck and his colleagues 
(Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Their investigation replicated previous findings that show 
the differential impact of anxiety on math performance between individuals with high anxiety and 
those with low anxiety. Moreover, the authors argue that these differences become more pronounced 
as the difficulty of the arithmetic tasks increase. Kellog et al. explored the relationship between time 
pressure and performance under similar conditions, predicting differential effects between groups 
(Le., individuals high in math-anxiety wauld perform proportionally worse). However, their results 
indicated that the stress of time pressure lowered performance in both anxious and non-anxious 
individuals on arithmetic tasks equally. The authors concluded that this finding fails to support the 
anxiety resource model and further suggests, “...that time pressure does not appear to be a critical 
component of the anxiety/performance deficits relation.” (p. 598). 
The effects of divided attention on memory performance may be related to the discussion above. 
While this subject will be addressed in further detail in a later section, I illustrate the issues briefly here 
as well. Analogous to the role of anxiety described previously, secondary tasks require and draw away 
resources and attention from the primary task. Thus, dividing attention between tasks ‘reduces the 
attentional resources available to apply to either task. In such cases when the recall or recognition of 
information is required, this division often results in a decreased capacity to recall or recognize 
information from memory. It has been demonstrated that dividing attentional resources has a direct 
negative effect on the encoding of information into memory (Baddeley, Lewis, Elderidge, & 
Thomson, 1984). Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, and Marom (2003) suggested that several mechanisms may 
be at work. For example, according to Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, and Anderson (1996), a 
division in attention may lead to a reduction in the time available to process incoming stimuli (due to 
time devoted to a secondary task). Similarly, incoming information may be subject to less depth and 
less elaborative coding when attentional resources are divided. 
Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2003) have explored a third hypothesis, referred to as the associative deficit 
hypothesis. From this perspective divided attention disrupts the, “. . .mechanism responsible for 
associating different components of an episode into a coherent unit.” (p. 1022). The authors state 
that as a result a fragmented unit of information is encoded into memory. To test this hypothesis the 
authors devised five experiments using a concurrent visual or auditory continuous choice reaction 
time task. During their initial experiment subjects were exposed to unrelated items (word-nonword 
pairs) while engaged in the concurrent task. In subsequent trials, different sets of subjects were 
exposed to variations of this initial paradigm: unrelated word-word pairs, and perceptual-contextual 
pairs (form-font pairing). Across all of the conditions of the first three experiments the investigators 
found no difference in memory performance between the recognition of associative information and 
item information. The associative deficit hypothesis was not supported. In their fourth and fifth 
experiments, Naveh-Benjamin et al. exposed subjects to six lists of unrelated word pairs under 
measurements of free recall, cued recall, and recognition. Neither of these additional designs resulted 
in findings that supported the associate deficit hypothesis. The authors concluded that the underlying 
mechanism that causes diminished memory performance as a result of divided attention is not likely 
to be attributable to a disruption in the processing of relational associations between episodic 
information units. Instead, Naveh-Benjamin and colleagues suggested that divided attention effects 
information processing at some other stage of the encoding process. For example, they suggested that 
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disruption may occur during the injtial perception of the stimulus, at the point of component 
encoding, binding, or perhaps during the elaboration or consolidation of the memory units. 
Memory and Other Putative Stressors 
There is evidence that other sources of stress (noise, threat, thermal conditions, etc.) reduce working 
memory performance. For example, several investigations have found that noise increases the 
incidence of errors on working memory tasks (Finkelman, Zeitlin, Romoff, Friend, & Brown, 1979; 
Gomes, Martinho-Pimenta, & Castelo-Brano, 1999; von Wright & Vauras, 1980). Hockey (1979) 
provided a review of the research on the effects of noise on performance and information processing. 
He concluded that noise has several effects: 1) it tends to over-arouse an individual, which results in a 
speedaccuracy trade-off in performance, 2) it changes attention allocation which reduces working 
memory, 3) it creates attentional selectivity or tunneling, 4) it increases response selectivity, and 5) it 
tends to reduce a person’s confidence in hidher performance. Thus, Hockey viewed the negative 
effects of noise on memory as eminating from earlier effects 011 attention. Evans, Hygge, and 
Bullinger (1995; 2000) argued that such effects may be reversible. Wickens, Stokes, Barnett, and 
Hyman (1991) studied the effect of various “stressors” (time pressure, noise, and financial risk) on 
working memory. They found that these factors tended to worsen memory performance but not for 
declarative knowledge tasks. This finding may reflect the resilence of long-term memory despite the 
presence of stressful conditions. I 
Previous investigations into memory performance have found negative effects across a variety of 
putative stressors including: fatigue (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Eysenck, 1985; Gevins & Smith, 
1999; Kleitman, 1963), alcohol intoxication (Gevins & Smith, 1999), simulated military combat 
(Lieberman, Bathalon, Falco, Georgelis, Morgan, Niro, & Tharion, 2002), and the thermal stresses of 
both heat (Hocking, Silberstein, Lau, Stough, & Roberts, 2001) and cold (Giesbrecht, Arnett, Vela, & 
Bristow, 1993). For example, Giesbrecht, Arnett, Vela, and Bristow (1993) found that after immersion 
in cold water, tasks requiring minimal cognitive demands remained unaffected (auditory attention, 
Benton visual recognition, digit span forward); however, those tasks deemed more cognitively 
challenging, requiring work memory (digit span and the Stroop task), showed significantly degraded 
performance. Slaven and Windle (1999) devised a unique experimental paradigm-simulating a 
disabled submarine. These researchers found that under the stress of cold, there were no significant 
performance decrements on measures of working memory. However, ’self-report measures suggested 
that decrements were subjectively perceived. These authors conjectured that motivation, spurred by 
the presence of peers, may have played a role in mitigating the effects of the cold. This conclusion is 
consistent with the notion that “misery loves company” whereby sharing a negative experience with 
others relieves some of the negative effects on the individual. This moderating variable is discussed 
further in a later section of the review. 
Burrows (2002) examined memory performance under conditions of workload (an increasing list of 
words) and time pressure (the speeded presentation of information) measuring the accuracy and 
speed of recall on a recognition test. Burrows’ initial experiment was designed by presenting a list of 
six words, each word being held visible for two seconds following which it was replaced (on a 
computer screen) with the next word. The list of words was presented Mice to each subject. During 
the subsequent recognition test, subjects were asked to determine as quickly as possible whether the 
word appearing was on the previous list or not. Burrows conducted 12 trials, half consisting of target 
words previously presented and half consisting of new words. After completing these trials each 
subject was asked to rate their subjective stress level and their perceived level of performance (how 
well they felt they had done). Burrows then presented a second list of six words instructing the 
subjects to add these additional words to the original list. Following a similar 12 trials and subsequent 
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self-ratings, these subjects were then presented an additional list of six words. This process continued 
until each subject had been exposed to 60 words and 120 recognition trials. Self-rating of stress and 
perceived success at the task were also assessed throughout these iterations. Three days later, each 
subject was then re-tested (a similar series of memory trials was used). Results from this experiment 
indicated that memory accuracy gradually decreased as workload (the number of items to be 
remembered) increased. For example, after exposure to just six words subjects averaged 95% correct 
upon recognition. This proportion dropped gradually to just over three-fourths after all 60 words had 
been presented. Similarly, the increase in words to be remembered resulted in a strong correlation 
with self-rated stress (r = .98), thus stress ratings mapped exceptionally well to measures of workload 
and decrements in memory performance. The author noted that while the drop in memory accuracy 
was significant and substantial, this decrement was gradual across the accumulation of memory items. 
This pattern was also demonstrated across measures of response time. Subjective rating of 
performance accurately represented objective measures, suggesting that subjects were aware of and 
accurately perceiving their own decremented performance. 
Burrows also manipulated the length of the word lists from six to 15, 30, 45, and 60 depending on the 
group. The remaining conditions were kept static. The data resulting from the 120 trial sequence was 
very similar to the previous set of findings. Memory accuracy dropped gradually to just over 80% 
after the full 60 words were presented. A similar decline was reported in reaction time (averaging 
approximately 3ms per word added). During a third experiment, Burrows manipulated the length of 
the word lists from six to 12, increasing the amount of material to be remembered. Once again, the 
results of this experiment mimicked the other two, finding a significant, but gradual decline in 
memory accuracy as the total length of words to be remembered (recognized) increased. The 
proportion of words recognized after just 12 trials was nearly 95%; however, by the time 60 words 
had been presented for memory the proportion recognized had dropped to below 80%. This number 
further declined but shallowed out as the number of items exceeded 100. Reaction times also 
declined to a point as did self-ratings of stress and performance. Burrows concluded from these three 
experiments that the increase in workload concomitantly resulted in an increase in subjective stress 
level and resulted objectively in gradual, not sudden, decrements in recognition memory accuracy 
and reaction time. 
In an attempt to examine the effect of speeded presentation on recognition (elements of workload 
and time pressure), Burrows conducted two further experiments. The first assigned two groups of 
participants to one of two conditions. The first received identical treatment to those in experiments 
1-3 described above (presentation times of two seconds per word). The second group also received 
similar conditions as described above, but with only a .5 second presentation of each word. The 
results suggested that self-rated stress increased as workload increased for both groups. Recognition 
accuracy was worse for the speeded group (approximately 10% worse). The proportional difference 
between the two groups remained equivalent as performance declined throughout the task. Based on 
self-rated performance it was clear that those in the speeded group were aware that their performance 
was appreciably degraded. Burrows concluded that the loss in time corresponded to a loss in the 
ability to encode and that the differential loss in recognition memory was attributable to limitations in 
encoding. In his fifth and final experiment, the author explored the impact of introducing a function 
of information updating into the list-memorization procedure. Specifically, he asked subjects to 
delete and replace previously viewed words with newly presented words, later requiring them to 
determine which items had replaced the words and which had been deleted from the lists. Once again 
two groups of subjects were observed, one receiving the same conditions previously experienced 
while the other performed under the memory reorganization condition. The results of this 
experiment demonstrated a similar pattern of performance decrement to that previously described for 
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all but the reorganized memory items. Performance on these items dropped dramatically, nearing 
chance. Burrows concluded, “...moving items from a state of never having been shown to a state of 
having been shown, and then to a state of being deleted leads to performance that literally reflects 
lack of memory ability.” (p. 30). Overall, Burrows reported finding a gradual decline in recognition 
memory as both stress and workload increase. Furthermore, reducing the time for encoding of words 
appeared to reduce the accuracy of later recognition of those words. Stress and workload also relate 
to concomitant increases in reaction time. Finally, when the reorganization of memory items is 
required, the ability to accurately recognize words that have been removed from memory categories 
versus those that have been added to them is dramatically affected. 
Burrow’s set of experiments provide support for three main assertions: 1) increasing the volume of 
to-be-remembered material decreases the recognition of that material gradually and not dramatically, 
2) reducing the time available for memorization of new material also results in a decrease in 
performance; however, not one that is catastrophic in nature, and 3) when to-be-remembered items 
are reorganized in memory (see final experiment for description of procedure) there is a dramatic 
effect that resembles the total loss of memory. 
Stress, Cortisol, and Memory 
Cortisol, having previously been established as a physiological measure of stress, bas also been 
examined in relation to memory functioning. Al’Absi, Hugdahl, and Lovallo (2002) measured 
cortisol levels in subjects after they completed mental-arithmetic and public-speaking tasks. Their 
results indicated that high-cortisol responders performed worse than low-cortisol responders on 
mental arithmetic, but better on dichotic listening. The authors suggested that the performance 
enhancement on dichotic listening may have resulted from a focus of attention (Easterbrook’s 
narrowing-attention hypothesis). Al’Absi and colleagues reported that high cortisol responders rated 
their moods more negatively than low responders. This finding further links the relationship between 
perceived stress, cortisol activation, and performance. These investigators concluded that cortisol 
disrupts working memory but enhances selective attention. Newcomer, Selke, Nelson, Hershey, Craft, 
Richards, and Alderson (1999) examined the role of cortisol (simulating stress) in degrading memory 
function as well. They subjected individuals to cortisol levels consistent with the psychological stress 
response experienced pending surgical procedures. They found that exposure to cortisol levels 
induced by such stress results in a temporary decrease in verbal declatative memory. These authors 
measured verbal memory through an immediate and delayed paragraph recall task (Wechsler 
Memory Scale-Revised Logical Memory Test). Both immediate and delayed recall was affected by 
the increase in cortisol. This decrement in performance was removed following a return to normality 
in cortisol blood levels. Performance was not found to be degraded significantly when assessing 
nonverbal memory, sustained or selective attention, and executive function tasks (continuous 
performance task, spatial delay response task, and the Stroop color-word task). The authors did not 
speculate as to the underlying mechanism affected by the cortisol (e.g., encoding processes, rehearsal, 
retrieval, etc.). 
Vedhara, Hyde, Gilchrist, Tytherleigh, and Plummer (2000) noted that student exam periods 
appeared to be related to an increase in self-reported stress (as one might expect); however, this 
corresponded unexpectedly to a decrease in cortisol levels. This profile was associated with an 
increase in short-term memory performance (hippocampal-specific short-term memory) without 
negative effects on auditory verbal working memory. Moreover, the increase in subjective levels of 
stress and decreased levels of salivary cortisol corresponded to degraded performance on measures of 
selective attention (telephone search task) and divided attention (telephone search and counting task). 
The authors concluded that cortisol is related to cognitive performance but that its effects are 
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selective. Vedhara and colleagues note that there may be a curvilinear relationship between 
glucocorticoids and cognitive functioning. In this way, the selectivity of effects incurred by increased 
cortisol exposure may be a result of differences in cognitive appraisal as well as differences in the 
peak of the inverted U. In a related study, Diamond, Fleshner, Ingersoll, and Rose (19%) examined 
the relationship between stress, hippocampal impairment, and memory. The authors formulated a 
strong case for the connection between hippocampal function and memory. Furthermore, they 
empirically linked the hippocampus to regulatory functions over corticosterone recepters and 
ultimately behavioral responses to stress. Diamond and colleagues indicated that extended exposure 
to stress (and concomitantly to hypersecretion of cortisol), results in damage to the hippocampus 
(neural loss) and impairment in learning. In addition, these authors reported that this exposure has 
also been found to block hippocampal potentiation-often considered a central-feature in the 
modeling of memory from an electrophysiological perspective. In their investigation, Diamond et al. 
studied the effects of stress on hippocampal functioning in rats measured by performance on a maze 
task. The results of this investigation showed that after being placed in a stressful environment, rats’ 
working memory and their subsequent ability to learn was impaired. This effect was not found in 
measures of reference or long-term spatial memory. The authors concluded the hippocampal-specific 
learning (i.e., declarative memories) may be particularly sensitive to the effects of stress on working 
memory functioning. 
Emotional Memories, Trauma, and Tunneling 
There is a compelling literature that has questioned the ability of individuals to accurately reflect on 
and report their own mental processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Furthermore, this lively debate has 
been extended to memory recall in naturalistic settings (Christianson, 1984; Loftus, 1980). Numerous 
studies have shown quite conclusively that merely imagining events can induce a false memory for 
the event (Heaps & Nash, 2001; Hyman & Pentland, 1996). Moreover, the more an event is imagined 
the more likely an individual is to believe that it really occurred (Goff & Roediger, 1998; Lampinen, 
Odegard, & Bullington, 2003). As one might imagine, the addition of emotion in memories reduces 
our confidence in those memories further. The emotionality of events appears to be related to the 
quality and content of what is remembered. Kramer, Buckhout, Widman, and Tusche (1991) exposed 
subjects to emotion-arousing traumatic stimuli (images of murder victims). Their results 
demonstrated that subjects’ memory was poorer for stimuli following exposure to emotional content. 
The emotion-arousing image was highly salient and well-remembered; however, exposure to this 
resulted in interference with the encoding of a subsequent image. Payne, Nadel, Allen, Thomas, and 
Jacobs (2002) found that under stress individuals were more likely to experience false memories (the 
false recognition of semantically related words that were never presented for study). The majority of 
studies examining the effects of emotion on memory have not attempted to tease apart whether these 
effects center on encoding, rehearsal, or retrieval processes. 
I 
Christianson (1992) provided an extensive literature review of eyewitness memory under conditions 
of arousal, stress, and acute negative emotional states. He posited that Easterbrook’s notion of a 
restricted range (centralized attentional cue sampling) could be used to characterize memory under 
stress. His review of the research on stress and memory points toward several conclusions: 1) memory 
tends to be impaired temporarily when recalling events prior to or follo‘wing an emotional event, 2) 
memory for the emotional event is not necessarily skewed or impaired under stressful conditions, 3) 
there is a tendency for improved recall for central-features when such events are emotional as 
compared to neutral, 4) improved recall for such events does not consistently hold up under 
conditions of cued or recognition recall, 5) peripheral details are less often remembered when the 
main events witnessed are emotional in nature, 6) the difference in recall may relate to attentional 
selectivity as visual scan studies suggest that individuals, “fixate faster, more often, and for longer 
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durations” on emotional items (p. 292); however, Christianson’s own experiments argue against this 
conclusion, 7) memory tends to be affected by context effects; specifically, it improves when retrieval 
conditions are congruent with encoding conditions (Le., mood-congruency effects), 8) research 
points to the notion that individuals may be predisposed or emotionally primed toward emotionally 
valent information, and finally, 9) there appears to be very little difference between laboratory and 
real-world findings concerning emotional arousal and memory performance. As stated, Christianson 
proposed that emotional events are remembered differently than neutral events. He further pointed 
out that it is not the case that the stronger the emotion the worse the recall. He believes that this model 
is far too simplistic. On the contrary, he asserts that highly emotional events are typically retained, 
particularly their central characteristics (but not to the exclusion of all peripheral detail). 
Memories also tend to show a preference toward mood-congruency. Russo, Fox, Bellinger, and 
Nguyen-Van-Tam (2001) examined the memory recall of individuals identified as highly anxious. 
They found that these individuals were more likely to recall mood-congruent stimuli than those 
identified as low anxious. Thus, the affective state of an individual may function in any number of 
ways toward mood congruency: 1) it may prime individuals for mood-congruent information in 
memory, 2) it may limit informational processing toward attentionally biased stimuli, or 3) it may 
sensitize the activation, rehearsal, or availability of mood-congruent material. These assertions 
highlight the important role of state-dependency in learning under stressful condjtions. That is to say, 
individuals tend to remember more and perform better in general when under similar conditions to 
their original learning environment. This appears to be even more pronounced when the emotional 
valence of the information is congruent with the individual’s emotional state (Le., remembering sad 
things when one feels sad). Lang, Craske, Brown, and Ghaneian (2001) demonstrated the effects of 
state-dependent learning under fearful and relaxed settings using a word recall task. 
Related to these findings is the notion that memory, under stressful conditions, tends to channel much 
in the same way as attention does. There appears to be at least some evidence for this tunnel memory 
hypothesis (Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Christianson, Loftus, Hoffman, & Loftus, 1991). Berntsen 
. (2002) explored the memory constriction hypothesis that Suggests that stress effectively “shrinks” 
memory resulting in a predominance of central-feature memories (in this case autobiographical in 
nature). In Berntsen’s first experiment he attempted to replicate findings from Christianson and 
Loftus (1990) and Wessel and Merchelbach (1!B4), who found a preponderance of central-feature 
memories when subjects were asked to recall memories of emotional or traumatic events. In his 
design, participants were asked to recall their most shocking experience along with as many details 
about this event within a specified time period. Furthermore, subjects were asked to write a description 
of the event including these details. After this portion of the experiment participants completed a 
brief questionnaire concerning their memory of the event. The classification of memory details as 
central or peripheral was carried out by two independent judges. Berntsen’s results revealed a strong 
preference for central-feature details (three times the proportion). It was also observed that the more 
emotionally intense, the greater the tendency for central-feature detailed memories. 
During a second experiment, Berntsen divided subjects into two groups; one experienced the same 
conditions as those described above while the other was asked to recall and describe their happiest 
memory. Both groups recalled the same number of detail memories, but there was a significant 
difference in the quality of the memories recalled between groups. The results of this study 
demonstrate that memory for central-feature details tend to occur under negatively valent memories 
and not nearly as often for positively valent memories. Moreover, negative emotional events were 
rated by subjects as more surprising. This finding may relate to the effect of uncontrollability and 
unpredictability in augmenting the effects of stress which would in turn result in a greater negative 
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effect on performance. In order to examine whether or not the act of recalling and recording 
emotionally valent memories was related to the quality of details recalled, Berntsen conducted a third 
experiment in which he asked participants to rate their mood prior to and following the recall and 
description of their event details. Berntsen was particularly interested in investigating whether or not 
subjects’ moods changed as a result of their recall and if this change resulted in any bias in mood- 
congruent memory recollection. Once again both groups (positively and negatively valenced 
memories) recalled similar amounts of details concerning their central events. However, significantly 
more central-feature details were remembered by those recalling a negative experience. Mood ratings 
were subject to change only after participants recalled their most shocking memories and not their 
happiest. There was a mood-congruence effect found for word-cued memories after subjects recalled 
these negative events (this effect was not found for positively valent memories). Berntsen concluded 
that this research supports the notion of a tunnel memory hypothesis, and he proposed that emotion 
and gist-related portions of events appear to be more accessible to recollection when remembering 
stressful events. The author did not address whether this tunneling was the result of prior attentional 
restriction or a memory-specific mechanism. 
Libkuman, Stabler, and Otani (2004) examined the relationship between arousal, emotional valence, 
and memory recall. Although these authors acknowledged the widespread empirical support for 
preattentive processing as an explanation for enhanced recall of emotionally valent material, they 
argued for the role of post-stimulus elaboration as a viable mechanism as well. Elaboration occurs 
during or following the initial encoding of the stimulus and is likely to involve the rehearsal of 
various event features. It has been shown to make memory for such events more resilient and less 
likely to be forgotten-flashbulb memories are believed to be one result of this type of elaborative 
process. In order to test the hypothesis that post-stimulus elaboration plays an active role in the 
memory of emotional events, the authors exposed subjects to both positively and negatively valent 
stimuli. The series of slides used for their examination were selected from the International Affective 
Picture System and were rated for their arousal properties (high and low) as well as their emotional 
valence. Subjects were broken into two groups, an elaboration group and a distraction group. Both 
groups were exposed to the series of pictorial slides; however, subjects in the distraction group were 
shown a distractor slide between each target slide that required them to perform a series of math 
problems (blocking the likelihood for elaboration). The elaboration group was shown a blank slide 
between target slides, allowing for elaboration to take place, before proceeding to the next slide. After 
the series of slides had been presented, both groups performed a brief filler task that was followed by 
a cued recall test. 
The results of the study indicated that positively valent images tended to be remembered better than 
negatively valent images (although both types of valenced images were recalled more often and in 
more detail than neutral stimuli). Images that were rated as highly arousing also tended to be 
remembered over those rated as low-arousing. In addition, memory for central-features was better 
than memory for peripheral details. Support for the author’s hypothesis, the role of post-stimulus 
elaboration, was not found. Their data suggested that onIy negatively valent stimuli were elaborated 
by subjects. This finding was irrespective of arousal-level which indicates that what enhances recall of 
emotional events is not necessarily arousal, but instead, may be the emotional valence (positive or 
negative) of the event. The authors speculated that this finding can be explained from an 
evolutionary perspective. For example, it may be more adaptive to initially respond based on the 
valence of an event when it is negative than based on arousal cues, which may reflect either a positive 
or negative event. Similarly, in addressing why elaboration occurred for negative images and not for 
positive images, the authors suggested that negative stimuli may present an evolutionary priority over 
positive stimuli. 
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Kensinger and Corkin (2003) also examined the relationship between valence and arousal in the 
remembrance of emotional stimuli. In contrast to Libkuman, et al. (2004), the results of their analyses 
suggest a greater role for arousal than valence. These authors constructed six experiments to test their 
hypothesis that subjects would be more likely to remember details associated with emotional words as 
compared to neutral words. Furthermore, they compared two types of subjective memory experience, 
remembering and knowing. Remembering, or recollection, has been described as a “slower attention- 
demanding process” that typically includes item-specific details. The second, knowing, which is 
based on familiarity, has been characterized as “faster and more automatic,” a remembrance or 
feeling that one has been acquainted with the stimulus in the past (p. 1170). Distinguishing between 
these two types of memory experience is typically done by asking subjects whether they remember, 
or simply know, they have been exposed to the stimulus. Remembering the stimulus usually portends 
a specific and detailed memory whereas knowing suggests a sense of previous encounter without any 
specific detail for the item remembered. Neuroimaging research in this area has contributed to the 
differentiation between these two states; remembering is associated with left-sided prefrontal areas and 
the hippocampus and knowing is connected with the right-sided prefrontal region and the 
parahippocamal gyrus (Kensinger, Clarke, & Corkin, 2003). 
During Kensinger and Corkin’s (2003) first experiment, subjects were exposed to,a series of words 
that were coded as either neutral or negative. Moreover, these words were also rated for their level of 
arousal and valence. During a self-paced recognition task, subjects were asked whether they had a 
vivid recollection of the word, whether they knew the word was familiar to them, or whether they 
thought the word was new. The results of their first experiment indicated that words rated as negative 
were remembered more often than those rated as neutral. This enhancement effect was predominantly 
true for words that subjects vividly recalled (remembered types). The authors concluded that negative 
words had a tendency to increase the vividness of the memories recalled, although both recollection 
and familiarity occurred more often for negative than neutral words. In subsequent experiments, 
Kensinger and Corkin (2003) assessed different measures of memory richness, varying levels of 
arousal and valence, and varying degrees of semantic association between words. A similar pattern 
emerged across all variations of study: memory details were more likely to be remembered for 
emotional than neutral words. Words that were rated as having a stronger valence as well as evoking 
greater arousal were remembered most accurately and in greater detail than neutral words. Words that 
were rated as arousing showed the greatest recall enhancement (over those that were rated as highly 
valent); however, the results of these studies demonstrate that physiological arousal is not necessary 
for the recall enhancement effect. On the contrary, highly valent words that were rated low in 
arousing quality also resulted in improved memory as compared to neutral words. The authors 
speculated about a number of possible explanations for these findings: 1) the distinctiveness of the 
stimulus, 2) the possibility of enhanced elaboration, 3) emotion’s role in memory coherence- the 
unification of memory themes under emotional valence, 4) attention’s prioritization of negative 
items, and 5 )  the effects of arousal. 
Recent research has questioned the field’s reliance on laboratory studies of emotional memories 
charging that such investigations typically expose subjects to unrealistic emotional stimuli. Laney, 
Heuer, and Reisberg (2003) point out that most laboratory studies examining the impact of emotion 
on memory employ gruesome images as to-be-remembered emotional material. In contrast to these 
visually-dominant displays, the authors argue that the emotion induced by natural events tends to be 
developmental (unfolding with the event) and rarely reflects the kind of visually shocking stimuli 
described above. Dubbed thematically-induced memories, the authors explored the frequency of this 
type of memory, as opposed to those that are typically visually-induced, in naturally occurring 
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memories. The authors directed subjects to list personal flashbulb memories for events including the 
details of what occurred and their emotional state at the time. Subjects were also asked to rate how 
confident they were in their own recollection of the events. Following this phase of the experiment, 
subject’s memories of their events were sent to third parties (with their consent) who could verify the 
event details (friends, family, etc.). These individuals were asked to rate whether subjects had 
accurately captured the gist of the event as well as the details associated with the event. The authors 
found that subject’s recall of event details was surprisingly accurate (as rated by the third parties). 
Additionally, they found that most of the memories recalled were categorized as thematic and not 
visual. This categorization was based on blind coding of the recollections using a classification rubric. 
Visual memories were identified as those that contained a clear visual focus or central attentional 
object, or those that were described using a predominance of visual terms and color features. This was 
in contrast to thematic memories which were any that lacked these features or elements. 
Given the findings that most emotional memories were coded as thematic and not visual (SO%), the 
authors suggested that previous laboratory paradigms have employed atypical emotional memory 
events. Laney et al. (2003) raise interesting questions about the generalizability of such laboratory 
findings. They suggest that the tunnel memory and “weapon focus” phenomena, robust among 
laboratory studies, should be evaluated using more naturalistic to-be-remembered stimuli. 
Furthermore, they propose that the effect of arousal, as Easterbrook (1959) and others have posited, 
may be an artifactual finding. Instead, what may underlie these phenomena are the sdiency of the 
image and not necessarily the direct effects of arousal on cue sampling. 
While Berntsen (2002), Laney et al. (2003), and others have conjectured about the mechanisms that 
facilitate tunnel memory, our understanding of the process remains unclear. Some have argued that it 
results from a combination of selective attention, preattentive bias, and post-event elaboration 
(Christianson, 1992) while others have argued that tunneling is actually a constriction in the time to 
access and retrieve. For example, Miyake and Shah (1999) theorized that stress limits the time scope 
of memory. On the other hand, as Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2003) have suggested, there may be 
multiple points along the encoding process that are negatively affected by disruptions in resource 
allocation resulting from stress or workload. Regardless of which hypothesis is correct, it seems likely 
that attention plays a significant role in this modulation (if not a direct gate keeping function). For 
instance, attention may channel the bandwidth of perceptual cues, thus reducing the number or scope 
of attended stimuli. The reduction in cue sampling may in turn result in a reduction in the number of 
items encoded and taken into memory, thus further reducing the number or range of possible target 
items to be recalled or activated and rehearsed for later recollection. 
Dougherty and Hunter (2003) examined the role of working memory and retrieval in the process of 
making probability judgments. They stated that most theories about how we make judgments assume 
that we compare the present decision or possibility with alternative hypotheses. Examples of these 
theories include: Tversky and Koehler’s (1994) support theory, Windschitl and Wells (1998) 
comparison heuristic, and Dougherty, Gettys, and Ogden’s Minerva decision making process (1999, 
2001). Dougherty and Hunter have closely linked working memory and attention in the decision 
making process. They defined working memory as reflecting, “. . .individual differences in . . .ability 
for controlled attention.” (p. 969). Further linking these concepts with goal structure, these authors 
defined sustainable controlled attention as, “. ..a process of both maintaining goal- or task-relevant 
information in the focus of attention and inhibiting goal- or task-irrelevant information from 
entering the focus of attention.” (p. 969). The results of their experiments suggest that people do 
indeed make probability judgments by comparing a focal hypothesis with relevant alternatives 
retrieved from long-term memory. They also concluded that individuals with a large working 
56 
memory span tend to include more alternatives in their comparison process, and that time constraints 
probably truncate the alternative generation process so that fewer alternatives are recalled from long- 
term memory for comparison. This notion is discussed further when examining the effects of stress 
on decision making, 
Learning, Practice, and the role of Automaticity 
Several investigations have shown that tasks that are well-learned tend to be more resistant to the 
effects of stress than those that are less-well-learned. Furthermore, when tasks are practiced and well- 
learned they are likely to be committed to long-term memory and through their frequent use 
(activation, rehearsal, and recollection) they tend to be more easily remembered and executed. This 
may result from greater accessibility. This leads them to be more resistant to the negative effects of 
stress; specifically, they are less likely to be forgotten and more easily recalled under stress. In 
addition, several authors have demonstrated that practice leads to automaticity and the 
proceduralization of tasks (Fisk & Schneider, 1984). When such tasks are well-learned (possibly over- 
learned) they tend to require less on-line control and fewer mental resources to maintain or retrieve at 
all (Leavitt, 1979; Smith & Chamberlin, 1992). This state tends to result in greater resistance to stress 
effects, which also leads to better performance than less-well-learned tasks under stress. 
Beilock and Carr (2001) found support for the notion that practice leads to autonpticity and 
proceduralization of tasks, resulting in expertise-induced amnesia (experts can’t tell you what they do, 
they just do it). These authors examined choking related to golf putting and mental arithmetic. This 
finding provides support for an explicit monitoring or executive focus theory of choking (when you 
self focus you begin to pay attention to each step of the task which degrades performance). Examples 
of choking would be Tiger Woods missing a two foot putt for the PGA Open tournament or Michael 
Jordan missing an undefended lay up in the NBA title game. These authors highlight two theories 
that help explain why choking behavior in skilled performance occurs. On one hand, there is the 
distraction argument. It suggests that under pressure a performer’s attention is drawn to task- 
irrelevant cues or information which diminishes the amount of on-task resources. For instance, in our 
golfing analogy, as Tiger sets up his putt and prepares to swing the club he might allow thoughts of 
worry or anxiety, “this is a big putt ... I can’t miss this one...can you imagine if I missed” to 
dominate his thought processes. Such events would absorb and divert mental resources and working 
memory processes away from the primary task at hand. This in turn would lead to a loss in 
concentration and focus and ultimately to the performance decrement. 
However, the self-focus theory posits the opposite-it suggests that there is an increase in the attention 
paid to task-relevant dimensions. However, this theory asserts that these attentional resources are 
misguided. Specifically, the performer under pressure directs attention to step-by-step procedures 
required for a given action. This explicit focus occurs in the presence of well-developed procedural 
memory or implicit skills. Such a shift from implicit to explicit monitoring in procedures interferes 
with performance. Put another way, individuals shift from automatic to controlled processing in the 
execution of well-learned procedural skills. For all intents and purposes, this shift effectively 
transforms otherwise expert performance into novice performance. For example, the self-focus 
theory would suggest that a basketball player misses his free throws not because he can’t tune out the 
crowds, but instead, because anxiety triggers within him a shift in explicit procedural monitoring that 
disrupts his performance. That is to say, he thinks about what he is doing too much and when this 
happens, he inadvertently replaces highly effective automatic execution of skilled performance with 
deliberate, mentally taxing processes that are poorly designed for skilled performance. 
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Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes (2002) explored the effect of attention on sensorimotor skills. 
They found that well-learned skills do not require on-line attentional control and as a result dual-task 
performance is easier. When prompted to focus attention to a component of the well-learned task, 
performance was degraded. This led the authors to conclude that step-by-step attention to tasks is 
beneficial during initial learning stages but is detrimental once skills are well-learned. Katz and 
Epstein (1991) studied a related phenomenon, panic. However, panic performance is very different 
than choking. The authors argue that when individuals panic as a result of extreme stress, they do not 
engage in “overthink” as they do in choking performance responses but instead they stop thinking 
altogether and their behavior becomes primitive and maladaptive. 
Allport, Antonis, and Reynolds (1972) asserted that well-learned tasks (e.g., sight-reading music) do 
not require constant attentional control, concluding that this results in more attentional resources 
available to allocate to secondary tasks. Haslam and Abraham (1987) imposed fatigue on subjects (90 
hours of sleep deprivation), finding mood and mental ability declined significantly. These authors 
examined a number of cognitive ability measures and concluded that tasks that were well-learned 
suffered least. Schoenberger and Harris (1965) investigated the effects of noise level on cognitive 
performance. They reported that the effects observed were reduced when the task examined was well- 
practiced. Fisk and Schneider (1983) asserted that task consistency determines how practice affects 
dual-task performance. These authors paired a digit span task with either a consistent or varied 
mapping task. Their results demonstrated that the decrements incurred to working memory under 
these high workload conditions were eliminated when the task paired with the consistent mapping task 
was well-practiced. Practice did not improve working memory accuracy. 
Consistent with the notions expressed above, Kivimaki and Lusa (1994) found that training that 
encourages automatic processing in operations under stressful conditions (fire fighting techniques) 
was most useful and least degraded under stressful conditions. Green (1985) examined three different 
types of stress (environmental stress, acute reactive stress, and life stress) as they relate to pilot error 
and aircraft accidents. The author argued that most pilots respond very well to acutely stressful 
situations and when surveyed report that previous experience in simulation training was the reason for 
their success. This self-report may imply that such training plays a role in the habituation and 
conditioning of possible affective responses. McKinney and Davis (2003) examined the effects of 
deliberate practice on pilot decision making under crisis conditions. They reported finding that 
deliberate practice tends to aid performance by automating it, enhancing the performer’s ability to 
use pattern matching, and improving the accuracy of his perceptions and expectations. However, they 
questioned whether practice helped performance when part of this performance was unpracticed (the 
conditions under which most crisis situations are encountered). These authors looked at both wholly 
practiced scenarios (ones in which the entire crisis situation conditions had been prepared for by 
pilots in simulators or previous training) and part-practiced scenarios (those that included a novel 
component that pilots could not have prepared for). 
A panel of doctoral-level pilot raters examined a series of U.S. Air Force aircraft accidents and 
grouped these mishaps into categories of pilot decision making effectiveness. The findings of their 
investigation showed that deliberate practice had a positive effect on decision making in wholly 
practiced scenarios. Effectiveness was also highly correlated with the number of flight hours 
accumulated by the pilots. There was no relationship between flight hours and the effectiveness in 
pilot decision making concerning the part-practiced scenarios and deliberate practice did not help 
decision making with these scenarios. The authors concluded that specificity of training is important. 
Targeting specific elements in training improves performance on those elements under crisis 
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conditions; however, this preparation does not appear to improve pilot's readiness for novel elements 
under crisis conditions. 
In a related study, Li, Baker, Grabowski, and Rebok (2001) found that flying experience (amount of 
flight time) was one of the best protective factors against a general aviation crash (after reviewing 
National Transportation and Safety Board reports). They suggested, as others have (Kornovich, 1992) 
that overtraining is a key to safety in flying. Van Overschelde and Healy (2001) also examined the 
role of learning as a protective factor against stress effects. They found that to help diminish the 
negative effect of stress on performance it helps to link new facts learned under stress with pre- 
existing knowledge sets. One might speculate that strengthening the association to well-learned 
information functions to increase the likelihood that new information will be automated and 
engrained. 
Several authors have argued that subjects tend to "fall-back" to earlier learned responses when under 
stress (Allnut, 1982; Barthol & Ku, 1959; Zajonc, 1965). These previously learned strategies or 
knowledge sets are typically assumed to be well-learned and may be more available, easing the 
retrieval of such information. However, it should be noted, although it has been observed that 
individuals tend to revert back to entrenched learning (particularly in the facilitation of problem 
solving tasks), these fall-back strategies and knowledge sets may be less efficien: or more error prone 
than less-well-learned strategies. Arnsten and Goldman-Rakic (1998) examined the stress of noise on 
Rhesus monkeys. Their analysis determined that exposure to acute loud noise reduced their 
prefrontal cortical functions, effectively taking them "off-line," resulting in a reliance on habitual 
responses that are mediated by posterior cortical and subcortical functions. These findings may be 
analogous in some circumstances to the human stress response although direct generalization of these 
findings is obviously difficult. 
There is a building literature implicating stress in conditions for optimal learning. High degrees of 
stress (Le., threat of electric shock) during knowledge acquisition phases of learning appear to 
degrade learning ability (Keinan & Friedland, 1984; Lee, 1961). This finding has been extended to 
other conditions as well. For instance, Thompson, Williams, L'Esperance, and Cornelius (2001) found 
that learning under the stressful conditions of skydiving altered memory and learning significantly. 
These authors postulated that under such stress various cues were unlikely to be encoded or 
associated with newly acquired information. This notion contrasts with popular wisdom that training 
under realistic conditions promotes performance, even when later performance occurs under stressful 
conditions. For example, Beilock and Carr (2001) asserted that training under realistic conditions 
may inoculate individuals against choking. Kivimaki and Lusa (1994) found that training that 
encouraged automatic processing in operations under stressful conditions was most useful. However, 
it should be noted that these examples illustrate the practice stage of learning and not an initial 
knowledge-acquisition stage. 
There is some support for the idea that phased training results in the best balance between learning 
retention and real-world preparation. This model allows for an initial stage of knowledge acquisition 
to occur over minimally stressful conditions. At this point, individuals can become familiar with 
criterion stressors and build realistic expectations of those stressors. This stage is followed by 
exposure to more realistic stressors and skill practice that successively approximates the actual 
performance environment. Keinan, Friedland, and Sarig-Naor (1990) compared different training 
methods under stress (cold temperature). They reported that phased training led to the best outcome. 
Friedland and Keinan (1992) further evaluated such training models and concluded that graduated 
stress training (trainees are exposed to increasing amounts of stress over time), counter to popular 
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opinion, tended to impair performance. This was in contrast to phased and customized training 
approaches that resulted in superior performance. 
Summary of Findings and Limitations to the Literature 
The research literature concerning the effects of stress on memory consistently demonstrates that 
elements of working memory are impaired. Although the mechanisms behind these effects are poorly 
understood, it seems likely that encoding and maintenance processes are the most affected. Some 
have concluded that this reflects a reduction in resource capacity. Resources may be eliminated in 
some way, the span of time in which they can be accessed may be reduced, or these resources may be 
drawn away as a result of resource sharing (the absorption of resources by competing demands). 
Furthermore, little is known about what stage in the process this depletion or occupation takes place. 
It may be that resources or capacity are reduced at several points in the process (Le., encoding, 
rehearsal, or retrieval). Few, if any, studies have attempted to separate these dimensions within 
memory processes while under stress conditions. 
There are a variety of tasks and putative stressors under which memory has been measured. Anxiety 
is perhaps the most common stress condition under which researchers have examined memory 
performance. This research has generally directed the field toward resource-depletion models. These 
assert that worry and intrusive thoughts compete for a limited pool of resources. This competition 
necessarily results in fewer available resources that can be devoted to the primary tad.  A 
complementary view contends that attention may reduce the bandwidth of perceptual cues thus 
reducing the number or scope of attended stimuli (following Easterbrook’s hypothesis). The 
reduction in cue sampling may in turn result in a reduction in the number of items encoded into 
memory, thus further reducing the number or range of possible target items available for later 
recollection. 
The effects of divided attention on memory performance may be significantly related to this 
discussion. Analogous to the role of anxiety described previously, secondary tasks require and draw 
away resources and attention from the primary task. Thus, dividing attention between tasks reduces 
the attentional resources available to apply to either task. In such cases when the recall or recognition 
of information is required, this division often results in a decreased capacity to recall or recognize 
information. It has been demonstrated that dividing attentional resources has a direct negative effect 
on the encoding of information, although research suggests that several mechanisms may be at work. 
For example, divided attention may lead to a reduction in the time available to process incoming 
stimuli (due to time devoted to a secondary task) or it may result in reduced depth of processing and 
less elaborative coding. 
Several consistent observations have been made concerning memory for emotional events. First, 
memory tends to be impaired temporarily when recalling information prior to or following an 
emotional event. Second, memory for a targeted emotional event may or may not be impaired under 
stressful conditions; however, there is a tendency for improved recall of central features when such 
events are emotional as compared to neutral. These “tunnel” memories resemble what has been 
observed in attentional processing (Easterbrook’s hypothesis). It has been argued that such memories 
result from a combination of selective attention, preattentive bias, and post-event elaboration. Third, 
peripheral details are less often remembered when the main events witnessed are emotional in nature. 
Fourth, memory tends to be impacted by context effects. Specifically, memory improves when 
retrieval conditions are congruent with encoding conditions (Le., mood-congruency effects). Finally, 
research points to the notion that individuals may be predisposed or primed toward emotionally 
valent information. 
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Recent research has made the connection between hippocampal function and memory. Damage to 
the hippocampus often leads to impairment in learning and memory. The hippocampus is also 
implicated in the human stress response and the activation of glucocorticoids. Moreover, exposure to 
high doses of cortisol (a known marker of the human stress response) has also been found to block 
hippocampal potentiation. Thus, the hormonal stress response may cause direct effects on the brain 
structure mediating some memory functions. These neurophysiological and electrophysiological 
relationships appear to be the most promising link to an underlying biological mechanism and 
process at this time. 
Tasks that are well-learned tend to be more resistant to the effects of stress than those that are less 
well-learned. Furthermore, when tasks are practiced and well-learned, they are likely to be committed 
to long-term memory, and through their frequent use (activation, rehearsal, and recollection) more 
easily remembered. Several authors have demonstrated that this kind of practice leads to automaticity 
and the proceduralization of tasks. Thus, these over-learned behaviors tend to require less attentional 
control and fewer mental resources, which further results in enhanced performance and greater 
resistance to stress. It is generally accepted that under stress, individuals tend to revert back to earlier 
well-learned responses. This appears to be true when these previously learned strategies or knowledge 
sets are over-learned and have greater availability in memory, easing their retrieval. 
Finally, some research suggests that high degrees of stress during knowledge-acquisition phases of 
learning tend to degrade an individual's ability to learn. This finding may relate to interference or 
disruption in the encoding and/or maintenance phases of working memory. In an examination of 
learningltraining models, a phased approach results in the best balance between learning retention and 
real-world preparation. Phased learning models typically prescribe an initial period of learning under 
minimally stressful conditions, followed by a graduated exposure to stress under increasingly 
naturalistic conditions. 
Table 6 provides a sample of research studies on the effects of stress and memory performance 
(particularly working memory). 
Table 6. Studies showing negative effects of Stress on Memory. 
Source Stress Manipulation Task Setting 
Al'Absi, Hugdahl, & Public speaking & Calculations & dichotic Mixed (L & R-W) 
Lovallo (2002) arithmetic listening 
Ashcraft (2002) Math anxiety Calculations 




Berntsen (2002) Recall of traumatic Recall of event & Mixed (L & R-W) 
memory& pleasant details 
memory 
Burrows (2002) Time pressure & Verbal recognition Laboratory 
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workload 
Campbell & Austin Time pressure 
(2002) 
Christianson & Loftus 
( 1990) memory 
Davies & Parasuraman Fatigue 
( 1  982) 
Diamond, Fleshner, Novel learning task 
Ingersoll, & Rose 
(1 996) 
Dutke & Stober (2001) 
Recall of traumatic 
Test anxiety 
Evans, Hygge, & Noise 
Bullinger (1995; 2000) 
Eysenck (1985) Fatigue 
Eysenck & Calvo Test anxiety 
( 1992) 
Finkelman, Zeitlin, 
Romoff, Friend, & 
Brown (1979) 
Gevins & Smith (1999) 
Giesbrecht, Arnett, Cold 
Vela, & Bristow (1993) 
Physical stress & noise 
Fatigue & alcohol 
Gomes, Martinho- Noise (prolonged high 
Pimenta, & Castelo- amplitude, low 
Brano (1999) frequency) 
Hocking, Silberstein, Heat 
Lau, Stough, & Roberts 
Kellog, Hopko, & Math anxiety 
Ashcraft (1999) 
Kramer, Buckhout, Traumatic images 
Widman, & Tusche 
(2001) 
(1991) 
Lieberman, Bathalon, Military combat 
Falco, Georgelis, 




Recall of event & 
details 
Learning a maze (rats) 
Counting task 
LTM, WM, & reading 
WM tasks 
Calculations 
WM tasks (digit recall) 
WM tasks (spatial) 




Recall of details 
Learning, working 
memory, & logical 
reasoning 
Laboratory 
















& Marom (2003) 
Newcomer, Selke, 
Nelson, Hershy, Craft, 
Richards, & Alderson 
(1 999) 
Payne, Nadel, Allen, 
Thomas, & Jacobs 
(2002) 
Russo, Fox, Bellinger, 
& Nguyen-Van-Tam 
(2001) 
Slaven & Windle 
( 1999) 




& PLummer (2000) 
Von Wright & Vauras 
(1 980) 
Wessel & Merchelback 
( 1994) 
Wickens, Stokes, 










Exam period (anxiety) 
Noise 
Recall of traumatic 
memory 
Time pressure, noise, & 
financial risk 
Recognition recall 
Immediate & delayed 




















Mixed (L & R-W) 
Simulation 
Note. R-W = Real-world, L = Laboratory 
The Effects of Stress on Perceptual-Motor Performance 
The research literature concerning the effects of stress on perceptual-motor performance consistently 
shows that these conditions tend to degrade performance. Most studies demonstrate this in terms of 
manual dexterity; however, other tasks or skills have also been shown to suffer negative effects. On 
the other hand, perceptual-motor skills tend to be less sensitive (more resilient) to various stress 
effects than higher-order cognitive processes &e., memory). The negative effects of stress on 
perceptual- and psycho-motor tasks have been demonstrated under a variety of conditions to include: 
noise (May & Rice, 1971; Schmidgall, 2001; Stokes, Belger, & Zhang, 1990), threat of electric shock 
(Ryan, 1962), thermal stressors such as heat and cold (Enander, 1989), fatigue (Buck-Gengler & 
Healy, 2001; Fendrich, Healy, & Bourne, 1991; Healy & Bourne, 1995; Matthews & Desmond, 
2002), anxiety and fear (Baddeley, 1966; Mears & Cleary, 1980), time pressure (Van Galen & van 
Huygevoort, 2000), workload (Matthews & Desmond, 2002; Stokes, Belger, & Zhang, 1990; Van 
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Galen & van Huygevoort, 2000) and military combat (Lieberman, Bathalon, Falco, Georgelis, 
Morgan, Niro, & Tharion, 2002). 
Baddeley led a series of experiments under real-world conditions that have been the foundation upon 
which subsequent research has been conducted (Baddeley, 1966; Baddeley & Fleming, 1967; 
Baddeley, DeFiguererdo, Hawkswell, & Williams, 1968). For example, Baddeley (1966) explored the 
performance differences in manual dexterity during underwater diving. This investigation employed 
both pressure chamber experiments as well as open-water dives. He attempted to replicate the findings 
of Kiessling and Maag (1962), who suggested that the negative effects of underwater pressure on the 
manual dexterity of divers (nitrogen narcosis), was small. Kiessling and Maag examined p e r f o m c e  
on land in a dry pressure chamber. Baddeley challenged the generalizability of the findings to real- 
world underwater diving, noting the differences in the environments as perceived by the divers 
themselves as well as the added stress of open dive conditions. He measured perceptual-motor 
performance using a screw plate task at different levels of depth surface, 5-12 feet below the surface, 
and 100 feet below the surface. He found that time and accuracy declined under water and that 
performance was degraded further as the depth increased (Le., 0-10-100 ft.). Previously, Kiessling 
and Maag (1962) reported very little impairment in dexterity (7.9%) but Baddeley’s experiment 
demonstrated that these impairments were much more substantial when measured in actual 
underwater diving conditions (19.8%). Most of the performance decrements were observed in terms 
of performance speed; however, accuracy (the number of nuts left loose on the screw blate) was worse 
as depth increased as well. Baddeley concluded that, “...results obtained in a dry pressure chamber 
can not validly be generalized to performance under water.” (p. 83). In an attempt to explain these 
differences, the author listed several possibilities ranging from equipment limitations (restricting 
movement and vision) to difficulties coping with weightlessness, the stresses of cold, isolation, and 
anxiety (concerning one’s safety). 
Baddeley and Fleming (1967) compared the differential effects of diving using oxy-helium versus air 
breathing systems. The primary objective of this investigation was to examine alternative breathing 
systems in the hope of reducing the presence of nitrogen narcosis. The performance efficiency of 
these divers was assessed using two simple tasks (addition tasks and the manual dexterity task used 
previously by Baddeley). Measurements were taken at two diving depths, 6-10 feet and again at 200 
feet. No difference was found between breathing conditions at the 6-10 foot depth. However, at a 
depth of 200 feet, there was a significant drop in the speed and accuracy of operations (both addition 
and screw plate tasks). Thus efficiency dropped significantly (Le., 15-20% worse on addition tasks 
and 3045% decrement in manual dexterity) as depth below the surface increased. Baddeley and 
Flemming suggested that these decrements were likely a result of environmental stressors, perhaps an 
interaction between the gas mixture (similar to the effect of nitrogen narcosis), and the cold and 
anxiety of the environment. 
Baddeley, DeFiguererdo, Hawkswell, and Williams (1968) also explored cognitive performance 
during underwater diving. Several measures (digit copying, sentence comprehension, and manual 
dexterity) were taken at three different depths (surface, five feet, and 200 feet). The authors indicated 
there was a decrement in efficiency on all three measures (intellectual tasks appeared to be most 
affected by the nitrogen narcosis and other factors). The degree of impairment was surprisingly 
similar to that reported under pressure-chamber conditions. This finding was unexpected and 
contradicts previous research, calling into question the generalizability of such studies (Baddeley, 
1966). Baddeley and colleagues attributed the differential effects of underwater diving across these 
cognitive domains as resulting from environmental stressors, “It seems probable then that anxiety 
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may be the crucial factor in producing the marked performance decrement at depth shown by 
previous open-sea studies.” (p. 163). 
Mears and Cleary (1 980) also sought to examine the role of anxiety in underwater diving 
performance. They compared performance at depths of six meters and 30 meters under both day and 
night time conditions. The 30 meter group differed significantly in performance pattern from that of 
the six meter group. For example, increased heart rate was observed at the 30 meter depth as was 
concomitant self-rated anxiety (using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory). Decrements in manual 
dexterity were also found at levels that are consistent with previous findings (Baddeley, 1966). In 
addition, some differences on Raven’s matrices, a measure of cognitive ability, were also found at the 
greater depth. There were no significant differences found in a time-estimation task or the diver’s 
respiration rates. 
In addition to examining the effects of underwater diving on measures of psycho-motor 
performance, other real-world conditions have been employed. Hammerton and Tickner (1969) 
demonstrated the effect of anxiety and/or fear (preparation for a parachute jump) on perceptual- 
motor tracking. Performance was poorer just prior to and after parachuting. The authors concluded 
that anticipatory anxiety and the physiological arousal associated with it were likely sources of the 
disruption. Hyde, Thomas, Schrot, and Taylor (1997) studied the performance of naval special 
operations forces under real-world stressors. The authors’ goal was to validate a dattery of measures 
within a typical operational context. The specific domains investigated included strength, visual 
acuity, hand-eye coordination, endurance, and both fine and gross motor skills. Moreover, measures 
of manual dexterity were derived from the disassembly and reassembly of a weapon. Hand and arm 
strength along with endurance were determined by use of a hand dynamometer. Upper body strength 
was assessed through pull-up performance while lower body mobility, coordination, and strength 
were assessed using the Harvard Step Test (mounting and dismounting a set of steps). Finally, 
shooting skills were measured under various conditions for response time and accuracy. Hyde et al. 
(1997) examined these performance measures under the stress of winter warfare training (cold and 
austere conditions), under land warfare training (physically demanding activities while sleep 
deprived), using high-speed boat operations (element exposure), day and night parachute operations 
(threat and anxiety), and underwater diving operations (element exposure and threat). There was not 
an absolutely consistent pattern of performance degradation observed 1 across these conditions. 
However, a general pattern did emerge. For instance, the stress and cold associated with the winter 
warfare training reduced fine motor skills and hand strength. Similarly, the stress of extended land 
warfare training tended to reduce fine motor skills as did the environmental stressors of shock, 
vibration, and exposure to cold during high-speed boat operations. On the contrary, during night- 
time parachute jumps, most large muscle skills measured were enhdnced (grip strength, step test, and 
pull-up performance). Performance across other measures was not significantly affected. While 
reducing manual dexterity over time (and increasing cold), underwater diving affected fine motor 
skills but not large muscle group performance. This finding is consistent with previous investigations 
(Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1983). Overall, fine motor skills were more susceptible to disruption and 
degradation than gross motor skills. 
While the previous field research paradigms provide an excellent look at the effects of stress in 
complex environments, the bulk of the research on stress’s effects on performance comes from well- 
controlled laboratory studies. For example, Buck-Gengler and Healy (2001) measured response time 
and accuracy on a data-entry typing task. They found that as mastery was developed, response time 
tended to decrease. However, as fatigue set in on the task, accuracy in typing diminished. These 
findings are consistent with earlier investigations (Fendrich, Healy, & Bourne, 1991; Healy & Bourne, 
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1995). Evans and Johnson (2000) also examined the effects of stress on a typing task. Their results 
indicated that exposure to low-intensity noise did not cause a decrement in performance; however, 
physiological measures of stress indicated greater arousal (elevated epinephrine) and decreases in 
motivation (negative mood reported). Interestingly, it should be noted that these subjects did not 
appear to interpret their physiological reactions as signs of stress when interviewed. 
Hartley (1981) studied the effects of stress on a motor-pursuit tracking task. He found decrements in 
performance when subjects were exposed to 95 dB of noise. May and Rice (1971) studied the effects 
of loud abrupt noise on motor performance. Using a pistol shot, they demonstrated that performance 
was impaired immediately following the introduction of the noise. The authors reasoned that this 
decrement was likely due to the startle response observed. Stokes, Belger, and Zhang (1990) found 
that noise and workload made performance on psychomotor tasks worse. However, they also noted 
that the effects of these stressors on the Stroop task resulted in an increase in the speed of responses 
which enhanced performance (possibly facilitated by a tunneling of attention). Schmidgall (2001) 
reported that the stressors of noise and other environmental factors tended to degrade performance 
on psychomotor and attention (vigilance/scanning) tasks primarily when the tasks were complex. 
Enander (1989) examined the thermal stresses of heat and cold on a test of manual dexterity and 
strength. The author determined that both tasks were negatively affected by exposure to cold; 
however, other physical and cognitive domains (vigilance and endurance) were negatively affected by 
heat. Van Galen and van Huygevoort (2000) examined the effects of time pressure and workload on 
a perceptual-motor tracking task. They found that these stressors generally resulted in more errors, 
greater movement variability and greater cursor control pressure on the task. Matthews and Desmond 
(2002) examined the effects of fatigue and increased workload on tasks of perceptual-motor abilities 
(a driving task). Driving an automobile requires the management of divided attention and task 
division. The authors found that fatigue tended to increase errors in heading, steering, and reduced 
perceptual sensitivity . 
Several researchers have investigated the resiliency of psychomotor tasks under stress conditions and 
concluded that they were unlikely to show much impairment. Theologus, Wheaton, and Heishman 
(1974) examined the effect of intermittent noise on performance and found that it tended to degrade 
various cognitive tasks; however, they concluded that psychomotor tasks appear to be less sensitive to 
noise effects. Cohen and Weinstein (1981) found similar results under noise exposure. Such findings 
are intriguing and appear to mirror previously reported results that suggest that well-learned or 
implicit tasks are more resistant to the negative effects of stress than those requiring active attentional 
control or higher-order cognitive involvement. 
Summary of Findings and Limitations to the Literature 
The research literature concerning the effects of stress on perceptual-motor performance consistently 
shows that these conditions tend to degrade performance. The negative effects of stress on 
perceptual- and psycho-motor tasks have been demonstrated under a variety of conditions. Most 
commonly this has been demonstrated using tasks of manual dexterity. Fine motor skills tend to be at 
greater risk for impairment than gross motor skills. However, compared with higher-order cognitive 
processes, perceptual-motor skills tend to be less sensitive to various stress effects. 
Table 7 provides a sample of research studies on the effects of stress on perceptual-motor 
performance. 
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Table 7. Studies showing negative effects of Stress on Perceptual-Motor Performance. 
Source 
Baddeley (1966) 




Baddeley & Fleming 
( 1967) 
Buck-Gengler & Healy 
(2001) 
Enander (1989) 
Fendrich, Healy, & 
Bourne (1991) 
Hammerton & Tickner 
( 1969) 
Healy & Bourne 
(1 995) 
Hyde, Thomas, Schrot, 
& Taylor (1997) 




Morgan, Niro, & 
Tharion (2002) 
Matthews & Desmond 
(2002) 
May & Rice (1971) 
Mears & Cleary (1980) 
Ryan (1962) 
Stress Manipulation Task seting 
Anxiety & fear 
(diving) 
Anxiety & fear 
(diving) 
Anxiety & fear 
(diving) 
Fatigue 
Heat & cold 
Fatigue 
Anxiety & fear 
(parachuting) 
Fatigue 






Fatigue & workload 
Noise (pistol shot) 
Anxiety & fear 
(diving) 
Electric shock 
Screw plate task Real-world 
Digit copying & Screw Real-world 
plate task 
Screw plate task Real-world 
Typing task Laboratory 
Manual dexterity 
Typing task Laboratory 
I 
Perceptual-motor Real-w orld 
tracking 
Typing task Review 
Various military Real-world 
operations 
Fine motor tasks Real-world 
Various cognitive tasks Simulation 
Driving task Simulation 
Psychomotor task Laboratory 
Manual dexterity & Real-world 
cognitive measures 




Schmidgall (2001) Noise (loudabrupt) Vigilance & scanning 
Stokes, Belger, & Noise & workload Psychomotor & S troop 
Zhang (1990) tasks 
Van Galen & van Time pressure & Perceptual-motor Laboratory 
Huygevoort (2000) workload tracking 
Note. R-W = Real-world, L = Laboratory 
The Effects of Stress on Judgment and Decision Making 
Judgment and decision making constitute distinct processes and outcomes, and investigators differ in 
their characterization of these two concepts. It can be argued that decision making is the result of 
judgment-an action-based response. Several authors have attempted to describe and model the 
process of decision making (Hammond, 1980; Speed & Forsythe, 2002) while othersthave 
characterized its role in information processing (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Deutsch & Pew, 2002; 
Keele, 1973) and as part of the larger cognitive architecture (Leiden, Laughery, Keller, French, 
Wanvick, 2% Wood, 2001; Neufeld, 1999). Regardless of how these two elements are ultimately 
defined, they are conceived of by most as related and interconnected. Furthermore, they are typically 
viewed as an end state culminating from the previous processes discussed (Le., attention, memory, 
cognitive appraisal). Are the effects of stress on judgment and decisions more than simply the sum of 
lower level effects related to attention, memory, and cognitive appraisal? Whether they are a reflection 
of these previous decrements taken to their logical conclusion or whether they are also subject to 
further stress effects in their own right is unclear; however, it is clear that judgment and decision 
making are altered under stress conditions. The research in this area can be divided a number of 
ways. 
In general, judgment and decision making under stress tend to become more rigid with fewer 
alternatives scanned (Broder, 2000; 2003; Dougherty & Hunter, 2003; Janis, Defares, & Grossman, 
1983; Janis & Mann, 1977; Keinan, 1987; Streufert & Streufert, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965; 
Wright, 1974). Furthermore, there is evidence that individuals tend to rely on previous responses 
(typically when they are familiar and well-learned), regardless of previous response success (Lehner, 
Seyed-Solorforough, O'Connor, Sak, & Mullin, 1997). Thus, in addition to experiencing greater 
rigidity, individuals may tend to persist with a method or problem-solving strategy even after it has 
ceased to be helpful (Cohen, 1952; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). For the sake of organization, 
I have chosen to present findings about individuals first, followed by research on teams and groups. 
Consistent with previous sections, the general findings are presented followed by more specific 
dimensions. Prior to a discussion of stress effects, a brief review of decision theory has been provided. 
Theoretical Models of Judgement and Decision Making 
Broadbent (1979) asserted that judgment is probabilistic in nature. He employed a signal detection 
task and noted that when subjects believed that the probability of a signal was high, they were more 
likely to assert their confidence that the signal was present or absent. Building from Broadbent's 
theory, Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) argued that decision makers rely on a number of heuristics 
ranging from the simple to the complex. They theorized that individuals are equipped with an 
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adaptive toolbox that is filled with these different strategies. Accordingly, when faced with a decision, 
these authors asserted that individuals are wired to employ the most adaptive heuristic available. 
Perhaps the most well-known heuristic is take-the-best (TTB). This model proposes that decision 
makers, when faced with a decision, search their memories for criterion-linked probability 
information. Gigerenzer, HafTrage, and Kleinbolting (1991) suggested that this search is bounded by 
cognitive economy-the search for information is quick, streamlined, and tends to rely on the most 
valid probabilistic cue separating alternatives. These authors challenged the notion that individuals 
reasoned from “multiple conditional probabilities,” instead opting for a single discriminatory cue. 
(p. 612). 
Broder (2000; 2003) attempted to establish empirical support for this model through the use of an 
artificial stock market paradigm. Broder (2000) determined that the majority of decision makers 
relied on this simple heuristic under certain circumstances while choosing other strategies at other 
times. The author suggested that the operant function in this strategy shifting appeared to be related 
to the perceived costs incurred with each decision. For instance, when the cost of gathering the 
additional information was perceived as low, subjects tended to expand their strategy; however, in 
situations when they perceived the cost of such information as high, they tended to rely solely on the 
take-the-best heuristic. Although these results have been replicated by others (Newell & Shanks, 
2003), Broder (2003) sought to test the model further. Using the same stock market paradigm, the 
author found similar results. In addition, Broder found a link between a measure of intelligence and 
heuristic choice. Drawing upon the connection between intellectual ability and working memory 
capacity, Broder explored these findings in a further experiment designed to test the hypothesis that 
working memory would be implicated in heuristic choice as well. Broder theorized (as others have 
before him) that working memory capacity is intimately linked to resource capacity. When 
individuals are engaged in a high working memory loaded task, their capacity for other information 
processing operations is likely to be compromised. Broder conjectured that if this is so, then 
individuals engaged in a decision making task would be more likely to rely on a simple heuristic than 
a complex one. They would be content with limiting their scan of alternatives in the name of resource 
. management. Although the findings from his second experiment once again indicated that 
intelligence (as measured by the Wiener Matrizen Test) was the moderating factor in heuristic choice 
(smarter people choose more adaptive decision making strategies) the results were not as supportive 
of his working memory hypothesis. Contrary to expectation, there was no link established to working 
memory load and heuristic choice. This finding is somewhat inconsistent with experiments conducted 
by Dougherty and Hunter (2003). These authors suggested that individuals tend to make probability 
judgments by comparing a focal hypothesis with relevant alternatives retrieved from long-term 
memory. They also concluded that individuals with a large working memory span tend to include 
more alternatives in their comparison process, and that time constraints probably truncate the 
alternative generation process so that fewer alternatives are recalled from long-term memory for 
comparison. This position argues that the complexity of heuristic or strategy employed in decisions 
may at least in part relate to the amount of time available for the decision. 
Individual Judgment and Decision Making 
In general, individual judgment and decision making is degraded under stressful conditions. 
However, just what elements are degraded and in what ways is less clear and is a much more complex 
issue. It has already been argued that stress can lead to hypervigilance, a state of disorganized and 
somewhat haphazard attentional processing. Janis and Mann (1977) were the first to formalize these 
observations under their decision-conflict theory. According to this theory, hypervigilance results in a 
frantic search, rapid attentional shifting, and a reduction in the number and quality of alternatives 
considered. Ultimately, this state leads to degraded judgment and decision making. Several 
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investigations have lent support to this theory. Janis, Defares, and Grossman (1983) found this to be 
true for some decision making tasks under the stress of perceived threat. Keinan (1987) also reported 
similar findings. He examined performance on a multiple-choice analogies test in order to assess the 
range of alternatives considered by subjects prior to making a decision. Keinan employed the threat 
of electric shock as his stress manipulation. He observed that when individuals felt threatened they 
tended to abandon their previous organized and systematic scan patterns. This resulted in a failure to 
consider as many alternatives. Furthermore, those that were examined were less systematic in their 
evaluation of alternatives. The result of this process proved to be a reduction in the quality of their 
decisions. 
Baradell and Klein (1993) designed a study to expand on this previous work by linking the 
hypervigilant decision making approach to a measure of body consciousness. These authors 
contended that when individuals experience stressful events they perceive their physiological 
reactions to these events as representing anxiety. Moreover, these individuals are believed to devote 
attentional resources toward this anxiety, resulting in a reduction in coping capacity. This lowered 
capacity diminishes the ability to consider alternatives comprehensively and scan systematically for 
information related to their judgment of the situation. As a result, Baradell and Klein suggested that 
individuals who are most sensitive to bodily stimuli are likely to be those who are the most susceptible 
to poor decision making due to the hypervigilance incurred through resource depletion. Their 
findings showed individuals scoring high on private body consciousness (sensitivity to internal 
sensations) performed worse on decision making tasks after experiencing negative life events than 
those scoring low on the measure of body sensitivity. Individuals scoring low on this measure tended 
to be rather resistant to the negative effects of stressful events. On the contrary, subjects that scored 
high on body consciousness tended to scan fewer alternatives prior to making their decisions, they 
scanned less systematically, and they were more likely to return to previously scanned options. One 
would conclude from these investigations that hypervigilant responses necessarily lead to poorer 
outcomes than other strategies. However, some have contended that this is not the case. For example, 
Driskell, Copper, and Moran (1994) found that subjects who employed a hypervigilant strategy 
performed better than those who used a vigilant strategy. Hypervigilance did not degrade under time 
pressure while a vigilant strategy did. The authors concluded that hypervigilant decision styles can be 
adaptive and effective in some circumstances. 
Kastner, Entin, Serfaty, Castanon, and Deckert (1989) employed a naval combat simulation task in 
their examination of the effects of task difficulty on decision making processes. These authors 
designated subjects as anti-submarine warfare commanders charging them with the task of friend or 
foe determinations. Decision makers were provided access (at a cost) to either a human consultant or 
a probe sensor. The levels of expertise of these two agents varied as did their costs (time penalties). As 
reported by Entin and Serfaty (1990), the researchers developed an optimal model of information 
search through which they tried to determine, “. . .under what circumstances decision makers should 
stop gathering information and start making decisions, and under what conditions decision makers 
should seek processed information (consultant opinions) rather than raw information (probe 
measurements).” (p. 4). Their results indicated that subjects tended to seek more information than 
was optimal and that such information tended to be preferentially sought from consultants who had 
already processed the data themselves. This was true even in cases when the cost associated with 
seeking the information clearly outweighed any potential benefit. In an extension of this work, Entin 
and Serfaty (1990) explored a very similar paradigm. In their experiment, subjects were under the 
dual “stress” of time pressure and a secondary task that intruded on their primary decisions. Task 
difficulty varied across workload levels, the discriminability of enemy versus friendly submarines, the 
cost to implement the consultant or the probe, and the level of expertise of the consultant (measured 
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in error rate levels). Entin and Serfaty found that decision makers tended to seek out more 
information in difficult versus easy discrimination tasks, and they typically followed a rational cost- 
benefit rule in their decisions. Cost information was determined to be the most important moderator, 
and under difficult decisions they typically preferred the easier-to-process opinion of the consultant. 
This was particularly the case as time pressure and workload increased. 
Sinclair and Mark (1995) explored the effects of mood state on judgment accuracy. There is a large 
literature that supports the notion that mood moderates differential processing strategies. This 
assertion has already been substantiated for anxiety and threat in terms of attentional bias. 
. . .subjects in positive states, regardless of arousal level, appear to make less 
effortful and less detail-oriented decisions that result in error, relative to those 
in negative states. Negative affective states, regardless of arousal level, appear 
to result in more effortful and systematic processing that can lead to greater 
accuracy in decision making, relative to positive affective states. (p. 430) 
Sinclair and Mark suggest that in cases when systematic and careful processing of information is 
related to enhancing performance, sad individuals should be more accurate in their problem solving 
than happy individuals. To test this hypothesis, the authors devised three experiments. In their first 
experiment the authors employed a mood induction procedure where subjects were asked to read 60 
statements (elated, neutral, or depressed) and then concentrated for two minutes on an event in their 
personal lives that caused them to feel similar to the mood statements. Following this induction phase, 
subjects completed a mood inventory. After this measure was complete, subjects were asked to 
examine and estimate the correlation coefficients of nine different scatter plots. The authors 
conducted a mood-manipulation check that confirmed the effectiveness of the mood-induction 
procedure. Their results indicated that subjects with more positive moods were the least accurate in 
judgments while those with neutral or negative moods were the most accurate. 
The authors noted that any conclusion that suggested mood was the operant element would be 
difficult as the presence of physiological arousal confounded such a determination. Accordingly, the 
author’s second experiment implemented separate affective and arousal induction items (Velten 
serenity and anxiety) in addition to the previous positive, negative, and neutral mood items. Following 
completion of a mood measure, subjects were once again shown a series of scatter plots and asked to 
estimate their corresponding coefficients. Additionally, each subject was asked to rate hidher level of 
effort and provide a description of the strategy employed in the exercise. The authors performed a 
principal axis factor analysis which ultimately revealed two main factors, arousal and affect, 
accounting for 29% and 47% of the variance respectively. The authors found that regardless of 
arousal level, subjects experiencing negative affect tended to access more information as well as more 
helpful information in their assessment of the scatter plot relationships. On the contrary, subjects with 
more positive mood states tended to approach the task with less effort and less time than those with 
negative mood ratings. This general trend appeared to be most characteristic of correlations that were 
weaker than those that were stronger. Thus, in less ambiguous estimations, mood was less of a factor 
in determining performance outcome. 
Finally, the author’s third experiment replicated the design of the first two while adding a direct 
manipulation of processing strategy. Specifically, they instructed half of the subjects to engage in a 
thoughtful and systematic analysis of the task-indicating that strong performance would increase the 
class extra credit received by their participation. The results of this approach indicate that direct 
manipulation of processing strategy is possible and that the outcome mimics that of induced positive 
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versus negative mood state. The authors concluded that processing strategy may moderate the effects 
witnessed as a result of mood state. Thus, subjects in positive moods may be less likely to use the kind 
of systematic and detail-oriented processing strategy that motivated neutral-mood individuals 
employ. The authors caution that heuristic use and processing strategy are likely to be task and 
situation dependent and that arguing the benefits of sad or neutral mood states over positive mood 
states in terms of judgment and decision making is likely to be an oversimplification of the findings. 
These are not the only investigations to link affect and decision making. Dreisbach and Goschke 
(2004) reviewed the research literature addressing the relationship between positive affect and various 
cognitive processes. They concluded that positive affect tends to increase cognitive flexibility, verbal 
fluency, flexibility in decision making, shifts in heuristic use, and enhances the activation of remote 
associates from memory. Calvo and Castillo (2001) examined the effect of negative affect on 
decision making and found that anxious individuals were more likely to make inferences that were 
mood-based than individuals who were not anxious. This finding is clearly related to mood-related 
attentional biases as well as the mood-congruent memory-recall literature previously reviewed. 
Many of the putative stressors described previously have been studied for their effects on judgment 
and decision making. For instance, Rotton, Olszewski, Charleton, and Soler (1978) found that the 
stress of noise reduced individuals’ ability to distinguish between social roles, which resulted in 
greater difficulty in social judgments and decisions. Soetens, Hueting, and Wauters (1992) found that 
fatigue degraded individuals’ performance on complex decision tasks but not on more simplistic 
judgments. Yamamoto (1984) examined the stress caused by a simulated fire and found that such 
conditions tended to result in degraded cognitive performance related to judgment and decision 
making on a variety of laboratory tasks. Several groups have investigated the effect of time pressure 
on judgment and decision making. The results of these investigations have been consistent and 
negative (Stokes, Kemper, & Marsh, 1992; Wickens, Stokes, Barnett, & Hyman, 1991; Zakay & 
Wooler, 1984). For example, Ben Zur and Breznitz (1981) used a gambling paradigm in their 
examination of decision making strategies. These authors found that decision makers under time 
pressure tended to make lower risk choices and spend more time viewing negative dimensions related 
to their decisions. Rothstein (1986) also examined decision making under time pressure and found 
that subjects were able to implement sound decision policies, but their behavior was more erratic than 
when time for their decisions was not as limited. 
Speier, Valacich, and Vessey (1999) investigated the effects of interruptions on individual decision 
making noting “interruptions were found to improve decision-making performance on simple tasks 
and to lower performance on complex tasks. For complex tasks, the frequency of interruptions and 
the dissimilarity of content between the primary and interrupted tasks was found to exacerbate this 
effect.” (p. 337). The authors argued that interruptions make information overload worse by 
reducing the amount of time one has to spend working the problem, which in turn leads to feeling 
time pressured. This creates both capacity, too much information to process, and structural, inputs 
that are occupying the same physiological channel, interference (Le., monitoring two visual displays 
at once). Moreover, interruptions also place greater demand on the cognitive processing system. For 
example, information that is forgotten due to overload requires further resources to re-process or 
simply never gets encoded. 
Ruffell Smith (1979) investigated the effects of increased workload on flight crew performance. 
Examining 20 three-person flight crews from a major civil aviation transport carrier, Ruffell Smith 
subjected crews to a series of flight simulator scenarios under various workload conditions (i.e., 
routine to abnormal scenarios). Flight crews were fitted with physiological monitoring equipment 
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during their observations. Data was recorded across five dimensions to include: observer’s comments 
(a running commentary concerning activities and errors), crewmember heart rate, paperwork or 
documentation regarding each flight, flight deck communications, and aircraft parameters. Crews 
initially flew an uneventful leg followed by a period of high workload (i.e., mechanical malfunctions, 
fuel load and weight issues, weather conditions, etc,). Following this period of flight, crews 
experienced a relative calm which ended in a more complicated landing sequence including a hand- 
flown ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach and a three-engine landing. Upon analysis, the 
author noted that a series of errors were made. These were categorized into several main types 
including those considered to be: navigational, communication-related, systems errors, flying errors, 
tactical-decision errors, and difficulties in crew integration or resource management. The results of 
this study indicate that periods of increased workload, even those considered to be part of normal 
flight operations, increased the frequency and volume of errors. In addition to a listing of errors and 
error frequencies, Ruffell Smith also provided a narrative account of how errors occurred during 
different phases of the flights. The author noted that procedural errors tended to be related to poor 
coordination among crew members while under stressful conditions. The greatest deviations in heart 
rate appeared immediately following take-off and landing procedures. Moreover, heart rate lability 
was also associated with the pilot flying as opposed to the pilot not flying in each scenario-when at 
the controls of the aircraft, pilots tended to experience a rise in their heart rates. It was also observed 
that reaction time was increased significantly for captains when faced with the decision to shut down 
an engine in flight. However, this was typically only when they were at the controls. The author 
concluded that numerous human factors issues remained unaddressed in airline operations, 
highlighting problems that ranged from instrumentation and ergonomics to checklist design. 
Wickens, Stokes, Barnett, and Hyman (1991) examined the effects of stress on pilot decision making. 
These authors highlighted the earlier work of Broadbent (1971) and Hockey (1986) as a foundation 
for current perspectives on how stress affects information processing. They cited three main effects: 
1) a reduction in cue sampling, 2) a reduction in the resource-limited capacity of working memory, 
and 3) when time is reduced, a speed-accuracy trade-off in performance outcome. In their 
investigation, Wickens and colleagues implemented the computer-based pilot decision program, 
MIDIS. Pilots were tasked with viewing a computer screen containing operating instrumentation and a 
text box that described various decisions during the course of a simulated flight. In an initial study, 
expert pilots were found to make similar decisions to novice pilots, though they tended to be more 
confident in their decisions. In a second experiment, pilots were asked to engage in a series of flight 
scenarios using the MIDIS system. Subjects were also asked to manage a concurrent task (the 
Sternberg memory search). Prior to initiating the flight scenarios, pilots were presented a four-letter 
memory set for memorization and then later asked to indicate when they recognized one of the letters 
appearing on the screen (during the flight simulation). A number of target and non-target letters were 
presented during the simulation. In addition, an annoying tone signaled after responding to the 
letters. If the pilots were correct in their recognition, this noise lasted only two seconds, if incorrect it 
continued for 12 seconds. The subjects were further motivated to accomplish the secondary memory 
task through a financial reward, the better the performance, the more money guaranteed. The results 
demonstrated that the authors’ motivational manipulations were effective. Furthermore, it was 
determined that the stress conditions presented alongside the MIDIS program did degrade decision 
making. These authors found that decisions requiring the activation of declarative knowledge were 
poorer than those that did not (procedural knowledge), but that they were made more rapidly and 
with more confidence. 
Ozel (2001) examined how fire fighters process environmental information used for the decision to 
exit a fire. Under time pressure and the threat of fire, Ozel asserted that when slightly “stressed,” 
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one’s ability to determine the best time to exit was likely to be enhanced, while under high levels of 
stress there would probably be a restriction in the range of cues attended and a distortion of 
information processing. He suggested that the result was likely to be a decrement in performance. 
Thus, based on a review of Easterbrook’s model of attentional narrowing and its impact on various 
information processing systems, Ozel posited that judgment and decision making would be degraded 
under stress conditions typical of fire-fighting situations. 
The Role of Experience in Judgment and Decision Making 
One’s experience level or familiarity with a type of decision task has been found to be related to the 
quality of their decision (Shafto & Coley, 2003). Several domains of expert decision making have 
been examined, most frequently fire fighting (Klein, 1989; Klein & Klinger, 1991; Taynor, Crandall, 
& Wiggins, 1987), military operations, and aviation (Hutton, Thordsen, & Mogford, 1997; Klein & 
Thordsen, 1991; Stoke, Kemper, & Marsh, 1992). For example, Klein observed the decision making 
process of fire-ground commanders using a “think aloud” approach to his investigation. He 
determined that experts in this kind of analysis tended toward a systematic and sequential strategy 
versus that adopted by novices, who evaluated conditions concurrently. Klein suggested that experts 
may be able to draw upon large stores of information from their long-term memory to assist them, 
possibly recognizing patterns with which to compare current situations with previous outcomes. 
Stokes, Kemper, and Marsh (1992) argued for this sort of schema-based evaluation io expert aviators 
as well. Shafto and Coley (2003) contend that experts make decisions on the basis of, 
“causal/ecological reasoning steeped in the context of the respective environs” as opposed to the 
novices, who rely on, “more decontextualized similarity-based reasoning.” (p. 642). Stokes (1995) 
further examined pilot performance on an aeronautical decision making task and found that novice 
pilots made poorer decisions than expert pilots and their decision making was further degraded under 
stress while expert pilots decision making was not. This is certainly consistent with previous findings 
that have causally linked a pilot’s risk of being involved in an airline accident and their experience 
level (Kornovich, 1992; Li, Baker, Grabowski, & Rebok, 2001)-as expected, experienced pilots are 
less likely to be at risk than less experienced pilots. 
Similarly, Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) explored the relationship between pilot experience and 
decision making strategies. They compared three groups of pilots: inexperienced, intermediate, and 
experienced (measured in overall flight time). Each pilot was provided a series of tasks to include 
measures of general problem solving ability, a syllogistic reasoning task, and a set of aeronautical 
decision scenarios calling for weather-related aeronautical determinations. Their investigation 
suggested that the more experience a pilot had, the more effective his or her cognitive strategy in 
making decisions was likely to be. Additionally, experienced pilots tended to visually search fewer 
screens of information, return to previously scanned information screens less often, and spent less 
time examining these screens than novice pilots. Experienced pilots also tended to take less time in 
making aeronautical and weather-related decisions. One of the most insightful findings of this study 
was that the potency of expertise appeared to be related to task-specific domains. That is to say, 
although experience as a pilot did aid in differentiating experts from novices in decision making, 
expertise in weather-related decisions as a pilot was the most predictive variable. Thus, expertise in 
and of itself helps, but it may be that task-specific experience is most relevant to time-critical decision 
making. This finding highlights the potential importance of realistic emergency and abnormal 
situation training, for in no other way can novice operators (regardless of the industry they represent) 
safely garner emergency decision making expertise. 
Lansdown (2001) examined the differences in novice and expert drivers. He found that experts 
tended to be more efficient in their attentive processing. Specifically, experts relied more on 
74 
peripheral visual cues to maintain lane position as compared to novices who relied heavily on foveal 
fixations. This finding led Lansdown to suggest that experts have more attentional resources to devote 
to other events or situations than novices due to this simplification or paring of tasks. This conclusion 
is well-supported by other research on the differences in resource management by experienced versus 
novice operators (Burke, 1980; Doane, Woo Sohn, & Jodlowski, 2004; MacDonald & Lubac, 1982; 
Stokes, 1995). These investigations into expertise provide at least one explanation for why stress tends 
to degrade novice performance and not expert performance differentially. For example, expertise 
affords the operator greater resources to devote toward other tasks through the proceduralization and 
automation of their performance. 
Team Judgment and Decision Making 
There is an expanding literature concerning team or group decision making. Historically, research 
has maintained a focus on the individual in terms of human performance. Examinations of the 
human-machine interface and methodology used to assess cognitive task analysis is all but 
exclusively oriented toward the individual (McDermott, Klein, Thordsen, Ransom, & Paley , 2000). 
Accordingly, various research groups have developed models designed to replicate the cognitive 
requirements and profile limitations of human teams (MacMillan, Paley, Levchuk, Entin, Freeman, & 
Serfaty, 2001). McBride (1988) examined three-member teams under time pressure and mental 
workload (increasing the rate of information presented to the teams). Each team was observed while 
performing a dynamic group-choice task. Teams that were provided a set of useful decision heuristics 
tended to report experiencing less stress and also performed better than teams who were not provided 
useful heuristics. The degree of stress created by time pressure was clearly related to the degree of 
effect suffered. Thus, teams performed worse as time pressure to make their decisions increased, 
regardless of heuristic choice. 
Effective or adaptive teams tend to shift strategies under stress. Specifically, their use of explicit 
coordination appears to shift to implicit coordination, subsequently enhancing performance (Entin & 
Serfaty, 1990; Entin, Serfaty, & Dekert, 1994; Entin, Serfaty, Entin, & Dekert, 1993; Serfaty, Entin, & 
Johnston, 1998). Bowers, Salas, Asberg, Burke, Priest, and Milham (2002) found this to be true in 
experiments using a high fidelity simulation under time pressure and mental workload. Using an 
artificial stock market game, Broder’s (2003) results also suggested that most participants shifted 
strategies in an attempt to adapt to the situation. Entin and Serfaty’s ‘(1999) examination of teams 
indicated that they tended to draw on shared mental models of their situation and task. This has 
previously been shown to be of value in the performance of aircrew (Orasanu, 1990). This strategy 
facilitated their ability to shift from explicit to implicit coordination, thereby reducing coordination 
“overhead” (the typical costs incurred by explicit strategies). These authors subsequently designed 
team-training procedures to teach teams to adapt to high-stress situations by improving their 
coordination strategies. Investigations have also found the inverse of this phenomenon, whereby less- 
adaptive teams lose implicit coordination when under stress, reverting to explicit strategies. 
Driskell, Salas, and Johnston (1999) examined social behavior in team decision making. These 
authors noted the common finding of Easterbrook’s attentional narrowing hypothesis and proposed 
that it could be extended to the group-process level. Highlighting recent examples from the airline 
industry whereby an aircrew’s performance as a team was causally linked to both positive and 
negative outcomes, Driskell et al. suggested that stress can reduce group focus that is necessary to 
maintain proper crew coordination and situational awareness. Using Navy personnel, the authors 
constructed a computer-based simulation of a naval decision task. Subjects were placed in teams of 
three, interacting over a computer network at varying levels. Their tasks consisted of the classification 
of craft (sub, surface, or air) with an assessment of their status (military or civilian) and intentions 
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(friend or enemy). Stress was manipulated across auditory distraction, task load, and time pressure. 
Their results indicated that groups lost team perspective under stress and that they were more likely to 
shift to individualistic self-focus than maintaining their group team-focus. The authors suggest that 
this occurs when, “. ..social or team cues are marginalized as attention is narrowed under stress.. ..’, 
(p. 300). In a related line of research, several investigators have concluded that time pressure 
increases the level of cooperation between groups in negotiation because it facilitates concession 
making; however, it has been noted that this may also interfere with the development of‘integrative 
agreements due to forced cooperation (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982; Rubin & Brown, 
1975). 
In addition to a shift to implicit over explicit strategy, various research results point to task or load- 
shedding as another adaptive strategy. This form of task simplification has been studied in a variety 
of contexts. Davis (1948) studied the effects of fatigue and continuous flying operations on pilots. 
He observed that, over time, pilots reduced their visual scan toward peripheral instrumentation opting 
for greater focus on instruments used in the central task of flying. Bursill (1958) replicated these 
findings on laboratory tasks. Welford (1973) further reviewed these earlier investigations into task- 
shedding and equated them to social attempts at load-shedding used by the elderly. Rothstein and 
Markowitz (1982) investigated task-shedding under the stress of time pressure. In their investigation 
they provided subjects with seven seconds to decide which of two sets of numbers had the largest 
mean. They found that subjects tended to simplify the task under the pressures of limited time. The 
most common approach was to use the larger sum as the indicator, even when this strategy was 
inaccurate. Raby and Wickens (1990) also examined task-shedding strategies in an aeronautical 
decision making task. In their experiment, pilots reduced their workload when task saturated and 
stressed. This tended to occur in expected directions. They initially dropped tasks that fell into the 
“can do” category, followed by those considered as “should do” items and lastly by more critical 
tasks falling into the “must do” category. 
Strategy-shifting and task-shedding often result in economical savings in cognitive resources as 
workload increases. Sperandio (1971) explored this strategy in ws examination of Air Traffic 
Controllers (ATC). He found that controllers tend to exercise a regulating effect on their workload 
through strategy shifting. Observing ATC operations, Sperandio found that controllers under 
increasing workload conditions (measured by traffic load) tended to shift *from a direct approach 
strategy (data needed to verify and possibly achieve separation between aircraft) to a standard 
approach strategy (data concerning aircraft performance not needed for separation of aircraft). This 
shift from direct to standard approaches provided less precise but adequate information. In short, 
“when the traffic level increases, the controller reduces the number of variables that he must 
process.” (p. 574). For example, during periods of low traffic (low workload) controllers tended to 
take into account several data points (performance data, flight levels, geographical information, etc.), 
but when traffic conditions increased significantly, just flight levels were attended to and processed. 
Sperandio concluded that controllers are economizing their workload with a shift in strategy or 
method, reducing any redundant information or non-essential information from being processed. 
These findings are consistent with previously reported research on expert versus novice decision 
making (Burke, 1980; Davis, 1948; Klein, 1989; Lansdown, 2001; MacDonald & Lubac, 1982; 
Stokes, 1995). 
Summary of Findings and Limitations to the Literature 
The research literature concerning the effects of stress on judgment and decision making 
demonstrates that both individual and team processes are degraded. Many of the putative stressors 
described previously have been shown to negatively affect these processes (e.g., noise, fatigue, 
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physical or emotional threat, etc.). The ways in which this occurs are diverse. Stress can lead to 
hypervigilance, a state of disorganized and somewhat haphazard attentional processing. This 
condition often results in a frantic search, rapid attentional shifting and a reduction in the number 
and quality of alternatives considered. As fewer alternatives are considered, there is a recursion to 
previously sampled possibilities. Individuals tend to rely on these previous responses regardless of 
their previous response success. Thus, in addition to experiencing greater rigidity, individuals may 
tend to persist with a method or strategy even after it has ceased to be helpful. This assumes that the 
previous strategy or approach is well-learned. 
Affect or mood has also been implicated in judgment and decision making. Individuals experiencing 
negative affect tend to access more information in general as well as more helpful information in 
their assessment of situations. What has been termed “depressive realism” in the past has found some 
support in this regard. The inverse of this assertion appears also to be true. Those experiencing 
positive mood states tend to approach tasks with less effort and less time. This trend appears most 
characteristic of decisions or judgments that are made when the task or conditions are ambiguous. 
Thus, individuals in positive moods may be less likely to use systematic and detail-oriented 
processing strategies in their decision as compared to individuals who are experiencing a negative 
mood. 
Effective or adaptive teams tend to shift strategies under stress. This often takes the form of a shift 
from explicit coordination toward implicit coordination, subsequently enhancing performance. This 
strategy has been suggested to reduce coordination overhead or the typical costs in time, resources, 
and effort that teams using explicit strategies alone incur. The opposite is true for less adaptive teams 
under stress. These groups tend to lose implicit coordination and fall back to explicit, on-line control 
strategies. The result can be a heavy cost in resources and ultimately decrements in performance. This 
phenomenon has also been described as a loss in team perspective. In this regard, teams under stress 
may lose their shared mental models and their collective comprehension (awareness of each other’s 
efforts), shifting to an individualistic self-focus. Although it has not been definitively determined, 
teams that share common mental models are believed to be those that are able to shift from explicit to 
implicit coordination. 
I 
In addition to strategy shifting, various research results point to task dr load shedding as another 
adaptive strategy. This form of task simplification has been studied in a variety of contexts and has 
been characterized as economizing workload with a shift in strategy or method that reduces any 
redundant information or non-essential information from being processed. This type of resource 
management seems to happen logically and/or systematically at first (paring tasks appropriately) but 
may result in less-organized and less-reasoned shedding as workload and stress increase to dramatic 
levels. 
The reader will note that decision making has frequently been studied under simulation or real- 
world-like environments. This has been the case more often than in previous cognitive processes 
examined. It is likely that the complexity of judgment and decision making forces this type of 
approach. But more restrictive approaches are highly desirable, in order to augment the study of 
decision-making under naturalistic settings. Table 8 provides a sample of research studies on the 
effects of stress on judgment and decision making. 
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Table 8. Studies showing negative effects of Stress on Judgment and Decision Making. 
Setting 
Laboratory 
Source Stress Manipulation Task or Outcome 
Baradell & Klein 
(1993) 
Negative life events & 
state anxiety 
Negative life events 
Analogies task 




Bar-Tal, Raviv, & 
Spitzer (1999) 
Ben Zur & Breznitz 
(1981) 
Gambling tasks Time pressure 
Bowers, Salas, Asberg, 
Burke, Priest, & 
Milham (2002) 
Time pressure & 
workload 



















Calvo & Castillo 
(2001) 
Greater rigidity, fewer 
alternatives considered 
Task-shedding 
Prone to ballistic DM 
style 
Hypervigilant style 





Time pressure Simulation 
Simulation 
Driskell, Copper, & 
Moran (1994) 
Implicit to explicit shift Driskell, Salas, & 
Johnston (1999) 
Stress 
Entin & Serfaty (1990) Time pressure & 
workload 
Simplified heuristic Simulation 
Simulation 
Simulation 
Entin & Serfaty (1999) 
Kastner, Entin, Serfaty, 
Castanon, & Deckert 
(1 989) 
Stress Explicit to implicit shift 
Strategy shift Task difficulty 
Most familiar heuristic Simulation Lehner, Seyed- 
Solorforough, 
O'Connor, Sak, & 
Time pressure 
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Pruitt & Carnevale 
(1 982) 
Raby & Wickens 
(1 990) 
Rothstein (1986) 
Rothstein & Markowitz 
(1 982) 
Rotton, Olszewski, 
Charleton, & Soler 
( 1  978) 
Rubin & Brown (1975) 
Ruffell Smith (1979) 
Serfaty, Entin, & 
Johnston (1998) 
Soetens, Hueting, & 
Wauters ( 1992) 
Sinclair & Mark 
( 1995) 
Sperandio (1971) 
Staw, Sandelands, & 
Dutton (1981) 
Stokes (1995) 
Stokes, Kemper, & 
Marsh (1992) 
Streufert & Streufert 
(1981) 
Walton & McKersie 
(1 965) 
Time Pressure Heuristic training 
helped 























Erratic DM style 
Task-shedding 
Social role distinction 
Facilitates concession 
making 
Poor CRM & explicit 










Explicit to implicit shift Simulation 
Complex decision tasks Laboratory 
Correlation coefficient Laboratory 
estimations 
Task simplification Real-world 
Greater rigidity, fewer Laboratory 
alternatives considered 
Novice pilot DM Simulation 
Decision making Simulation 
Greater rigidity, fewer Laboratory 
alternatives considered 
Greater rigidity, fewer Laboratory 
alternatives considered 
Welford ( 1973) 
Wickens, Stokes, 
Barnett, & Hyman 
(1991) 
Wright (1974) 
Y amamoto ( 1984) 
Zakay & Wooler 
1984) 
Social situations Task-shedding Review 
(elderly) 
Time pressure, noise, & Vigilance & attention Simulation 
financial risk 
Time pressure Greater rigidity, fewer Laboratory 
a1 ternatives considered 
Threat of fire Laboratory 
Time pressure Buying decisions Laboratory 
The Effects of Putative Stressors on Performance 
Putative stressors such as workload &e., concurrent task management, task switching, time pressure), 
heat and cold, noise, and fatigue have already been discussed in part during previous sections (e.g., 
attention, memory). However, there are large bodies of literature that focus directly on each of these 
variables individually. In the preceding sections, I briefly review the research that supports major 
conclusions about each “stressor’s” role in affecting performance. Portions of this review have been 
included in previous sections as appropriate; however, additional research that addresses these 
stressors directly is also presented. 
There is significant inconsistency among researchers concerning the direct and indirect effects of 
various putative stressors. Direct stress effects are those incurred by the task load alone irrespective of 
any psychological stress that may also be generated. Accordingly, indirect stress effects are those that 
evolve out of psychological factors associated with the task load demands. There is a fine line that 
separates these two, and they can be indistinguishable at times. This fact b s  made their separation 
and measurement particularly difficult. There are several issues at the heart of the inconsistencies 
found in the literature. For example, is the application of some task demand (i.e., workload or time 
pressure) an application of stress? Many would argue that it is while others would contend the 
contrary. Proponents of the former typically offer one of two arguments. The first argument states 
that stress is a term that can be applied to any demand on a system. Therefore, any task that requires 
mental resources qualifies as a stressor-it places a demand on the system. This argument meets the 
criteria of early stress definitions (stimulus-based approaches); however, it is no longer as accepted 
given the widespread belief that stress is transactional in nature. The second argument proposes that 
demands incur a psychological cost in addition to their direct effects. That is to say, these demands 
trigger a psychological response such as frustration, anxiety, or psychological discomfort. This 
response often contains both physiological and mental components that vie for resources. In this way, 
stress acts as a secondary workload factor drawing resources away from the primary demand, 
devoting them instead to secondary psychological processes. 
On the other hand, a compelling argument can be made that workload is a demand that does not 
require, nor regularly incur, a secondary psychological cost. In applying the stated definition of 
stress-the interaction between three perceptions: a demand, an ability to cope with that demand, and 
the importance of being able to cope (McGrath, 1976), it’s difficult to see how demand 
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characteristics alone qualify as stressors. For example, in some circumstances time pressure and/or 
workload would trigger anxiety or frustration that might further distract or interfere with 
performance. However, it is not clear that this would necessarily be so in most, let alone all, situations. 
If we agree that subjective experience and specifically cognitive appraisal (a transactional model 
assumption) is elemental in defining stress, then one must assume it plays a significant role in 
answering questions about whether workload, time pressure, or other putative stressors carry both 
direct and indirect effects. Does this suggest that when a demand is deemed stressful or upsetting it is 
necessarily a stressor, regardless of the objective outcome? If an increase in workload does not impair 
performance yet is viewed as stressful by the operator, does this indicate that it should be considered a 
stressor? Reasonable arguments can be made to support both positions, and the research literature, in 
its current state, is a reflection of this fact. As the reader has already observed, several researchers have 
attempted to side-step this issue by relying on descriptions of task load alone, ignoring the potential 
accompanying psychological stress. In doing so, they have circumvented a direct discussion of stress 
and its role in performance degradation or enhancement. However, in leaving this issue unaddressed, 
these authors have left the reader to infer a stress effect, correctly or not. I have not attempted to 
resolve this issue but to make the reader aware of it. At the end of this review I attempt to provide a 
conceptual framework that helps organize data and concepts that I hope provides more coherence 
than is apparent in the literature. 
The Effects of Workload (Work Volume, Concurrent Task Management, and Task 
Switching) 
Early views of stress treated the concept and the human organism in mechanistic terms (Cannon, 
1932; Selye, 1950). Stress was frequently viewed as present when demands outweighed resources. 
The resulting “strain” on the system was seen as a stress effect. Later theorists included a cognitive 
component to this definition yet stress was still conceived as an imbalance between environmental 
demands and the organism’s capability to adequately respond to those demands (Lazarus, 1966). 
This type of simplistic dichotomy lent itself to an interpretation of workload and other variables as 
“stressors.” For instance, it has been established that increased work volume requires greater 
resources to sustain performance. According to earlier views of stress, this fact alone draws the 
parallel between the two concepts. Although there is far from universal acceptance of this connection, 
many in the research community today still consider factors such as workload, stress-related. 
I 
Although some have resisted the temptation to connect workload and stress, instead relying on 
descriptions of the task demands alone (Hancock & Desmond, 2001), this has proven difficult given 
the divergence among the research community. For example, Parasuraman and Hancock (2001) drew 
a distinction between workload and task load, asserting that task load was the environmental load on 
the organism while workload was the experience of that loading by the organism as it attempted to 
adapt accordingly. These descriptions are reminiscent of the troubled distinction between direct and 
indirect stress effects. Readers are likely to be confused by the inconsistencies among researchers as 
one investigation’s task loading is another’s stressor. The following discussion of workload elements 
has been provided in light of the divergence that exists among researchers in this area. The reader 
should note that this reviewer found little, if any, discussion in previous reviews or in the primary 
literature that provided a validation account for the connection between putative stressors and 
psychological stress. 
Most human interactions in the world involve dynamic and complex management of multiple tasks. 
This is certainly true of human-machine interactions. Thus, it is not insignificant that a large portion 
of the human performance literature has historically examined single putative stressors, isolated from 
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their environments. Unfortunately, as valuable as such studies are to our collective understanding of 
various processes and their relationships, they fail to match the character of the world we live in. 
Because of this, research that examines multitask performance is of particular interest. Much of this 
research literature has already been reviewed under previous sections of attention and memory; 
however, studies directly related to concurrent task management not previously addressed are 
reviewed below. 
In general, concurrent task management results in degraded performance on either the primary or 
secondary task (Hitch & Baddeley, 1976; Kahneman, 1975; Neisser & Becklan, 1975; Shaffer, 1975). 
It should be noted that among studies in the experimental literature, discerning a primary from a 
secondary task is somewhat arbitrary. Simply stated, within the limited resources model, multiple tasks 
divide available resources between themselves and under high workload or stress conditions, there 
tend to be insufficient resources to concurrently manage both tasks. Therefore, one, if not both tasks 
(having received less than optimal resource devotion), suffers. While real-world settings may in some 
circumstances afford natural primary task and secondary tasks, often times these designations are 
merely a laboratory convenience more than a reflection of the naturalistic design. 
The concept of capacity and the presumption of limited resources has been the most popular 
explanation as the intervening variable in dual-task performance decrements (Kahneman, 1973; 
Navon & Gopher, 1979; Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Similarly, earlier models of single-channel 
information processing (Kerr, 1973) have recently made way for the assertion of more complex 
system explanations. For example, in contrast to Broadbent (1958) and Treisman’s (1969) early 
selection theory which postulates a single-channel information processing bottleneck in structural 
theory (occurring at the point of perception), Wickens and Dixon (2002), based on their exploration 
of navigational flying tasks, proposed three theories of concurrent task demands, single channel, 
single resource, and multiple resource. The authors found the most convincing support for a 
multiple-resource model. Wickens (1991) was one of the first to introduce a multiple resources 
model, choosing to illustrate the model using a concurrent task management example. This author 
suggested that three possible factors were engaged in concurreqt task management performance 
outcomes. The first was confusion, which he defined as a condition where similar tasks often interfere 
with performance while more distinct tasks degrade performance less often. The second potential 
outcome he coined cooperation. The cooperation between task processes can be seen when high task 
similarity yields combined results @.e., tracking a ball as you prepare to hit it with a racquet). Finally, 
he suggested that there can be competition between demands. Competition for task resources, 
specifically resource allocation to one task versus another, results in diminishing resources from the 
other task(s) being managed. Wickens has argued that timesharing (cooperation) improves between 
tasks to the extent that they use separate versus shared resources. 
The research reviewed here predominantly adheres to the notions of confusion and competition 
between concurrent tasks. Driskell, Mullen, Johnson, Hughes, and Batchelor (1992) performed a 
meta-analysis of studies investigating dual-task performance. They reported a relatively consistent 
finding (over a variety of stressors to include thermal, noise, time pressure, etc.) that performance on 
the primary task tends to suffer when individuals attempt to accommodate a secondary task (a 
moderate effect size was noted). The authors found that the more similar the two tasks, the greater the 
interference and the worse the primary task performance. Thus performance did not degrade to the 
same extent when attempting to manage dissimilar tasks. Boggs and Simon (1968) and Finkelman 
and Glass (1970) observed similar differential effects with exposure to noise. McLeod (1977) 
determined that performance on a tracking task was worse under conditions of high response 
similarity, when both responses were manual as compared to conditions of low response similarity 
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(one manual, one verbal). This seems consistent with the idea that less confusion or interference 
occurs as task characteristics diverge. 
Allport, Antonis, and Reynolds (1972) examined dual-task performance in listening and reading 
tasks. They found that subjects who attempted to verbally shadow prose passages while learning 
auditorily presented words performed worse than when learning visually presented words. Sullivan 
(1976) enlisted subjects to perform dual auditory tasks, shadowing and target detection. Each task 
was presented to a different ear which resulted in an increased difficulty in performance of the 
shadowing task, in turn leading to fewer target detections. Concurrent task management does appear 
to be easier (performance improves) when tasks are dissimilar than when they are similar (Treisman 
& Davies, 1973). Wickens (1980) theorized that two tasks with similar processing demands will 
interfere with each other more than tasks with different processing demands which may account for 
these findings. 
It should be well established in the mind of the reader by this time that dividing attention between 
tasks reduces the attentional resources available to devote to either task. In such cases when the recall 
or recognition of information is examined, this division frequently results in a decrease in memory 
recall and recognition. The mechanisms under which this occurs are somewhat obscured at the 
present, but they are becoming clearer. Baddeley, Lewis, Elderidge, and Thomsop (1984) have 
demonstrated that dividing attentional resources tends to negatively affect the encoding of 
information into memory. Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, and Marom (2003) and Craik, Govoni, Naveh- 
Benjamin, and Anderson ( 1996) have proposed several different mechanisms for this occurrence. 
From this list have emerged the two strongest candidates, the time availability hypothesis and the 
elaboration hypothesis. The former suggests that divisions in attention lead to reductions in the time 
available to process incoming stimuli (due to time devoted to a secondary task). The latter hypothesis 
proposes that information is coded with less elaboration and depth when attentional resources are 
divided. Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2003) explored a third hypothesis, the associative deficit hypothesis, 
which suggests that divided attention disrupts the coherence between associated units of information 
during encoding. However, they failed to find adequate support for this explanation in their own 
examination of the mechanism. 
While the general findings concerning concurrent task management are compelling, in some 
instances this management does not lead to degraded performance on either task. Several authors 
have examined the accuracy in simultaneously detecting tones and lights and found little interference 
effects (Eijkman & Vendrik, 1965; Moore & Massaro, 1973; Tulving & Lindsay, 1967). Similarly, 
dual-task performance can be maintained across both tasks when they are well-learned (Spelke, Hirst, 
& Neisser, 1976). Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, Caharack, and Neisser (1980) examined this hypothesis by 
asking subjects to read aloud prose while taking dictation. These authors tested individuals initially 
and after 50 hours of practice and found that highly practiced tasks can be performed jointly with 
little interference. Schneider and Detweiler (1988) suggested that automatic and/or controlled 
processing theory could be used to account for such observations. 
Undoubtedly, the degree to which performance is affected seems likely to be related to the difficulty 
of each task-based on the degree of resource mobilization required by the task. Relatively simple 
tasks such as the signal-detection tasks described above may be relatively resistant to the negative 
effects of resource sharing. In this instance, it may be the case that there are ample resources to share 
between tasks. This seems to also be confirmed by the finding that well-learned or automatic tasks 
can be maintained more easily than less-well-learned tasks. On the other hand, more complex tasks, 
presumably requiring greater resource devotion, may be at greater risk for interference and 
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degradation. Although very little research seems to have been conducted on concurrent task 
management under psychologically distressing conditions, it can be assumed that such stress would 
compromise the management of resources further, drawing them away from either or both tasks. 
The Effects of Time Pressure on Pedormance 
Time pressure has been found to degrade performance across a variety of cognitive domains. The 
range of performance domains that have been found to suffer under time pressure include: judgment 
and decision making (Entin & Serfaty, 1990; Raby & Wickens, 1990; Rothstein & Markowitz, 1982; 
Sperandio, 1971; Stokes, Kemper, & Marsh, 1992; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Zakay & Wooler, 
1984), visual search behavior, vigilance and attentional processes (Streufert & Streufert, 198 1; 
Wickens, Stokes, Barnett, & Hyman, 1991; Wright, 1974), memory recall strategies (Cambell & 
Austin, 2002), concession making and integrative agreements (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982; 
Rubin & Brown, 1975; Walton & McKersie, 1%5), and subject’s self-ratings of performance 
(Greenwood-Ericksen & Ganey, 2002). In addition to a general drop in performance, time pressure 
and the corresponding sense of urgency experienced tends to result in strategy-shifting in teams 
(explicit to implicit rules and greater coordination between members), task- or load-shedding (of 
which strategy-shifting may be seen as one specific example), tunneling of attention and visual 
scanning, and a speedaccuracy trade-off in performance. 
Some have argued that time pressure is the central factor at the heart of all performance decrements 
and that any element that impinges on an operators’ workload, does so through this variable. Hendy, 
Farrell, and East’s (2001) information processing model of operator stress is defined by time 
pressure. These authors posit that time pressure is the underlying stressor that determines operator 
performance, error production, and judgments of workload. In fact, according to Hendy et al. all 
factors affecting workload are reduced to this variable. Moreover, the authors suggest that the 
relationship between a given task load and its corresponding time pressure can be estimated by 
dividing the task load by the rate at which information (related to the load) can be processed. This 
equation results in a determination of the decision time needed to manage the load. This figure is 
further divisible by the time available to the operator to complete the operations in question, which 
leaves a numerical function representing time pressure. The authors propose three possibilities by 
which human information processing can reduce load mismatch. The first is reduction in task load or 
the amount of information required to be processed. The second is an increase in the time available 
to complete the task, and the third is an increase in channel capacity (regulating the rate and volume 
of information processing). Hendy et al. are certainly not alone in their alignment of time pressure 
and workload. 
I 
O’Donnell and Eggemeier (1986) also drew a direct connection between these two variables. These 
authors have suggested that time pressure and workload are the operant conditions that lead to load- 
shedding. The previous discussion of shedding strategies seems to further support this perspective 
(Raby & Wickens, 1990; Rothstein & Markowitz, 1982; Sperandio, 1971). Wright (1974) found that 
time pressure contributed to a state of information overload whereby subjects simply did not have 
enough time to process information and were forced to simplify their decision task by reducing their 
visual scans and by considering fewer decision-related alternatives. Entin and Serfaty (1990) placed 
subjects under the dual workload conditions of time pressure and a secondary task. The authors 
found that with difficult decision tasks subjects preferred seeking additional input from the easy-to- 
process opinion of a consultant versus raw data from a sensor probe. This was particularly the case as 
time pressure and workload increased. This pattern of performance further reflects the common use 
of resource economizing or shedding strategies through the employment of pre-processed 
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information. To what extent these “strategy-shifts” are motivated purely by anxiety and to what 
degree they reflect the physical limitation of time is unclear. 
Lehner, Seyed-Solorforough, O’Connor, Sak, and Mullin (1997) also examined decision making 
performance under time pressure. They found that teams used less-effective decision strategies as 
time pressure increased. Specifically, they used strategies that were more familiar to them versus those 
that were better but more recently learned. This finding links what is known about our reliance on 
previous learning under stress and our preferential use of well-learned strategies regardless of their 
effectiveness. These tendencies may be seen as adaptive in some instances as research has shown that 
well-learned and proceduralized knowledge sets tend to be resistant to the negative effects of 
workload and stress. 
Using a gambling paradigm, Ben Zur and Breznitz (1981) found that subjects tended to make lower 
risk choices and spend more time viewing negative dimensions while under time pressure. This 
tendency to accentuate negative evidence present in their decision making task was also found by 
Wright (1974). Greenwood-Ericksen and Ganey (2002) explored the effect of time pressure on 
subjects’ ratings of their own performance. The authors found a tendency for individuals to rate 
themselves worse under time pressure than those not under this pressure (even when there was no 
difference in objective performance). Thus, not only does time pressure seem to ,draw some 
individuals toward an active processing of their negative circumstances; it may also cause them to 
view their abilities to manage these circumstances in negative ways. 
Finally, several investigators have concluded that time pressure increases the level of cooperation 
between groups in negotiation because it facilitates concession making; however, it has been noted 
that this may also interfere with the development of integrative agreements due to forced cooperation 
(Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Walton & McKersie, 1965). 
Driskell, Mullen, Johnson, Hughes, and Batchelor’s (1992) meta-analysis of the effects of time 
pressure on performance revealed that time pressure has a negative effect on performance speed 
(across various cognitive domains) and accuracy (although the size of the effect is much larger for 
speed than accuracy). These authors also determined that the effect of time pressure is mediated by 
the type of manipulation employed. For example, continuous manipulations (shortening the length 
of the time available for the task) produced strong negative effects for both speed and accuracy, 
whereas categorical manipulations (stating that subjects should work as fast as possible from the 
beginning) created mild to moderate increases in speed and actually enhanced performance accuracy 
slightly. Logically, the magnitude under which an individual is pressured for time affects their 
performance: the stronger the magnitude, the greater the speed but the more impaired the accuracy 
for continuous manipulations. The authors found no effect of magnitude on categorical 
manipulations. Driskell et al. noted that urging an individual when pressured for time also affected 
their performance. For continuous manipulations, there were strong negative effects for both 
accuracy and speed of performance when urged. 
The authors concluded that the effect of time pressure on performance appeared to be a function of 
the task. Pattern recognition tasks, vigilance tasks, and reaction tasks were the most negatively effected 
in terms of performance accuracy while pattern recognition, reaction tasks, and to a lesser degree 
cognitive tasks, were the most posidvely effected in terms of performance speed. 
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The Effects of Thermal Stress (Heat and Cold) on Performance 
Under thermal stress (heat and cold) various cognitive processes appear to be impaired and this 
impairment seems to be related to the severity of these stressors. Cognitive impairments appear to be 
more prevalent under conditions of cold than those of heat. Most of the research literature in this area 
has assessed psychomotor and/or perceptual-motor tasks and to a much lesser extent complex 
cognitive tasks. Accordingly, impairment patterns have been clearly demonstrated among 
psychomotor skills (particularly fine motor skills under cold conditions), but there are mixed results 
when it comes to higher-order cognitive abilities. 
The explanation for such decrements remains unclear but likely originates from several sources. 
From a biological or neural functioning perspective, thermal stress may lead to a breakdown in 
thermal regulation. On the other hand, the discomfort caused by thermal extremes may result in an 
information processing distraction that interferes with task-related performance (Le., drawing 
resources and attention away from the task and toward the subjective experience). Similarly, volitional 
changes in strategy may occur. For example, it has been suggested that the strategic allocation of 
resources across different task components may change. In such a case, the shift in resource 
allocation may accompany a goal shift toward emotion-focused coping -a result of concurrent 
management of the task demands and the subjective discomfort of the stressor. 
The number of contexts in which thermal stressors have been shown to degrade performance is large 
and includes those in attentive processes (Callaway & Dembo, 1958; Pepler, 1958; Vasmatzidis, 
Schlegel, & Hancock, 2002), memory (Giesbrecht, Arnett, Vela, & Bristow, 1993; Hocking, 
Silberstein, Lau, Stough, & Roberts, 2001), psychomotor and/or perceptual-motor tasks (Baddeley & 
Fleming, 1967; Enander, 1989; Gaydos & Dusek, 1958; Hyde, Thomas, Schrot, & Taylor, 1997; 
Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1983), problem solving (Fine, Cohen, & Crist, 1960), and under various 
training environments (Keinan, Friedland, & Sarig-Naor, 1990). 
I 
Attentional processing has typically been examined using vigilance tasks. Pepler (1958) found that, 
under the stress of heat, vigilance decreased over time. Vasmatzidis, Schlegel, and Hancock (2002) 
found similar decrements in vigilance, visual tracking, and auditory discrimination tasks when 
participants were subjected to heat. Callaway and Dembo’s (1958) examination of cold demonstrated 
its effects on the judgment of sizes. Subjects were instructed to put their foot into a bucket of ice 
water simulating stressful conditions related to thermal discomfort. The authors found that the 
subjects tended to judge the objects as larger than matched controls. Due to the fact that size 
judgments typically require the incorporation of peripheral cues such as elements in the foreground 
(shadow, texture, relative position of other objects, etc.), the authors concluded that subjects had not 
attended to these cues, focusing instead on the central object. These judgments did not appear to be 
related to ophthalmic changes and Callaway and Dembo (1958) surmised that some physiological 
mechanism seemed to increase the selectivity of an individual’s attention under the stress of cold. 
Thermal stressors have also been employed in the study of working memory performance. These 
examinations have included both heat (Hocking, Silberstein, Lau, Stough, & Roberts, 2001) and cold 
(Giesbrecht, Arnett, Vela, & Bristow, 1993). Giesbrecht, Arnett, Vela, and Bristow (1993) found that 
after immersion in cold water, tasks requiring minimal cognitive demands remained unaffected 
(auditory attention, Benton visual recognition, digit span forward); however, those tasks deemed more 
cognitively challenging (digit span backward-requiring working memory, and the Stroop task) 
showed significantly degraded performance. Slaven and Windle (1999) simulated conditions of a 
disabled submarine and found that under the stress of cold, there were no significant performance 
decrements (including measures of working memory). However, self-report measures suggested that 
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decrements were perceived. These authors concluded that motivation and the presence of peers 
(shipmates) may have played a role in mitigating the effects of thermal stress. 
Fine, Cohen, and Crist (1960) are one of the few to have studied problem-solving abilities under 
thermal stressors. They found that there was no difference in performance between 70 degrees and 
95 degrees (Fahrenheit) on anagram tasks. Giovani and Rim (1962) failed to find performance 
decrements in subjects responding to a dominoes task when under heat and they found no difference 
in performance between heat extremes (77 and 109 degrees). Grether (1973) examined finger 
tapping, response time, and vigilance behavior. His investigation demonstrated that heat tended to 
improve performance up until a point after which performance decreased. His results suggested that 
decrements in this curvilinear relationship occurred reliably after temperatures rose past 85 degrees. 
Hancock and Vasmatzidis (1998) also found support for a derivation of the Yerkes-Dodson inverted- 
U performance curve in their review of the literature on heat and performance studies. 
Performance on perceptual-motor tasks is perhaps the largest domain in which thermal stressors have 
been examined. Early investigations by Baddeley and his colleagues tended to lump the stress effects 
of cold with other anxieties in their evaluation of under-water diving performance (Baddeley, 1966; 
Baddeley & Fleming, 1967). Enander (1989) examined the thermal stresses of heat and cold on a test 
of manual dexterity and strength. Although he acknowledged the presence of sowe direct 
physiological effects, “the temperature of the hands.. .is clearly a limiting factor in the performance 
of manual tasks in the co ld ,  he stated, “...performance on more complex cognitive tasks is the 
result of an integration of physiological reactions, physical and mental capabilities, and subjective 
assessments.” (p. 28). In his review of the research on the effects of cold, Enander reported that 
reductions in core body and muscle temperature result in decreases in strength and endurance 
(Bergh, 1980; Ramsey, 1983) as well as tactile sensitivity at 8-10 degrees Celcius and manual 
dexterity at 12-15 degrees Celcius (Clark, 1961; Dusek, 1957). Fine motor movements and the 
manipulation of small objects have also been shown to be impaired when exposed to cold 
temperatures (Kiess & Lockhart, 1970; Vaughan, Higgins, & Funkhouser, 1968). Enander asserted 
that research has implicated the role of cognitive distraction in these effects at both cool (15.5 
degrees Celcius j and cold (4.5 degrees Celcius) water temperatures (Vaughan, 1977). Exposure to 
cold air has also resulted in an increase in errors on serial choice-reaction time tasks of varying 
complexities (Ellis, 1982; Ellis, Wilcock, & Zaman, 1985). Moreovet, working memory and encoding 
processes (likely mediated through attention) have been shown to be impaired when exposed to 
significant cold (core body temperature of 36.7 degrees) while long-term memory stores remain 
fairly resistant to such effects (Coleshaw, Van Someren, Wolff, Davis, & Keatinge, 1983). 
Enander (1989) also reviewed the research on the effects of heat and found, “there is little initial 
effect on physical strength, but the gradual accumulation of heat in the body during longer and more 
intense exposures gradually builds up fatigue and a corresponding decrease in endurance” (p. 29). 
Vigilance and sustained attention tasks have been the most common types of tasks tested under heat 
exposure. The overall pattern of effects for heat is somewhat confusing and appears to depend on the 
task examined and the intensity of the heat experienced. Moreover, when the temperature remains 
constant (albeit hot), performance decrements are much less (except for extreme temperatures) than 
when temperature is variable or climbing. 
These differential effects have also been noted by others. Driskell, Mullen, Johnson, Hughes, and 
Batchelor’s (1992) meta-analysis of the effects of thermal stress on performance indicate that heat 
does not significantly affect the speed of performance but does slightly degrade the accuracy of 
performance. However, these authors found cold temperature significantly affects both the speed of 
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performance as well as the accuracy of performance (moderate effect sizes were found for both 
outcomes). Driskell et al. also noted that group size was a significant moderator of performance. 
While there was no effect of group size under heat conditions, there were significant differences in 
performance under cold conditions-the larger the group, the less was the negative effect of the cold 
on performance. This finding resembles the “misery loves company” theory reported earlier and 
may reflect the role that motivation and effort play in reducing the negative effect of thermal 
discomfort. 
Ramsey (1983) postulated that the most significant effect of cold temperature on performance is the 
loss of manual dexterity of the hands. Gaydos and Dusek (1958) examined the effects of cold on 
manual dexterity and found that significant impairment occurred when hand skin temperature was 
below 53 degrees (Fahrenheit). Horvath and Freedman (1957) also investigated the effects of cold 
temperature on manual tasks (writing ability). These authors observed men working at temperatures 
of 22 degrees for two weeks noting that significant decrements in manual tasks and writing ability 
occurred but that general mental and cognitive performance remained intact. Although 
conspicuously absent from the research literature, the need for a differentiation between direct and 
indirect effects is no where more necessary than it is here. Presumably, the effects of cold on fine 
motor control are largely a function of physiology and thermodynamics; however, research on 
human performance under thermal stress fails to address this issue adequately. 
1 
Hyde, Thomas, Schrot, and Taylor (1997) studied the performance of naval special operations forces 
under real-world stressors. The specific domains in their investigation were predominantly 
perceptual-motor in nature and included: grip and arm strength, visual acuity, hand-eye coordination, 
physical endurance, and both fine and gross motor skills. Hyde et al. (1997) examined these 
performance measures under several adverse conditions to include winter-warfare training and 
underwater diving operations. There was a general pattern of performance decrement that emerged. 
The exposure to cold, associated with the winter-warfare training, reduced fine motor skills and hand 
strength. While reducing manual dexterity over time, exposure to cold and the elements in underwater 
diving impacted fine motor skills but not large muscle group performance. These findings are 
consistent with previous investigations (Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1983). Overall, fine motor skills were 
more susceptible to disruption and degradation than gross motor skills. 
Several researchers have investigated the role of motivation and effort in staving off the effects of 
thermal stress. As mentioned above, Slaven and Windle (1999) found few if any significant 
performance decrements using a disabled submarine simulation. They surmised that motivation may 
have played a role in mitigating the effects of thermal stress. Razmjou and Kjellberg (1992) explored 
the effects of heat on a serial-choice reaction task. They found that heat increased the frequency of 
errors but did not impact reaction time. The authors asserted that this finding was possibly offset by 
the allocation of additional effort (based on the self-report of their subjects). Razmjou (1996) 
subsequently provided a framework for the analysis of stress states. He examined two control 
processes, strategy and effort. Razmjou found that providing feedback to subjects regarding their 
performance resulted in improvements under the stress of heat. These findings taken together seem to 
suggest that appraisal, goal structure, and subsequent effort can, and often does, moderate the 
negative effects of some thermal stress conditions. 
. 
The Effects of Noise on Performance 
In general, exposure to noise tends to degrade performance. Although the results are mixed, most 
studies find that intermittent noise is more disruptive to performance than continuous noise. However, 
definitive conclusions about decibel level at which performance decrements are shown are difficult to 
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draw since the research findings in this area have also been mixed. As the nature of the task changes, 
the effects change. For example, psychomotor tasks appear to be less affected by noise than higher- 
order cognitive processes. As one might expect, this is likely to be related to the findings previously 
reported concerning the resilience of proceduralized or implicit skills and knowledge. Undoubtedly 
there is a shared mechanism which facilitates these performance patterns. 
The research on the effects of noise on performance is relatively well-developed. This maturity owes 
much to a handful of dedicated individuals who have investigated this area extensively and includes 
the work of Donald Broadbent, Robert Hockey, and Christopher Poulton. The examination of the 
effects of noise on performance has occurred across several domains to include vigilance and 
attentional tasks (Broadbent, 1954; Broadbent & Gregory, 1963; Broadbent & Gregory, 1965; 
Broadbent, 1971 ; Hockey, 1970), memory (Poulton, 1978; 1979), reaction-time (Allen, Magdaleno, 
& Jex, 1975), psychomotor tasks (Cohen & Weinstein, 1981; Theologus, Wheaton, & Fleishman, 
1974), and the ability to distinguish social roles (Rotton, Olszewski, Charleton, & Soler, 1978). 
Broadbent was one of the first to systematically examine the relationship between noise and tasks of 
vigilance (195 1). Across a series of investigations, he and his colleagues demonstrated significant 
impairment in sustained attention at the level of 100 dB of noise (Broadbent, 1954; Broadbent & 
Gregory, 1963; Broadbent & Gregory, 1965; Broadbent, 1971). Hockey (1969) reviewed the effects 
of noise on performance and found a wide range, from impairment to improvement. These mixed 
results led the author to examine the effects of noise on attention. His review suggested that the 
effects of noise were mediated by attentional selectivity (Easterbrook’s hypothesis) and Hockey 
decided to test this theory further (Hockey, 1970). He employed a dual-task of pursuit-tracking and 
multi-source monitoring under two noise level conditions (70 dB and 100 dB). Subjects were tasked 
with manually aligning a pointer with a moving target while visually scanning a series of light flashes 
and responding with key strokes accordingly. Hockey’s (1970) results support the notion that noise 
has differential effects on performance. Performance on the designated primary task (manual- 
tracking) was enhanced through the application of loud noise (relative to quiet). Performance on the 
secondary task (light detection) was enhanced in central-feature performance but not in monitoring 
lights on the periphery. Hockey concluded that these findings support the presence of a noise- 
induced attentional-selectivity mechanism. 
Hockey has provided several subsequent reviews of this literature (Hockey, 1978; Hockey, 1979; 
Hockey, 1983). He suggested that two theories account for the effects of noise on performance. The 
first is distraction theory. This theory is largely based on Broadbent’s (1958) earlier model of 
information processing and simply states that noise interferes with performance. Specifically, it posits 
that a human’s information processing center is singular and of limited capacity. Often referred to as 
Broadbent’s filter theory, the model proposes that information is filtered and either selected for 
further processing or discarded. Moreover, Broadbent argued that, at some point along the way, 
information coming in for processing must be reduced to a single channel of limited bandwidth. 
Thus was born the bottleneck theory of information processing that has been discussed previously. 
The second theory maintains that noise facilitates functioning by stimulating processing. This 
perspective, based on arousal theory, is deeply rooted in the position that central nervous system 
activation is required for information processing and that such activation initiates and sustains 
processing. Applied to noise, the theory suggests that such stimulation increases arousal, facilitating a 
concomitant increase in performance up to a point where over-arousal occurs, resulting in 
corresponding decrements in performance. 
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Hockey’s (1979) review of the literature provided nine conclusions regarding the effects of noise on 
performance: 1) noise results in both positive and negative outcomes; however, these are less likely to 
occur early in performance, 2) negative effects have a greater likelihood among complex tasks, 3) 
improvement from noise exposure is often seen in less complex tasks or those in which boredom is 
experienced (noise acts to increase alertness), 4) low to moderate levels of steady noise ( 4 0  dB) are 
not as likely to effect performance as intermittent noise or noise above these levels, 5) memory effects 
can occur with as low as 70-80 dB of noise early on in task performance, 6) verbal comprehension 
can be negatively affected by noise that is less than that needed to impair the intelligibility of speech, 
7) noise can increase attentive focus during the encoding of information while reducing the 
availability of that information, 8) noise’s central effect on information processing is to tunnel 
attention toward the central-features of a task, and finally, 9) noise appears to increase one’s 
subjective sense of confidence in one’s decision making even though no additional evidence for such 
confidence has been added. 
One of the most frequently reported decrements in the literature is the masking of speech. Obviously, 
if the interference of the noise is so great that one can not hear, any hope of processing the 
information is all but lost. Hockey points out that the risk for such problems in human 
communication is greatest when encountering sounds in the lower register as most of human speech 
occurs among the lower sound frequencies. Hockey wasn’t the only one to explore tQe relationship 
between acoustic masking and performance. Poulton (1978) asserted the notion that the introduction 
of noise resulted in the masking of acoustic cues and a reduction in subvocalizations so that 
individuals couldn’t “hear themselves think.” This loss in subvocalization has been construed as a 
loss in attention to internal thoughts and ideas. Thus, without the ability to monitor and engage in 
internal dialogue, performance on various tasks is likely to be degraded. In a further description of 
this process, Poulton (1979) suggested, “...performance may improve initially because of an increase 
in arousal. If performance is disrupted by the masking of audible feedback or inner speech, the initial 
improvement in continuous noise may become a decrement, as arousal falls and no longer 
compensates for the masking.” (p. 361). 
Accordingly, noise can either improve or degrade performance. Improvements in performance 
typically occur soon after the noise is initiated while decrements typically arise later and may 
continue (an aftereffect) after the noise has ended. In appreciation of both the distraction and arousal 
theories, Poulton provided descriptive evidence of both. He reported that when noise creates masking 
of acoustic feedback or inner speech, performance decrements are immediate, as soon as noise 
begins, and should return to normal once noise discontinues. However, noise also produces arousal 
which typically improves performance initially; however, as noise continues and adaptation occurs, 
performance will drop along with the corresponding reduction in arousal. Poulton observed that 
when noise is discontinued, arousal often drops below baseline, resulting in a brief decrement in 
performance until such levels return to normal. Poulton further provided us with an explanation 
behind the effects of noise on memory. He stated, “Continuous noise interferes with the storage of 
words probably by reducing the duration of the storage. More frequent rehearsal is therefore 
required to maintain the words in working memory. The more frequent rehearsal occupies the 
limited-capacity processor more of the time, leaving less time available for additional processing.” 
(p. 364). This latter finding was corroborated by the work of Carter and Beh (1989) who reported 
finding that an individual’s cardiovascular responses to acute noise habituated quickly unless the 
individual was involved in a high-demand or complex task. Poulton’s investigations found reliable 
decrements in performance under continuous noise conditions occurring after exposure to 75-80 dB. 
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In response to Poulton’s statements, Broadbent (1978) argued convincingly that the effects of noise 
were not simply due to acoustic masking. Instead, he cited numerous empirical findings that support 
two alternative hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that noise alters the salience in items to-be- 
remembered from memory, favoring what he referred to as “dominant items.” Drawing on the wake 
of findings that followed Easterbrook’s tunnel hypothesis, Broadbent proposed that the mechanism 
by which this occurs is attentional selectivity. Thus, as a result of differential attentive processing, the 
saliency of items must change, which leads to their prominence in later recall from memory. His 
second hypothesis suggests that Baddeley’s (1976) articulatory loop is highly active in the 
memorization of items under noise conditions. As a result he suggested, “Not masking of internal 
speech but talking to oneself at all costs offers a more plausible explanation of the results.” (p. 
1062). 
Several specific assertions have received attention in the noise-performance literature. For example, it 
has been suggested that intermittent noise generally seems to evoke a greater negative reaction to 
performance than continuous noise (Coates & Alluisi, 1975; Eschenbrenner, 1971; Glass & Singer, 
1972; Theologus, Wheaton, & Fleishman, 1974). This has been found to be the case when the noise is 
random or aperiodic as well, and, in fact, it has been suggested that such noise produces greater 
performance decrements (Percival & Loeb, 1980). 
Various investigations have come to the conclusion that lower-order cognitive tasks such as 
perceptual-motor tasks are fairly resistant to the effects of noise (Cohen & Weinstein, 1981; Harris, 
1973; Theologus, Wheaton, & Fleishman, 1974) while higher-order cognitive tasks tend to be 
relatively sensitive to both the disruption and enhancement of noise (Loewen & Suedfeld, 1992; 
McCormick & Sanders, 1982). Hartley (1981) studied the effects of noise on a motor-pursuit 
tracking task. He found decrements in performance when subjects were exposed to 95 dB of noise. 
Stokes, Belger, and Zhang (1990) also found that noise made performance on psychomotor tasks 
worse. However, they noted that the effects of this stressor on the Stroop task resulted in an increase 
in the speed of responses which enhanced performance (possibly facilitated by a tunneling of 
attention). Schmidgall (2001) reported that the stressors of noise and other environmental factors 
tended to degrade performance on psychomotor and attention (vigilance/scanning) tasks primarily 
when the tasks were complex. 
Several authors have explored noise-induced startle and its affect on performance. Sternbach (1960) 
and May and Rice (1971) both found slowed reaction times and general physiological activation in 
subjects after exposing them to an unexpected pistol shot. Thackray (1965) extended this study by 
the use of unexpected loud noise (120 db) followed by intervals of moderate to loud noise. Subjects 
were asked to perform a variety of flight-related tasks during their exposure to the unexpected and 
unpredictable noises. Thackray found a strong physiological reaction related to the onset of the noise 
conditions as well as a disruption in subject’s initial reaction to the task. However, subjects appeared 
to improve their performance on these tasks as subsequent noise was experienced. Across a series of 
studies, the authors found that subjects tended to recover from their initial autonomic reactions to the 
startling events. This recovery was also associated with an improvement in performance following 
their initial responses. The authors concluded that performance disruption following startle typically 
lasts between one and three seconds (although some residual effects can be present up to 10-20 
seconds after the event). This disruption was generally found to be directly related to increases in 
autonomic activation. 
1 
Although there are differences in the findings of many investigations, most research on dB level 
seems to indicate that impairment in performance can be reliably observed (depending on the task) 
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after exposure to between 90 and 100 dB of noise (Broadbent, 1954; Broadbent & Gregory, 1963; 
Broadbent & Gregory, 1965; Fornwalt, 1965) although cognitive impairments have been recorded 
under as low as 68 dB of noise (Weinstein, 1974). Most of these investigations have examined 
performance on tasks of sustained attention. 
Driskell et al.’s (1992) meta-analysis into the effects of noise on performance suggests noise has a 
negative effect on the accuracy of performance but that it does not generally have such an effect on 
the speed of performance. The size of this effect is reportedly mild to moderate. Driskell et al. also 
found that noise has a negative effect on the perceived stress level of individuals exposed to it (a 
strong effect size reported). These authors point out the various moderating factors involved in 
studying the effects of noise on performance. These factors include the intensity of the noise studied, 
whether it is intermittent or continuous, its duration, mode of delivery, and of course the type of task 
being assessed. For example, although commonly reported in the literature, these authors found no 
significant difference in effect between continuous and intermittent noise (across measures of distress, 
accuracy or speed). There was a trend found that suggested that under continuous-noise conditions 
individuals tend to perform more slowly while the opposite is the case under conditions of 
intermittent noise. It should also be noted that individuals tend to habituate to continuous noise over 
time, resulting in gradually improved performance. This does not appear to be the case under 
intermittent noise conditions. 1 
They did note that there was greater self-reported distress as noise decibel level increased. Moreover, 
the accuracy of performance was also degraded somewhat as a function of increased noise intensity; 
however, performance speed appeared to be unrelated to decibel level. There was no consistent 
relationship between the duration of noise and the performance decrement observed. Impairment in 
performance speed was noted when individuals were exposed to intermittent bursts of noise over time 
but not continuous noise. Individuals also tended to report experiencing less stress as noise endured 
even though their performance did not improve. This too seems to suggest that as the duration of 
noise increases, individuals habituate to the noise. The authors theorized that this may result in the 
blocking of some environmental inputs in certain circumstances, which in turn may result in the 
filtering-out of some task-relevant information (leading to performance degradation). 
Driskell et al. (1992) found small to moderate negative noise effects coneefning performance 
accuracy on various cognitive, psychomotor, and working memory tasks. On the other hand, small to 
moderate positive effects were found on tasks of pattern recognition. The effect of noise on the 
speeded performance of these measures was negligible. The authors provided a graded effect-rating 
based on the level of noise intensity. The results of their analyses suggest that mild distress typically 
does not occur until reaching over 80 dB of noise. Moderate distress tends to be reported when noise 
levels exceed 85 dB and not until noise is greater than 91 dB do individuals tend to report a large 
negative effect. In terms of objective performance, noise levels as small as 76 dB appear to be related 
to decreases in accuracy; however, to witness moderate-sized effects in most performance domains, 
noise intensity must reach around 145 dB. 
The Effects of Fatigue on Performance 
Although it will come as no surprise, the research on fatigue and performance consistently indicates 
that fatigue tends to degrade performance. Furthermore, the negative effects of fatigue increase as 
sleep is deprived for greater periods of time. Are these effects due to stress or the direct role fatigue 
plays? The answer is unclear. This review has included fatigue as a putative stressor in light of the 
convention for doing so in the stress and performance literature; however, few, if any, studies have 
definitively separated direct from indirect effects concerning fatigue. 
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Before a further discussion of these effects, a brief review of the construct of fatigue is necessary. Job 
and Dalziel (2001) reviewed the concept and concluded that researchers have long struggled with 
how to define and study fatigue. A quick review of previous investigations bares this out. For 
example, there are numerous operational definitions of fatigue and little consensus on how to bind 
the construct. Brown (1994) suggested that, “psychological fatigue is defined as a subjectively 
experienced disinclination to continue the task” (p. 298). Cercarelli and Ryan (1996) indicated that, 
“fatigue involves a diminished capacity for work and possibly decrements in attention, perception, 
decision making, and skill performance.” Perhaps most simply put, “fatigue may refer to feeling 
tired, sleepy, or exhausted.” (NASA, 1996). Job and Dalziel (2001) posted the following definition 
of fatigue: 
a state of an organism’s muscles, viscera, or central nervous system, in which prior 
physical activity and/or mental processing, in the absence of sufficient rest, results in 
insufficient cellular capacity or system wide energy to maintain the original level of 
activity and/or processing by using normal resources. (p. 469). 
Gawron, French, and Funke (2001) provide an overview discussion of fatigue, and these authors 
suggest that there are two types. They consider physical fatigue peripheral, “. . .a, reduction in 
capacity to perform physical work as a function of preceding physical effort.” On the other hand, 
mental fatigue they contend is central, “...inferred from decrements in performance on tasks 
requiring alertness and the manipulation and retrieval of information stored in memory.” (p. 581). 
Desmond and Hancock (2001) also identified two different types of fatigue but chose to classify 
them as passive and active. These authors suggested that passive fatigue is that which resembles 
vigilance-resulting from passive monitoring of a given system with little if any active interaction 
with that system. As one might guess, active fatigue has been defined as that which results from the 
continuous or prolonged interaction with a system. Desmond and Hancock defined fatigue as, “a 
transition state between alertness and somnolence.” (p. 459). 
Matthews and Desmond (2002) have observed that fatigue is typically thought of in relation to 
energetical concepts (i.e., effort, resources, activation). In an attempt to explain the effects of fatigue 
on performance, these authors noted that research points to three cofnpeting hypotheses. One 
hypothesis proposes that fatigue removes resources in some direct way or perhaps indirectly diverts 
them toward coping strategies. Thus, performance falls off on tasks due to the depletion of resources. 
This is consistent with the notion that more complex tasks are more sensitive to fatigue effects since 
these types of tasks are also likely to require greater resources to maintain. However, a second 
hypothesis suggests that fatigue is related to effort regulation. Several investigations have shown that 
individuals under fatigue states generate less effort than those not fatigued (Fairclough & Graham, 
1999). There is some indication that fatigue is a state of under-arousal which fails to actively mobilize 
the resources or effort required to achieve or sustain strong performance. This second situation 
reflects less of a resource insufficiency and more of an activation insufficiency. Finally, it has been 
suggested that a combination of these two hypotheses best explains fatigue’s effects and the 
underlying mechanisms at work. 
Confusion and disagreement over what defines fatigue has also led to difficulties in measuring 
fatigue. Several researchers have equated this difficulty to the one experienced with the concept of 
stress in general (Tepas & Price, 2001). Muscio’s (1921) quandary was mentioned earlier and applies 
equally well to fatigue. If we are to define any phenomenon, we first need to be able to measure it. 
However, it is difficult to create such a measure without knowing what you are trying to measure. This 
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circular reasoning has left many to wonder, what is the most appropriate way to measure fatigue? Job 
and Dalziel (2001) have commented that this issue has complicated the development and assessment 
of fatigue countermeasures. In many instances, fatigue is spoken of as being present or absent, yet 
theoretically most consider it to be a continuous variable. Thus, at what degree of subjective 
experience or objective measure is one to be considered fatigued? Although many questions remain, 
the research literature on fatigue and the best ways to measure the construct have begun to converge 
(M. Mallis, personal communication, November 2003). 
In various reviews of the fatigue literature, visual scan and attentional processes have been shown to 
be particularly sensitive to disruption (Ainsworth & Bishop, 1971; Banks, Sternberg, Farrell, Debrow, 
& Dalhamer, 1970; Drucker, Cannon, & Ware, 1969). These investigations have typically employed 
between 36 and 48 hours of sustained performance to achieve the states of fatigue studied. However, 
it should be noted that as little as 20 minutes of certain tasks have been used to induce fatigue. 
Haslam and Abraham (1987) examined performance on a continuous task for 90 hours. Their results 
indicate that fitness remains relatively unaffected while mood and mental ability decline significantly 
under a fatigued state. Cognitive measures suggested that vigilance and complex cognitive 
performance were most sensitive while simple, well-learned tasks suffered least. This finding was 
confirmed by Soetens, Hueting, and Wauters (1992) who noted that fatigued individuals did worse on 
complex decision tasks but not on more simplistic tasks. These findings are consistentl with the 
general notion that well-learned or proceduralized tasks are relatively resistant to stress effects. 
Fatigue states have also been studied under a number of contexts. In each case, sleep deprivation is 
typically paired with sustained performance on a given task (Le., vigilance). Across this broad range 
of settings, fatigue has been shown to diminish performance. For example, Bartlett (1953), in an 
examination of aircrew (monitoring aircraft instruments) under fatigue, found that increasingly larger 
deviations of instrument readings took place, as well as increased levels of distraction, cue restriction 
(focusing in on the central task and neglecting peripheral cues), and response variability, as the 
aircrew’s state of fatigue was prolonged. 
Buck-Gengler and Healy (2001) studied fatigue on a data-entry task (typing) and found that 
response time was enhanced as mastery on the task was developed; however, accuracy diminished as 
fatigue set in. Matthews and his colleagues have studied driving stress and#fatigue extensively 
(Matthews & Desmond, 2002). Examinations of driving behavior under the strain of fatigue have 
revealed general deficits in lane deviations and difficulty maintaining lateral positioning (Brookhuis 
& De Waard, 1993; Brookhuis & De Waard, 2001). Matthews and Desmond (2002) designed two 
experiments under simulated driving conditions to assess subjective and performance-based measures 
of fatigue. Fatigue was induced in drivers through the implementation of a high-workload pedestrian 
detection task while driving. This condition was maintained for approximately 24 minutes followed 
by a drop in the dual-task demands (subjects continued to drive but not detect). Objective measures 
of performance included lateral tracking and steering reversals. Subjective measures were assessed 
using the Task-Induced Fatigue Scale (fatigue), the Dundee State Questionnaire (emotion and 
motivation), and the NASA-TLX (workload). The results of this investigation revealed that motivation 
toward task achievement and active coping decreased as the fatigue-induced condition persisted. 
Fatigue subsequently increased heading errors, reduced steering activity, and reduced perceptual 
sensi tivit y . 
In order to replicate these findings and further test their motivational hypothesis, Matthews and 
Desmond (2002) constructed a second experiment. Conditions were identical with the exception of a 
motivational message encouraging participants to “make a special effort to concentrate” during their 
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performance. They were told that their driving skill was being measured. The results of this second 
experiment were consistent with the earlier findings. They suggest that fatigue effects are moderated 
by motivation which further supports the effort-regulation hypothesis over the resource-depletion 
model - when demands are low individuals experience greater difficulty in mobilizing sufficient 
effort to perform as well. The authors contend, “Interventions should be geared towards enhancing 
driving motivation, rather than reducing attentional demands on the driver.” (p. 681). 
Haslam (1978) explored the effects of sleep deprivation on a group of military parachute troops. He 
deprived these individuals of sleep for nine days while they conducted routine training operations. 
Following the third night without sleep, the platoon was considered ineffective (rated by the platoon’s 
leaders). However, after being given three hours of sleep a night, performance effectiveness remained 
adequate for all nine nights evaluated. This and similar findings have led many researchers to 
examine the level of sleep deprivation that individuals can incur while still sustaining adequate 
performance. In this same vein, Rosenberg and Caine (2001) surveyed military pilots concerning 
fatigue in regular operations. Their survey data show that military pilots feel they should be required 
to arrive earlier for night flights (to facilitate napping), that the squadrons should improve their flight 
scheduling, that they should be allowed to use stimulants to sustain their alertness, and that squadrons 
should routinely brief the issues concerning fatigue and their countermeasures. 
Caldwell and his colleagues have examined the use of various fatigue countermeasures in sustained 
flying operations in the military (Caldwell, 1997; Caldwell & Caldwell, 1997; Caldwell & Gilreath, 
2002). Caldwell (1997) determined that pilots were able to improve restfulness and restore their sleep 
patterns after using a self-administered relaxation therapy. He and others have also shown that various 
pharmacological interventions (ModafinNProvigil R and Dextroamphetamine/Dexedrine R) can be 
incorporated into stress management procedures to improve performance, mood ratings, and 
physiologic measures of alertness (Caldwell, 2001 ; Caldwell & Gilreath, 2002). Caldwell and Caldwell 
(1997) also found that Dexedrine could be employed to improve flight performance across a number 
of dimensions including: maintenance of heading and airspeed, roll control, turns, slips, and localizer 
tracking across all phases of flight. 
Van Dongen, Maislin, Mullington, and Dinges (2003) explored the degree to which sleep can be 
reduced prior to inducing cognitive performance deficits. In their experiments subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of two sleep restriction groups (four hours or six hours) or a control group 
(eight hours) for 14 days. An additional group was restricted from sleep for three days. Subjects were 
tested across a variety of cognitive measures (psychomotor, vigilance, and working memory). The 
results of this investigation revealed an almost linear relationship between the amount of sleep 
restricted and the degree of cognitive impairment across measures. Both the four and six hour 
restrictions demonstrated deficits that were dose-dependent (as did the total deprivation group). The 
authors concluded “restriction of sleep to 6 hours or less per night produced cognitive performance 
deficits equivalent to up to 2 nights of total sleep deprivation.. .moderate sleep restriction can 
seriously impair waking neurobehavioral functions in healthy adults.” (p. 1 17). Interestingly, the 
authors reported that subjects tended not to be aware of their cognitive deficits. 
Driskell et al.’s (1992) meta-analysis concerning the role of fatigue on performance suggests that 
fatigue negatively affects self-reported distress ratings, as well as objective measures of performance 
accuracy and speed. Furthermore, as deprivation of sleep increases (increasing fatigue) individuals 
tend to continue to perform poorly, but rebound slightly over time (perhaps coping or acclimatizing 
to their fatigue). As the duration of the task while fatigued increases there tends to be a small decrease 
in performance speed and a moderate decrease in accuracy (across a wide domain of cognitive tasks). 
95 
Driskell et al. also found that when tasks are self-paced, there is less negative effect on the speed of 
one’s performance but found this is not the case when tasks are work-paced. The author’s meta- 
analysis also showed that the larger the group, the worse the speed of performance. However, when 
examining self-reported distress and performance accuracy, the larger the group, the better the 
performance. This second finding regarding group size appears to support the “misery loves 
company” hypothesis presented previously, but only in terms of subjective ratings. Finally, based on 
established circadian patterns of performance the authors mapped diurnal rhythms with sleep- 
deprivation effect patterns. The results of this suggest that fatigue has its greatest negative effect when 
the rhythm is lowest (2-8 AM) and is least disruptive when the rhythm is highest (6-10 PM). 
Moderator Factors and the Effects of Stress on Performance 
There are a handful of factors that appear to play a moderating role in stress’s effects on 
performance and information processing. Although their relationship to these processes is poorly 
understood, these factors are generally thought to be related to motivation, goal structure, and arousal 
or activation levels. 
The Presence of Others 
Under stress, the presence of others appears to affect performance in both positive and negative ways. 
These two outcomes have generally been termed “social facilitation” and “social impairment,” 
respectively. While the field of social psychology has provided a large literature supporting these 
findings, only the handful of studies appearing in the cognitive psychology and human performance 
domain have been included in this review. 
Performance seems to be facilitated on simple or well-learned tasks when others are present. One 
suggestion for this finding is that such tasks are believed to occur under automatic processes. On the 
other hand, performance tends to be degraded on complex, poorly-learned or novel tasks when an 
audience is present. These latter tasks are believed to require controlled processing which may 
account for their vulnerability. These findings appear related to the assertions of Beilock and Carr 
(2001) and others (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002; 
Katz & Epstein, 1991) reviewed previously. Carver and Scheier (1981) found this degradation to be 
particularly likely of complex tasks performed in the presence of others when there was a 
discrepancy between the individual performer’s self-evaluation of their performance and their 
performance expectations (Le., when they expected to perform better than they thought they did). 
Bond (1982) also examined performers’ expectations and found that when an individual expects to 
do well, the presence of an audience helps; however, if the individual expects to do poorly, then the 
presence of an audience tends to hurt performance. Several subsequent investigations have confirmed 
these notions (Geen, 1979; Sanna & Shotland, 1990). 
It has been suggested that this type of performance outcome may be contingent on the presence of a 
highly evaluative audience (as compared to a less evaluative audience). An assessment of whether an 
audience is evaluative is likely to be cognitively mediated. Cottrell (1972) argued against the notion 
that the mere presence of the audience affects a performer. On the contrary, he conjectured that the 
audience present must have the potential to evaluate the performer. He argued that this condition was 
likely to lead to an increase in arousal which would then result in feelings of apprehension and 
ultimately performance degradation. In accord with this assertion, Paulus and Murdoch (1971) 
suggested that the more evaluative the audience, the greater the performance impairment was likely to 
be. 
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Social Facilitation and Prosocial Behavior 
In a related line of research, several investigations have implicated stress in prosocial or social 
facilitation behaviors. Specifically, it has been postulated that under stress, prosocial or social 
facilitation behavior (Le., the likelihood that an individual will help another) decreases. Mathews and 
Canon (1975) found that individuals were less likely to help others when exposed to loud noise. 
Similarly, Sherrod and Downs (1974) determined that subjects were less likely to volunteer to 
perform a requested task when exposed to noise. The reader is directed toward the social psychology 
research literature for further support of these assertions (Bond & Titus, 1983; Cacioppo, Rourke, 
Marshall Goodell, & Tassinary, 1990; Cohen, 1980; Zajonc, 1965). 
Group Member Status 
Under stress, the dynamic of group relationships between high-status group members (Le., leaders) 
and low-status group members (i.e., followers) changes. Specifically, an individual’s view of their 
performance as well as their perspective of others’ performance may be altered. Westman (1996) 
found that when raters were in stressful jobs, they evaluated managers who were also in high-stress 
jobs as less effective than managers in low-stress jobs. In contrast, when these same raters were in low- 
stress positions, they evaluated managers in high-stress jobs as more effective than managers in low- 
stress jobs. Thus, how stressed an individual is can affect the judgments they make concerning their 
manager or leader. I 
Under stress and workload, lower-status group members are more likely to rely on their leader’s 
decisions and to look to them for making decisions. For example, Helmreich (1979) found that non- 
lead aircrew tended to defer to their leader’s decisions under stress. This has been confirmed by 
others (Foushee, 1984; Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). Driskell and Salas (1991) also examined the 
performance of the flight crews under stress and found that under low-stress conditions, low-status 
group members tended to be more likely to defer to high-status members, while high-status members 
tended to be more likely to ignore low-status members’ inputs. However, under stress, these authors 
found that while low-status members were still more likely to defer to the high-status members, high- 
status members under stress were more open to their inputs,. 
Personality 
Personality appears to have some, but probably a limited, role in moderating reactions and 
performance while under stress. Ackerman and Kanfer (1994) found that individual differences, as 
measured by the five factor model of personality (NE0 PI-R), accounted for some differences in 
cognitive measures of performance; however, cognitive ability tests accounted for more of the 
variance. These authors asserted that personality measures offer little incremental validity above and 
beyond cognitive ability measures. Revelle and Anderson (1999) examined the role of impulsivity 
and neuroticism measures in performance. They noted a shift in these indices as a result of diurnal 
arousal rhythms. In particular it was observed that measures of energetic and tense arousal ebbed and 
flowed in response to these rhythms. Moreover, energetic arousal has been found to be related to an 
increase in working memory capacity while tense arousal has been shown to reduce this capacity. The 
authors concluded that impulsivity interacts with time of day to affect the detection and retrieval of 
information. This interaction subsequently affects performance accordingly. 
Several investigations have examined the role of trait and state anxiety in cognitive performance. 
While much of this literature has already been reviewed under the cognitive appraisal and attentional 
bias sections, trait anxiety is also related to personality. Wofford, Goodwin, and Daly (1999) have 
found that low-trait anxious individuals are less prone to the negative effects of temporary stressors in 
terms of cognitive performance than high-trait anxious individuals. This finding has been well- 
97 
established across a variety of indices (Wofford, 2001; Wofford & Goodwin, 2002). For a further 
discussion of this factor the reader is refered to the previous section in this review regarding 
attentional bias. 
Using Fiedler's leadership model Pereira and Jesuino (1987) found that leader behaviors could result 
in significant improvements in their followers' experience of stress. Similarly, it has been found that 
airline crew captains with more confidence tend to have crews who report experiencing less stress. 
This finding may not necessarily suggest that captains who are more confident are more skilled. For 
example, Bowles, Ursin, and Picano (2000) found that aircrews that were led by captains with greater 
knowledge and self-confidence reported experiencing less stress, but did not perform differently than 
crews with less confident and less knowledgeable captains. 
Emotional Awareness 
Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that individuals with greater awareness of their emotional 
states-the ability to label their current feelings-perform better under stress than those unable to do 
so. Worchel and Yohai (1979) found that individuals who were able to label or identify the novel 
physiologic reactions they experienced under stress were less distressed by them and they performed 
better. Similarly, Gohm, Baumann, and Shiezak (2001) noted that individuals who are able to label or 
identify their emotional reactions to stressful events appear to have more attentional rpsources 
(perhaps due to engaging in fewer ruminations) to devote to tasks. The result is improved 
performance compared to those who are not able to label their emotional experience. It seems 
reasonable to conclude from these findings that cognitive appraisal is at least one explanatory 
mechanism. Those who can introspect and cognitively frame their experience are likely to feel better 
and improve their sense of control and predictability over their reactions than those unable to do so. 
These factors have previously been shown to be of value in reducing the negative effects of stress 
exposure. 
Additional Areas of Discussion 
Stress Interventions 
When we turn our attention to the research literature on the management of acute stress, several 
themes emerge. First, it seems clear that most programs designed to deal with stress are based on 
secondary or tertiary prevention models. That is to say that they target either those deemed to be at 
risk for acute stress (stress inoculation protocols) or those that are already symptomatic in some way, 
having been exposed to stressors (stress management programs). While strongly related to one 
another, each approach has some distinguishing characteristics. 
Stress Inoculation Training 
Stress inoculation, as the name suggests, attempts to immunize an individual from reacting negatively 
to stress exposure. This process takes place prior to experiencing the stressful conditions in question. 
There are at least two implicit assumptions in such a model - both the individual and the condition are 
identified a priori. For example, experience has taught us that psychologically preparing fire fighters 
and emergency medical personnel prior to their engagement in stressful events assists them in 
managing the psychological distress of the event when it actually occurs (Meichenbaum, 1985). 
While there are several different models for such interventions, most rely upon psychoeducational 
principles and thought or appraisal restructuring. One critical hallmark of stress inoculation is the 
requirement for increasingly realistic pre-exposure through training simulation. The model proposes 
that through successive approximations, one builds a sense of expectancy and outcome that is 
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integrated into positive cognitive appraisal, a greater sense of mastery and confidence. Furthermore, 
one often habituates to what might otherwise be an anxiety-producing condition. This habituation 
may in turn diffuse affective states that would otherwise draw upon performance resources and 
hamper efficient information processing (as discussed previously). This cognitive-behavioral, pre- 
emptive approach to stress prevention has been implemented in a variety of settings to include work 
with the military, law enforcement, fire fighters, medical personnel, and many others (Meichenbaum, 
1985). 
Stress management differs slightly from stress inoculation. The management of stress implies that 
stress or exposure to stressors has already occurred. Thus, the management of symptoms related to 
stress reactions is of primary consideration. As one might imagine, this model has primarily evolved 
from clinical applications. Most stress management programs draw largely on cognitive-behavioral 
principles. Psychoeducational methods and cognitive restructuring are cornerstones of this approach, 
as they are in most inoculation protocols. While there are some differences in actual cognitive 
technique and process between inoculation and management, the greatest difference is typically one 
of timing and purpose. 
Both of these approaches have been reviewed extensively. In general, stress management and stress 
inoculation programs appear to have a positive effect on subjective measures of qtress and anxiety 
prior to and during performance; in some circumstances this has been related to an improvement in 
actual performance across a number of real-world domains. For example, early investigations 
addressed the effect of preparatory information on medical patients pending operations and other 
stressful procedures (Auerbach, Martelli, & Mercuri, 1986; Egbert, Battit, Welch, & Bartlett, 1964; 
Langer, Janis, & Wolfer, 1975; Turk, Meichenbaum, & Genest, 1983; Weisman, Worden, & Sobel, 
1980). Other applications of the strategy have included work in anger management (Bistline & 
Frieden, 1984; Egan, 1983; Novaco, 1975) and the control of anxiety (Altmaier, Ross, Leary, & 
Thornbrough, 1982; Meichenbaum, 1971; Salovey & Harr, 1983), and in work with law enforcement 
personnel (Novaco, 1977; Novaco, 1980; Sarason, Johnson, Berberich, & Siegel, 1979), and the 
military (Novaco, Cook, & Sarason, 1983). 
Inzana, Driskell, Salas, and Johnston (1996) provided a concise review of stress inoculation research 
and the assumptions that underlie most models of preparatory inforfnation training. They highlighted 
three phases of preparatory information strategies: sensory, procedural, and instrumental. The 
sensory training phase consists of information about how one may feel physiologically (general 
arousal activation) and emotionally (negative affective state activation). The second phase, procedural 
information, details the environmental events likely to take place during the stressful condition. For 
example, aircrew facing an emergency descent might be told to prepare for the sounds of warning 
systems, the visual display of caution and warning lights, time pressures to access and complete 
emergency checklists and procedures, and frequent communication interruptions concerning 
clearances and heading changes. Finally, during the instrumental phase of preparation, 
countermeasures are discussed and recommendations for various intervention or coping strategies are 
provided. 
Inzana and colleagues (1996) offered an explanation for the mechanisms that facilitate these 
processes and in doing so they suggested that the protective factors related to stress inoculation are 
many. For instance, they argued that preparatory information reduces the novelty of an emergency 
or stressful task. This may have several results, not least of which is reducing the tendency to focus 
narrowly on threat-related stimuli (e.g., weapon focus), thereby diverting mental resources from task- 
relevant demands. Second, this information may increase the likelihood of a positive expectation and 
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a greater sense of predictability and control. Both of these factors have already been implicated in the 
reduction of performance via resource diversion. Finally, by reducing unpredictability and novelty 
and increasing a sense of personal control and self-efficacy, one is more likely to appraise a situation 
positively and thus reduce both physiological and emotional reactivity. As an illustration of this 
theory, the authors designed a realistic naval decision making task incorporating vigilance, visual 
tracking, and pattern recognition. Navy personnel were asked to determine the type of a craft, its 
status, and intentions under normal and high-stress conditions. Task load, distraction, and time 
pressure constituted the various stress manipulations in the study. The results demonstrated that 
preparatory information improved the awareness of the subjects and their ability to respond to the 
distractions introduced in the task. Further, these individuals reported experiencing less subjective 
distress, and greater confidence and self-efficacy, and they made fewer errors in the decision making 
task. In sum, these authors concluded that stress inoculation improved performance across a number 
of dimensions. 
In a similar review, Saunders, Driskell, Johnston, and Salas (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of stress 
inoculation studies. The authors described three phases of training that are related to, yet distinctly 
different than those outlined by Inzana et al. (1996). Specifically, Saunders and colleagues posited an 
educational component, a skill acquisition and practice component, and an application component. 
Their analysis was directed toward determining the outcome of such training on both ,subjective 
(anxiety) and objective (performance) measures. Their results suggested that the overall effect of 
inoculation programs is strong (r = S09) for reduction of performance anxiety (anxiety stemming 
directly from a task). This effect is moderate (r = .373 and .296, respectively) in terms of reducing 
state anxiety (anxiety that is not necessarily task-related) and similar in terms of ultimate performance 
enhancement. These effect sizes are considerable when you compare them to the effects of other 
training interventions such as mental practice (r = .255; Driskell, Copper, & Moran, 1994) and over- 
learning (r = .298; Driskell, Willis, & Copper, 1992). 
These authors determined that the number of training sessions needed to inoculate an individual was 
relative to the size of the outcome. In terms of reducing perfoqance anxiety, their investigation 
found that the greater the number of training sessions, the better. They also concluded that there was 
no difference in effect on performance or state anxiety measures between laboratory or field 
interventions. Programs that used imagery components were more effective at reducing performance 
anxiety; however, those that included behavioral practice in coping were more likely to improve 
performance itself. The authors’ analysis also revealed that the size of the training group was directly 
connected to the size of the effect. Stress inoculation training was found to be less effective at 
reducing state anxiety and enhancing performance with larger groups than with smaller groups. This 
pattern of outcome was not found to be true for the reduction of performance anxiety, on the 
contrary, the larger the training group, the greater the reduction in anxiety. 
The findings from these reviews clearly suggest that stress inoculation is a very effective means of 
reducing subjective psychological distress and enhancing objective performance in some 
circumstances. 
Stress Management Programs 
Several studies have examined the effectiveness of stress management programs and found them to 
help reduce symptoms associated with stress (Bernier & Gaston, 1989; Saunders, Driskell, Johnston, & 
Salas, 1996; Zakowski, Hall, & Baum, 1992). Kagan, Kagan, and Watson (1995) implemented a 
psychoeducational stress management program to emergency medical service workers over a three- 
year period that included nine and 16 month follow ups. This rather extensive investigation 
100 
demonstrated the positive effect of the program across a variety of domains to include measures of 
emotional health such as depression, anxiety, strain, depersonalization, and a sense of accomplishment 
as well as at least one measure of behavioral outcome-the number of commendation letters from 
customers doubled following the training. Murphy (196)  also investigated the efficacy of stress 
management programs. Following his 20-year review, encompassing numerous programs, he 
concluded that stress management approaches that combined techniques were most effective. Humara 
(2002) also conducted a review of such programs (for sports performance) and found several 
common mechanisms across the programs evaluated. The results of his review indicate that programs 
that included the following concepts tend to be the most effective at improving performance and 
reducing anxiety: goal-setting, positive thinking, situation restructuring, relaxation, focused attention, 
and imagery and mental rehearsal. 
Other researchers have examined various components within these programs as mechanisms for stress 
reduction. Dandoy and Goldstein (1990) found that intellectualization statements resulted in positive 
coping. Specifically, these investigators showed that being exposed to statements that encouraged 
emotional detachment and analytical observation of explicit industrial accidents on videotape (i.e., 
table saw injury) lowered levels of physiological arousal in subjects and enhanced their recall of 
events. Shipley and Baranski (2002) investigated the effect of a visualization strategy (visuo-motor 
behavioral rehearsal) on stressful police scenarios. Visuo-motor behavioral reheysal, like many other 
visualization techniques, requires individuals to imagine in vivid detail the perfect performance of 
some act, prior to engaging in the act. For example, using this strategy with a professional downhill 
skier would entail having him repeatedly practice a flawless run down the mountain. The protocol 
calls for as much detail and imaginal reality as possible to enhance the visualized experience. There 
are several theories as to why such techniques are effective. For example, some have posited that 
visualization can result in muscle contraction similar to that experienced in the actual performance of 
the act when the visualization is vivid and realistic. Other researchers argue that visualization provides 
a relaxed setting in which to practice and problem-solve performance prior to the actual event. This 
may reduce both the novelty of the situation and anxiety or stress otherwise associated with the 
performance. In the case of Shipley and Baranski's investigation, officers who used visualization 
techniques reported experiencing less anxiety and improved their performance in subsequent test 
scenarios. Caldwell (1997) determined that pilots were able to improve restfulness and restore their 
sleep patterns after using a self-administered relaxation therapy. He and his colleague have also 
shown that various pharmacological interventions, central nervous system stimulants, 
(Modafinil/Provigil R and Dextroamphetamine/Dexedrine R) can be incorporated into stress 
management procedures to improve performance, mood ratings, and physiologic measures of 
alertness (Caldwell, 2001; Caldwell & Gilreath, 2002). 
Dutke and Stober (2001) determined that the adverse effect of stress on performance was ameliorated 
to some degree after individual motivation improved (motivation instruction was provided). Katz and 
Epstein (1991) found that individuals high in constructive thinking (solution-focused problem 
solving attitudes) tended to be less physiologically aroused by stress (performing calculation and 
visual tracking tasks with threats to self-esteem) and more positive emotionally and cognitively than 
those low in constructive thinking who were also exposed to stress. These authors concluded that the 
majority of stress one experiences is self-produced. Similarly, Ingledew, Hardy, and Cooper (1997) 
noted that as psychological stress increases, avoidance coping does as well. However, such strategies 
are less common in individuals with high internal strategies (Le., cognitive reframing) and perceived 
social support. They found that strategies high in emotion-focused and problem-focused coping had 
the greatest positive effect. Such findings shed light on the cognitive appraisal mechanisms targeted 
in most stress management and inoculation programs. Taken collectively, these investigations suggest 
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that stress management programs can indeed be effective, probably because of the cognitive and 
behavioral coping strategies they provide. For example, the ability to cognitively reconstruct one’s 
appraisal of an event into less distressing terms may be one of these strategies. Furthermore, given 
that such appraisal is related to motivation and effort (perceiving an obstacle as a challenge tends to 
mobilize effort and motivation whereas viewing it as an overwhelming threat may have the opposite 
effect) it is easy to see why such an approach would be beneficial. Subsequent performance feedback 
that confirms success as a result may enhance the positive effects of the coping strategy leading to a 
greater sense of confidence and self-efficacy. In turn, self-efficacy affects one’s perception of 
controllability and predictability and makes positive cognitive appraisal more likely. These events 
further reinforce the strategy used, making it more likely to occur under future conditions. 
Critical Incident Stress Management I Psychological Debriefing 
Critical incident stress management (CISM) is a procedure related to stress management and bears 
mention in this review. In some ways CISM is a hybrid of both stress inoculation and management 
programs. Typically, the model is geared toward first responders (similar to inoculation) but it is 
implemented de facto, following exposure to a stressful event or set of conditions (similar to stress 
management). Its purpose is to defuse or prevent the later development of acute as well as chronic 
stress reactions to critical or traumatic stressors. The model has been embraced by numerous 
organizations and is currently used extensively by law enforcement, fire fighting, emqrgency rescue, 
military, and airline industries. However, this intervention strategy has received only limited and 
recent empirical review, and the results are quite mixed.This technique, although related, should not 
be confused with Flanagan’s Critical Incident Technique (Flanagan, 1954) or the subsequent 
knowledge elicitation methods used in cognitive task analysis (Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998) 
that build from this earlier critical incident interviewing approach. 
McNally, Bryant, and Elders (2003) provided an extensive review of the literature on CISM and the 
debriefings associated with this intervention. These authors raise several important questions 
regarding psychological interventions following traumatic events. Specifically, they target 
psychological debriefing methods: “ . . .do psychological interventions delivered shortly after 
traumatic events mitigate distress and prevent later problems, especially PTSD? In particular, do 
trauma-exposed people who receive psychological debriefing - the most popular 
intervention-experience fewer difficulties than do people who are not dtbriefed?’ (p. 46). 
McNally and his colleagues (2003) provide operational definitions and descriptions of psychological 
debriefing, and they present several of the model’s underlying assumptions. For example, the belief 
that it is better to commit to some form of catharsis-to talk about one’s feelings rather than to keep 
those thoughts and emotions inside. Another is the assumption that the earlier the intervention, the 
better the outcome (believing that psychopathology can be “nipped in the b u d  following a 
traumatic experience). As the authors aptly point out, these are empirical questions with no definitive 
answer at this time. However, they are alive and well (and affirmed) in the psychological debriefing 
model. The authors continue their review with a concise discussion of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and acute stress disorder (ASD) and a portion of their corresponding outcome literatures. 
Suffice it to say, having been exposed to a traumatic event does not predict with any certainly that 
one will suffer post-trauma pathology. In fact, in most instances the odds are clearly in one’s favor 
for recovery and a return to functioning given time and the most basic levels of support (McNally et 
al., 2003). 
McNally et al. (2003) trace the origins of psychological debriefing back to W.W.1 at which time 
commanders gathered together combatants to debrief them and allow them to share their stories, 
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creating a cohesive and collective experience. Such procedures have been continued throughout the 
twentieth century by military commanders (Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler, 2002), and this has expanded 
in recent decades to include a number of industries well beyond the military. An early champion of 
this movement was Jeff Mitchell who saw the connection between first responders (law enforcement, 
fire fighters, and emergency medical personnel) and the earlier combatants. He is typically credited 
as the first to introduce the concept of critical incident debriefing in his landmark paper on the 
subject two decades ago (Mitchell, 1983). Initially conceived as an individual or group model, geared 
toward first responders (Le., EMS workers), and not the actual victims of trauma, critical incident 
stress debriefing (CISD) has evolved significantly. These rapid mutations have outstripped the 
research community’s ability to evaluate the changes, and this is at the heart of the problem cited by 
McNally et al. (2003). 
Various researchers have confirmed that most participants debriefed seem to perceive the experience 
as a positive one. Most recipients of psychological debriefings (98%) affirm that they feel better or 
feel that the debriefing was helpful in some way (Carlier, Voerman, & Gersons, 2000; Small, Lumley, 
Donohue, Potter, & Waldenstrom, 2000). Unfortunately, according to Carlier et al. (2000) there was 
no relationship between those that felt their debriefing was helpful and their psychological or 
functional health (as measured by the number of symptoms and continuation of work duties). 
Several previous investigations have revealed disappointing results (Rose, Bisson, & Wessely ,2001 ; 
Rose, Brewin, Andrews, & Kirk, 1999; van Emmerik, Kamphuis, Hulsbosch, & Emmelkamp, 2002). 
Rose et al. (1999) explored the efficacy of single-session debriefings for victims of violent crime and 
concluded that there was no substantive support for such interventions. Codon, Fahy, & Conroy 
(1999) examined the benefits of psychological debriefing in motor-vehicle accident survivors. They 
found no “prophylactic benefit” of psychological debriefing (p. 43). Furthermore, Rose et al. 
(2001) failed to discover any utility in CISD for the prevention of PTSD and openly criticized the 
notion of mandatory debriefings for trauma victims. Moreover, several studies support the negative 
effects of debriefings. Van Emmerik et al. (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of 29 studies using both 
individual and group intervention formats. Their review found that those debriefed were more likely 
to later develop PTSD symptoms than those that were not debriefed. Others have reached similar 
conclusions (Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander, & Bannister, 1997; Hobbs, Mayou, Harrison, & Worlock, 
1996; Mayou, Ehlers, & Hobbs, 2000). According to McNally’s grotrp (2003), some investigators 
have presented positive results (Bohl, 1995; Everly & Mitchell, 1999; Wee, Mills, & Koehler, 1999); 
however, none of these studies used randomized trials and many have been open to criticism for 
various methodological problems. 
l 
The review by McNally and colleagues closes with an overview of findings, the main points of which I 
summarize here: 
1) Mitchell and Everly (1999) criticize their critics for failing to investigate group debriefings 
(typically examining only individual debriefing models). This is a significant concern; however, 
McNally et al. (2003) contend that the underlying mechanisms shouldn’t differ so greatly as to 
discount the findings that are limited to individual debriefing models. In addition, it should be noted 
that individual interventions remain a standard approach (one of the seven components) in CISM that 
is encouraged by the Mitchell model (Mitchell & Everly, 1998). Mitchell and Everly (1995) make it 
clear that CISD is “a group process” (p. 15), and, as such, any review of their model should contain 
group-debriefed outcome data. However, at least one recent investigation has addressed this criticism 
(van Emmerik et al., 2002). 
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2) Mitchell and Everly (1999) assert that psychological debriefing, as specified by their CISM model, 
reduces the likelihood of developing psychopathology following exposure to a critical incident. The 
randomly controlled trials in the research literature reviewed cast doubt on this assertion. Currently, 
very little is known experimentally regarding group debriefing outcomes. 
3) Mitchell and Everly (1999) contend that CISD is not a stand-alone intervention. However, Mitchell 
(1983) previously indicated that single-session interventions were often sufficient for both 
prophylactic benefits as well as general symptom reduction. This seems contradictory. 
4) Mitchell and Everly (1999) suggest that critics of CISD are failing to use the right outcome 
measurements, often choosing PTSD or depression measures instead of functional measures. 
However, Mitchell and Everly’s own research findings as well as their claims made about CISD’s 
ability to stave off PTSD symptoms seem to contradict this counter argument. 
5) Mitchell has raised concerns that his critics have studied primary victims instead of secondary 
responders. This, too, seems inconsistent given the common advocacy for the models use with both 
primary and secondary victims. 
6) Finally, McNally and his colleagues point out psychological debriefings, specifically Mitchell’s 
model, have discounted review investigations that failed to adhere to the “letter of the law” in terms 
of CISD protocol. However, this seems to place the cart before the horse. No probative research has 
been leveled that sufficiently demonstrates Mitchell’s particular model alone contains the underlying 
mechanisms related to efficacy. 
The Speed / Accuracy Trade-off Effect 
Under the various stressors discussed previously, individuals tend to experience a speedaccuracy 
trade-off on cognitive measures whereby they tend to respond more quickly but create more errors 
(Fitts, 1966). This general finding appears across a wide variety of cognitive domains and under 
multiple sources of stress. Intuitively this makes sense as speed md accuracy are the two most 
accessible measures readily available to experimenters. Similarly, they represent a “teeter-totter” 
effect as movement in one, most often results in a corresponding movement in the other. 
This effect has been reported under a number of conditions to include exposure to noise (Broadbent, 
1957; Diaz, Hancock, & Sims, 2002; Hockey, 1979; Hygge & Knez, 2001), fatigue (Schellekens, 
Sijtsma, Vegter, & Meijman, 2000), time pressure (Driskell et ai., 1992), the thermal stressors of heat 
and cold (Driskell et al., 1992), and group pressure (Driskell et al., 1992). Moreover, it has also been 
examined among varying contexts or tasks to include measures of visual search and attentional 
processing (Diaz, Hancock, & Sims, 2002; Hockey, 1979), memory (Hygge & Knez, 2001; 
Schellekens, Sijtsma, Vegter, & Meijman, 2000; von Wright & Vauras, 1980), signal detection 
(Wickens, 1992), reaction time tasks (Lulofs et al., 198l), and measures of personal confidence 
(Hockey, 1979). Driskell et al.’s (1992) meta-analysis also examined several cognitive measures 
across various putative stressors and found support for the speedaccuracy trade-off phenomenon. 
Laboratory versus Real-World Research Designs 
Most of the research studies reviewed relied on laboratory experimental paradigms. Few examined 
human performance in its dynamic naturalistic setting (judgment and decision making being one 
exception). Naturally, science has erred on the side of experimental rigor, which calls for controlled 
environments, careful manipulation of singular variables, and isolated effects. In truth, causality and 
the specific relationship between variables would be difficult to understand in any other context. As 
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one can imagine, it would be nearly impossible to tease apart complex relationships when numerous 
confounding variables and conditions co-exist. The unfortunate consequence of this is that any 
conclusions we may form based on controlled laboratory studies may not generalize to real-world 
performance under stress. 
Several authors have addressed this subject and have highlighted similar concerns, Baradell and Klein 
(1993) remarked, “Experimental stressors are temporary, often novel, and restricted in intensity, and 
usually have little long-term effect on the subject. Naturally occurring stressors tend to be more 
severe, recurring or continuous conditions that may have tremendous long-term effects on a person.” 
(p. 267). Similarly, Morphew (2001) asserted that, “It has not been sufficiently demonstrated that the 
anxiety, fear, stress, uncertainty, risk, mental pressure, and arousal associated with performing in 
operational environments can be even generally approximated by laboratory-induced stressors.” (pp. 
255). Thus there is a disconnect between laboratory and real-world operational studies and outcomes. 
Woods and Patterson (2001) explored the cascading escalation of cognitive demands in real-world 
settings. They highlight the fact that such conditions typically do not occur in the laboratory. The 
authors argue that such escalation often results in a greater number of errors and that the expanding 
demands create opportunity for new demands and new errors. Therefore, real-world phenomena can 
not be considered a match for the “textbook case” when examined within an experimental 
laboratory setting. I 
Wilson, Skelly, and Purvis (1989) studied pilot’s responses during actual versus simulated flight 
emergencies. They found a 50% increase in heart rate during real flight emergiencies as compared to 
simulated flight emergencies. Low-heart-rate variability, often associated with high stress and 
workload, was much more pronounced in the real situation than in the simulator. Their results 
indicate that significant changes related to performance can occur between real and simulated 
conditions. These findings are consistent with previous investigations into the difference between 
open water diving and chamber diving as well as shallow versus deep water diving. Mears and Cleary 
(1980) found that there was a perception of risk and danger associated with deeper water dives as 
compared to shallow or chamber dives. These perceptions resulted in performance decrements on 
measures of manual dexterity, physiological arousal (increased heart rate) and self-reported anxiety. 
Several previous investigations into this phenomenon confirm that there is a difference in perception 
and objective performance measures between real-world diving operations as compared to chambered 
diving (Baddeley, 1966; Baddeley & Fleming, 1967; Baddeley, DeFiguererdo, Hawkswell, & Williams, 
1968). 
McCarthy (1996) described G-LOC (the rate of change in velocity that induces a loss of 
consciousness) and the difference in research laboratory findings versus those in the real-world in 
terms of combat fighter pilot performance. The author noted that 99% of fighter pilots can sustain 
pressures of 9G’s for about 15 seconds after training; however, G-LOC continues to be a problem 
and occurs at much lower G tolerances than demonstrated in the laboratory. McCarthy suggests that 
this is due to limited attentional resources. He cites that most individuals have a relaxed G tolerance of 
up to 5Gs. With the addition of the ATAGs flight suit (Advanced Technology Anti-G Suit), specially 
designed for increasing G tolerance, this figure rises to around 8Gs. He contends that operational 
workload reduces a pilot’s ability to perform a focused AGSM (Anti-G Straining Maneuver) which in 
turn leads to 6-LOC under conditions of less than 9Gs. The author found that test pilots have no 
problem handling the higher G load, nor do astronauts or stunt pilots (Le., the Thunderbirds) due to 
their ability to focus on singular tasks. In each case their full attentional resources can be devoted to 
performing the AGSMs. However, the added complexity and higher workload of normal fighter 
operations can lead to reduced attention for AGSMs, and this leads to G-LOC and higher accident 
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rates. McCarthy (1 996) provides a compelling illustration of the disastrous impact that disconnections 
between laboratory and real-world research findings can have. 
Several researchers have questioned the validity and generalizability of laboratory studies examining 
emotional memories. They have charged that such investigations typically expose subjects to 
unrealistic emotional stimuli. For example, Laney, Heuer, and Reisberg (2003) suggest that most 
laboratory studies examining the effects of emotion on memory employ gruesome images as to-be- 
remembered emotional material. In contrast to these visually-dominant displays, the authors argue 
that the emotion induced by natural events tends to be developmental (unfolding with the event) and 
rarely reflects the kind of visually shocking stimuli described above. In their own investigation of this 
issue, the authors found that most of the emotional memories recalled by subjects were categorized as 
thematic and not visual. This is in stark contrast to the type of visual display used by researchers to 
induce emotional memories in most laboratory studies. Given the findings that most emotional 
memories are thematic and not visual (80%), the authors suggested that previous laboratory 
paradigms have employed atypical emotional memory events. Laney et al. (2003) raise interesting 
questions about the generalizability of such laboratory findings. They suggest that the tunnel 
memory and “weapon focus” phenomena, robust among laboratory studies, should be evaluated 
using more naturalistic to-be-remembered stimuli. Furthermore, they propose that the effect of 
arousal, as Easterbrook (1959) and others have posited, may be an artifactual finding.,Instead, what 
may underlie these phenomena are the saliency of the image and not necessarily the direct effects of 
arousal on cue sampling. 
Kingstone, Smiek, Ristic, Frieden, and Eastwood (2003) argued that the field of cognitive psychology 
has “lost touch with its origins as studies of real-world significance have been slowly replaced by 
artificial laboratory experiments that bear little if any generalizability to the real-world. The authors 
illustrate this point by reviewing a handful of naturalistic studies that have subsequently over-turned 
previously held positions in the field based on past laboratory findings. The authors report, “...the 
evidence suggests that laboratory studies that have lost touch with real-life context may generate 
fundamental misunderstandings of the principles of human attention and behavior.” (p. 179). The 
authors call for future research to focus more on identifying which studies in the field are truly 
generalizable to the real-world and which are not. 
There is yet a further point that deserves discussion here. It concerns the implementation of realistic 
stress manipulations in laboratory designs. The criticism has been leveled that stress manipulations 
used in experimental designs tend to be mild or moderate and rarely rise to the level experienced in 
real-world or naturalistic settings. Moreover, simulation studies may not effectively manipulate real- 
world levels of stress. This conclusion has lent support for the expression, “no one has ever died in a 
simulator.” The reader will undoubtedly note that the research addressing stress effects on 
performance rarely includes adequate checks of its stress manipulations. Typically, researchers 
assume that they are increasing workload or stress, without measuring whether this is truly the case or 
not. Moreover, even when these checks are in place, the stressors used to evoke a change in 
performance rarely mimic the intensity or complexity of those experienced in a naturalistic setting. 
Finally, the most frequently used stress manipulation check is self-report, yet very little appears in the 
research literature concerning the validity of such measures and their sensitivity or participants’ 
ability to discriminate between negative affective states (e.g., stress as compared to emotional 
discomfort or anxiety). 
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The Biology and Neuro-anatomy of the Human Stress Response 
There is an entire domain of the stress and cognitive processing literature that this review has not 
thoroughly addressed. This domain includes: neuro-anatomical structures, subcortical and cortical 
functions (i.e., executive-prefrontal cortex literature), biochemical influences, and pharmacologic 
effects on cognitive performance while under stress. A brief review of these elements follows. 
Several different avenues have been explored to explain the relationship between stress and cognitive 
process. The most commonly examined systems are those considered to be neuro-endocrine-based 
and include the pituitary-adrenocortical, adrenomedullary, and the sympathoneural systems. There 
have been few attempts to connect cognitive functions directly to neuro-anatomical structures or 
neural systems; yet most researchers agree that it is within such systems that cognitive processes lie. 
For example, many studies have implicated frontal lobe function and portions of the prefrontal 
cortex in the organization and prioritization of mental tasks (Borisyuk & Kazanovich, 2003; 
Vasterline, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker, 1998); however, researchers can only speculate as to how 
these processes occur, what generates their activity, and how they are organized and distributed 
cognitively. 
Mills (1985) provided a review of the endocrine system and its response to various stressors. He 
reported that Cannon (1915) was the first to outline the ‘emergency-function’ theory of adrenal 
medullary activity- the sympathetic nervous system’s fight or flight response using adrenaline. He 
suggested that, “conditions characterized by novelty, anticipation, unpredictability, and change 
produce a rise in adrenaline output which correlates with the degree of arousal evoked by the 
stressor.. .[however]. . .if the subject then gains control over the situation, adrenaline excretion falls.” 
(p. 642.). Mills pointed out that physical stress elicits catecholamine production and its release, which 
has been shown to increase performance on certain tasks in terms of speed, accuracy, and endurance. 
Several investigators have explored executive function as it relates to changes in information 
processing (Fowler, Prlic, & Brabant, 1994). For example, Russo, Escolas, Sing, Thorne, Johnson, 
Redmond, Hall, Santiago, and Holland (2002) implicated fatigue and sleep deprivation in the 
deactivation of portions of the prefrontal cortex. These authors examined the role of continuous 
flight operations and found that fatigue appears to result in a hypometabolism or deactivation of 
complex prefrontal attentional and prioritization regions in the brain: The prefrontal cortex may also 
play an important role associated with task-shedding as it is believed to relate to the organization of 
information and its coordinated distribution to other brain processing centers. 
Various investigations have attempted to understand the organization of neural structures and 
corresponding biochemical systems that are related to the human stress response. Gray (1990) 
reviewed the neurobiological research and concluded that there was a strong link between cognition 
and emotion. He subsequently developed a model containing three fundamental emotion systems: the 
behavioral approach system (BAS), the fighvflight system (WS), and the behavioral inhibition system 
(BIS). These basic response systems have been used extensively in work on pre-cognitive appraisal 
models such as the evaluative reflex (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002). Wofford and Daly 
(1997) have also put forth a cognitive-affective model of stress and coping connecting neural 
network and pathway theories with contemporary cognitive models of appraisal and attribution. 
Gaillard and Wientjes (1994) suggested that two types of energy mobilization systems were engaged 
in the human stress response: an effort system-dominated by the adrenal-medullary system and 
catecholamines (the autonomic nervous system)-and the distress system-dominated by the adrenal- 
cortical system and its agent, cortisol. Cacioppo (1994) reviewed the neurophysiological stress 
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Figure 5: the figure above represents the neuro-physiological elements believed to be involved 
in the human stress response (Akil, Campeau, Cullinan, Lechan, Toni, Watson, 4 Moore, 1999; 
Cacioppo, 1994; Gaillard & Wientjes, 1994). 
various physioIogic responses associated with the activation of this system (heart rate, blood pressure, 
respiratory rate, perspiration, inhibition of digestive system and sexual functions). Akil, Campeau, 
Cullinan, Lechan, Toni, Watson, and Moore (1999) described the brain-pituitary-adrenocortical axis 
asserting its involvement in the regulation of glucocorticoid hormones implicated in the stress 
response. 
Zeier (1994) found support for this connection when he compared self-reported and objective 
workload measures to salivary cortisol levels in an assessment of Air Traffic Controller tasks. His 
results suggest that workload and cortisol levels are highly correlated. Bohnen, Nicholson, Sulon, and 
Jolles (1991) investigated whether salivary cortisol secretion, as an index of stress on mental task 
performance, reflected individual differences in coping styles. Their findings suggest that cortisol 
levels are in fact a useful index of subjective stress and coping strategy. Furthermore, these authors 
determined that using cognitive affirmations and cognitive reframing strategies is useful in reducing 
cortisol levels as well as improving subjective stress ratings. 
Al'Absi, Hugdahl, and Lovallo (2002) measured cortisol levels in subjects after they completed 
mental-arithmetic and public-speaking tasks. Their results indicated that high-cortisol responders 
performed worse than low-cortisol responders on mental arithmetic but better on dichotic listening. 
The authors suggested that the performance enhancement on dichotic listening may have resulted 
from a shift in focus of attention. Al'Absi, et al. reported that high-cortisol responders rated their 
moods more negatively than low-responders. This finding further links the relationship between 
perceived stress, cortisol activation, and performance. These investigators concluded that cortisol 
disrupts working memory but enhances selective attention. Newcomer, Selke, Nelson, Hershey, Craft, 
Richards, and Alderson (1999) examined the role of cortisol (simulating stress) in degrading memory 
function as well. They subjected individuals to cortisol levels consistent with the psychological stress 
response experienced pending surgical procedures. They found that exposure to cortisol levels 
induced by such stress results in a reversible decrease in verbal declarative memory. These authors 
measured verbal memory through an immediate and delayed paragraph-recall task. Both immediate 
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and delayed recall was affected by the increase in cortisol. This decrement in performance was 
removed following a return to normality in cortisol blood levels. Performance was not found to be 
degraded significantly when assessing nonverbal memory, sustained or selective attention, and 
executive-function tasks (continuous performance task, spatial delay response task, and the Stroop 
color-word task). 
Vedhara, Hyde, Gilchrist, Tytherleigh, and Plurnmer (2000) noted that student exam periods 
appeared to be related to an increase in self-reported stress; however, this corresponded unexpectedly 
to a decrease in cortisol levels. This profile was associated with an increase in short-term memory 
performance (hippocampal-specific) without the result of negative effects on auditory verbal working 
memory. Moreover, the increase in subjective levels of stress and decreased levels of salivary cortisol 
corresponded to degraded performance on measures of selective attention (telephone search task) 
and divided attention (telephone search and counting tasks). The authors concluded that cortisol is 
related to cognitive performance but that its effects are selective. Lupien, Gillin, and Hauger (1999) 
came to a similar conclusion after examining the effects of hydrocortisone on working memory. 
They found these effects to be acute for all but declarative memory performance, which may suggest 
a differential sensitivity to corticosteriods between memory systems. 
In a related study, Diamond, Fleshner, Ingersoll, and Rose (1996) examined the relationship between 
stress, hippocampal impairment, and memory. The authors formulated a strong case for the 
connection between hippocampal function and memory. Furthermore, they empirically linked the 
hippocampus to regulatory functions over corticosterone receptors and ultimately behavioral 
responses to stress. Diamond et al. indicated that extended exposure to stress (and concomitantly to 
hypersecretion of cortisol), results in damage to the hippocampus (neural loss) and impairment in 
learning. In addition, these authors reported that such exposure has also been found to block 
hippocampal potentiation-often considered a central-feature in the modeling of memory from an 
electrophysiological perspective. In their investigation, Diamond et al. studied the effects of stress on 
hippocampal functioning in rats measured by performance on a maze task. The results of this 
investigation showed that after being placed in a stressful environment, a rat’s working memory and 
its subsequent ability to learn was impaired. This effect was not found in measures of reference or 
long-term spatial memory. The authors concluded the hippocampal-specific learning (Le., declarative 
memories) may be particularly sensitive to the effects of stress on working memory functioning. 
Van Galen and van Huygevoort (2000) concluded that neuromotor noise, defined as, “...the random 
variation of individual moves around their group mean” (p. 154) was the primary source of human 
error under workload and time pressure conditions. These authors argued that such noise reflects a 
mismatch between an intended movement and the outcome of that movement. Their approach is 
somewhat unique among the literature in its attempt to link directly to neural function, specifically, 
the way in which neural signals are disrupted by neuromotor noise. They contend that motor 
behavior is an inherently noisy process (typified by variable and random motor signals in the brain 
and body) and that biophysical, biomechanical, and psychological factors contribute to such noise. 
Through repeated investigations, the authors found that psychological and physical stress resulted in, 
“ . . .non-specific neural activation spreading” and that this tended to increase neuromotor noise, 
making error in motor movement more likely (p. 155). Mandler’s (1979) work is certainly consistent 
with the notion that cognitive noise absorbs available resources. He proposed that autonomic activity, 
resulting from stress, demands cognitive resources and attentional capacity. He labeled this autonomic 
activity “cognitive noise,” due to its ability to draw away an individual’s attention from primary task 
demands. Mandler examined the role of experience and mastery in performance in light of 
Easterbrook’s cue utilization hypothesis. He affirmed the role of appraisal in the creation of 
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subjective stress; however, he suggested stress created noise in the cognitive system which competed 
for a pool of limited mental resources. Van Gemmert and Van Galen (1997) share Mandler’s view 
(1979), contending that this noise in the cognitive system results in either a reduced sensitivity to 
task-related sources of information or less exacting motor movements. 
Biondi and Picardi (1999) provided the most thorough review of research examining the relationship 
between stress, cognitive appraisal, and neuroendocrine function. They found that one’s subjective 
perception of a stressful situation resulted in various psycho-endocrine response patterns, specifically, 
modulations among the pituitary-adrenocortical, adrenomedullary, and the sympathoneural systems. 
They reported that mental arithmetic was perhaps the most commonly examined stressor in this 
literature and that it has been demonstrated repeatedly to induce elevations in plasma catecholamine 
levels such as epinephrine and norepinephrine. More specifically, their review of the literature 
suggested that these elevations resulted primarily from adrenal medulla and sympathetic nerve 
terminal releases. Mental arithmetic stress has frequently been combined with that of public speaking. 
This combination has been found to result in the addition of an adrenocortical activation (typically 
measured in salivary cortisol levels) as well. Similar results have been reported in Stroop color-word 
conflict examinations and under prolonged laboratory cognitive tasks. In fact, various investigations 
have shown that the more demanding the cognitive task, the greater the elevations of epinephrine and 
cortisol released. However, this pattern has not been observed among more pleasant emotional 
experiences. For example, under conditions of videogame playing, significant adrenomedullary 
activation does not occur, although some increases in norepinephrine have been measured. 
Although there has been some concern over the generalizability of laboratory findings to real-world 
experience in the area of human physiology (Dimsdale, 1984), Biondi and Picardi (1999) indicated 
that a consistent pattern of increased adrenaline, noradrenaline, and cortisol secretions have been 
found in both. In summarizing the findings associated with bereavement, these authors reported 
general agreement in the notion that adrenocortical activity is altered in many cases (Le, increased 
levels of cortisol release). This appears to be the case particularly in instances where levels of anxiety 
and depression are greatest. Periods of test and examination have been researched by many, and this 
literature also points to altered levels of catecholamines as is the case with research on the anticipation 
of surgical interventions. In studies examining the immediate threat presented by parachute jumping, 
researchers have found a consistent pattern of an initial increase in cortisol devels as well as ACTH 
(adrenocorticotropic hormone) prior to the jump with an equal or greater release of adrenocortical 
activation following the jump. 
According to Biondi and Picardi (1999) several lines of research have investigated the influence of 
coping strategies on hormone response. There is some data to support the notion that problem- 
focused interventions reduce psychoendocrine activity while avoidant or denial coping strategies 
actually tend to increase this response. The authors point out that these findings are modulated by the 
effectiveness of each strategy, implying that avoidant styles may in fact be less effective at dealing 
with stress than those that attempt to fix the problem directly. They concluded that these patterns 
appear to suggest that one’s appraisal is a “main determinant of the psychoendocrine response ...” 
(p. 139). Ennis, Kelly, Wingo, and Lambert (2001) also examined neuro-endocrine activity and its 
relationship to cognitive appraisal. They determined that the sympathetic neuro-endocrine system 
output increased differentially in individuals who perceived a test as threatening compared to those 
who viewed it as a challenge. 
Farrace, Biselli, Urbani, Ferlini, and De Anelis (1996) found an increase in post-flight hormonal levels 
in student pilots (measured by growth hormone, prolactin, and cortisol) as compared to pre-flight 
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levels. Instructor pilots demonstrated elevations only in growth hormone. Student pilots were also 
found to have significantly higher pre-flight levels of these hormones as compared to their 
instructors. These findings seem to suggest that experienced pilots may incur physiological arousal 
during flight but not the emotional arousal of students. Additionally, they may lack the anticipatory 
arousal incurred by student pilots. 
Critchley and Mathias (2003) found a physiological correlate among Air Traffic Controller and 
driver performance on measures of attention and reaction time. Moderate hypotension was associated 
with decreases in behavioral measures. The authors cite work using neuroimaging that has explored 
the relationship between arousal and regional brain activity. They noted that previous findings 
indicate that blood pressure tends to increase after performing certain cognitive and motor tasks that 
are associated with stress and workload. These events coincide with anterior cingulate activity (located 
in the medial portion of the frontal lobe). Given research that has linked frontal lobe activity with 
attention and reaction time (Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001) the authors speculate a 
relationship between hypotension and attentional control may implicate arousal-dependent processes 
as the underlying mechanism. 
Matthews (2001) has suggested that neuroscience has taught us at least two important things about the 
relationship between mental resources and information processing. First, biologic agents such as 
drugs, hormones, neurotransmitters, and processes such as circadian rhythms clearly affect 
performance. Second, psychophysiological measures have provided information about performance 
and the human stress response. However, he also outlined several shortcomings with biological 
models. For example, debate continues as to the identification of specific neural systems implicated in 
the mediation of biological stressors. There is very little information on real-world experiences and 
their neural response. Neuroscientists have failed to provide us with strong biological models of 
personality and individual difference factors, and finally, we still have many central unanswered 
questions concerning cognition and information processing. 
Limitations of the Review and Questions left Unanswered 
There are a number of limitations that bear mentioning concerning this review. The first is that while 
I have attempted to be as inclusive as possible, there are undoubtedly portions of the research 
literature I have completely ignored as well as others of which I have only tapped the surface. As has 
already been stated, the majority of this review is based on a synthesis of previous reviews and as such 
is a reflection of what these previous reviews have addressed as well as what these reviews have 
neglected. Furthermore, many of the putative stressors examined-such as noise, thermals, fatigue, 
and others-have voluminous literatures of their own. No attempt was made to cover these areas in 
any depth. Instead the review selected a handful of studies that are believed to be representative of 
much larger literatures providing a general overview of pertinent findings. 
In similar fashion, there are other cognitive processes beyond those covered within this review that 
deserve acknowledgment. For example, there is a significant literature addressing the effects of stress 
on language and communication (French, 1983). In addition, there are bodies of work on thought 
suppression and distraction or interference processes that address stress-specific effects and not just 
those related to dual-task performance (Keinan, Friedland, Kahneman, & Roth, 1999). There is a 
large research literature that has examined social dynamics and team performance among the social 
and industrial/organizational psychology communities as well. The interested reader is referred to 
these areas for further review accordingly. 
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There are many questions that have been left unanswered by the research community. As in most 
areas of science, it seems that the more one learns about a complex human system the more one 
realizes how little is really understood about that system. Furthermore, such inquiry seems to 
frequently result in more questions being raised than answered. Many of these are questions that our 
field is currently ill-equipped to answer. I have provided a table outlining several of these questions 
that my review of the research literature on human performance and stress could not answer, at least 
not in depth. 
Table 9. Questions that Remain Unanswered. 
What is stress and can we measure it? Do all stressors create the same physiological pattern? If not, why not, and in 
what way do they differ? What is the mechanism that facilitates these differences? Is there a unitary mechanism that 
underlies the human stress response such as arousal? Are there several different systems? 
What causes cognitive or information processing decrements? Are these the result of the direct effects of arousal or 
some other physiological system? What are the boundaries of impairment for each cognitive process and each 
stressor? 
Why does positive appraisal improve performance? Are the positive effects of appraisal related to effort and 
mobilization? What mechanism is activated differently when viewing a stressor as a challenge as obposed to an 
overwhelming threat? 
Why do various external stressors (heat, cold, noise, fatigue, etc.) cause decrements? Are these due to direct or 
indirect effects, or both? For example, are thermals (heat and cold) merely an irritant that plays into focus and 
motivation, or do they operate on physiological or thermodynamic principles to degrade performance? How can we 
systematically separate and measure these two types of effects to better understand their relative contributions? 
Where do psychological resources come from? Are they a static pool upon which we draw? Are they called up via 
physiological responses (arousaYactivation hypothesis) as described in the traditional fightlflight models? Are they 
limited in capacity? Is this just a regulation-of-attention problem? Are the cognitive structures associated with 
information processing the resources described by others, or do they simple require resources to process? 
To what degree are top-down processes engaged in information processing and to what degree are bottom-up 
processes involved? In other words, are resources drawn and pulled by stimuli or direqed by executive functions? 
Does this depend on the process, the task, or both? What is the nature of the central executive or homunculus 
function in the allocation or resources and other processes? 
Is attention the primary gatekeeper for all other information processing decrements? For example, can working 
memory resources or capacity be diminished directly or are such deficits the result of earlier effects on attention? 
Similarly, does psychological stress inhibit attention, and thus cause memory to be degraded (encoding is disrupted), 
does it interfere with the quality of what is encoded (bad in = bad out), does it disrupt maintenance functions &e., 
rehearsal), or simply make retrieval more difficult in some other way? 
Are biases in attention toward threat-related cues a function of trait, state, or a different underlying mechanism? Do 
these biases result in preferential orienting, difficulties disengaging, more depthful processing, or a combination of 
effects? 
Are performance decrements that result from stress andor workload catastrophic or gradual? Does this correspond to 
physiological changes that are catastrophic or gradual? Does this depend on the task? Does this depend on the source 
of the stress? When task-shedding occurs, which tasks are abandoned? At what point are they resumed? Why are some 
tasks Drotected and others shed? 
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Can we map the cognitive architecture of the human stress response to a neuro-biological basis? Are there 
corresponding neuro-anatomical structures that support our divisions of labor and projections of relationship? Will 
this provide us a definitive answer as to what resources really are? Are neuroendocrine and biochemical correlates 
causal agents or just transmission agents? 
Well-learned tasks are generally resistant to stressors as compared to newly learned tasks (this is true of implicit 
material as compared to explicit). Why? Does it depend upon which type of task or which type of stressor? 
~ 
What are the protective factors against stress and how do they work? What are the underlying mechanisms that 
explain how they operate? 
Why do various moderating variables change the way putative stressors affect performance and cognition? Do they 
work off of a common mechanism such as effort or motivation or are there different mechanisms that explain their 
effects? 
The Conceptual Framework of Information Processing under Stress 
I present here, and in appendices A-E, a brief sketch of a conceptual framewod of information 
processing under stress (Staal, Nowinski, Holbrook, & Dismukes, in preparation). As with any such 
model its benefits are descriptive and not predictive. This framework is an instantiation of the 
transactional perspective and is generally consistent with previous models (e.g. Hancock & Warm, 
1989; Matthews, 2002; Park & Folkman, 1997). It is also grounded in well-established and accepted 
cognitive architectural principles (Anderson, 2000; Lebiere & Anderson, 2001). However, while 
attempting to accommodate previous frameworks, it also extends beyond these in attempting to 
integrate various perspectives and bodies of information. 
This framework relies on several assumptions that have been drawn from the existing cognitive 
science literature. It does not assert a unique mechanism or explanation for the nature of resources 
nor does it attempt to displace existing explanations beyond that which has been provided by the 
literature review, concerning arousal, effort, or other activation-based theories of energy mobilization. 
The model does assume that energy mobilizations typically occur under one of two conditions: 1) 
task-induced situations (activation results from the stimulation of the task or environment itself), and 
2) internally-guided mental effort (a voluntary mobilization). This set of assumptions is somewhat 
distinctive from traditional resource theories (Kahneman, 1973; Wickens, 1992), as it emphasizes 
regulatory processes and not the availability of supplies. Accordingly, the framework contends that 
activation and energetical processes can be allocated, controlled, and subject to resource management 
decisions. Moreover, this model assumes that behavior is largely goal-directed and self-regulated and 
that this regulation incurs costs to various portions of the processing system (Le., further resources 
can be acquired at the expense of increased effort). These additional assumptions rest predominantIy 
in the work of Hockey (1997) and Gaillard (2001). It should be noted, however, that these 
propositions are not in conflict with a strictly bottom-up-driven processing model either, and it is 
believed that both processes play a role in information processing under stress. 
This construction assumes a transactional model of cognitive appraisal. As the reader may recall, 
transactional models view stress as the interaction between the environment and individual, 
emphasizing the role of appraisal in designing a response to stress (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; McGrath, 1976). Thus, to a certain degree, cognitive mediation is required for 
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perceptions of threat, fear, or anxiety, particularly in the later stages of the initial stress response. Prior 
to such processing, this model also assumes that an early, likely “hard-wired” and subcortical 
evaluation occurs after orienting to a given stimulus (Crawford & Cacioppo, 2002; Duckworth, Bargh, 
Garcia, Chaiken, 2002; Rohrbaugh, 1984). This initial evaluation is believed to be rooted in bio- 
evolutionary mechanisms aqd as a result occurs prior to conscious awareness (perhaps arguably at a 
pre-cognitive level). 
Following this initial stage of recognition, evaluation, and higher-order appraisal, information 
regarding the stimulus and one’s response feeds back into the system. As a result, there is an 
activation and mobilization of resources. These resources are both drawn and directed toward further 
processing of the stimuli. This process is moderated by various influences such as goal structure, 
motivation, and effort as well as individual difference characteristics and previous experience and 
learning. Continued information processing is accompanied by further appraisal and evaluation that 
periodically feeds back into the process. Such continuous input and situation assessment updates 
provide adjustments to resource allocation and processing accordingly. This process is believed to be 
similar to what has been described in the situation models literature (Zwaan & Madden, 2004, 
O’Brien, Cook, & Peracchi, 2004), and that encapsulated by research on situation assessment and 
awareness (McCarley, Wickens, Goh, & Horrey, 2002; Uhlarik & Comerford, 2002; Wickens, 2002). 
As this processing directs and draws attention, the effects of stress and workload impinge on the 
resources available for processing. This can result from a number of factors including resource- 
depletion and re-allocation. For example, emotion or threat-based cognitions (Le., anxious thoughts) 
may re-distribute resources away from a task-relevant response or may simply consume or occupy 
them, resulting in fewer available resources to devote elsewhere (Ashcraft, 2002; Ashcraft & Kirk, 
2001; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). 
The general effect of both psychological stress as well as high degrees of workload on attentional 
processing tends to be a reduction in the processing of peripheral information and an enhanced focus 
on centralized cues (Chajut & Algom, 2003; Easterbrook, 1959). The determinant between central 
and peripheral stimuli seems to be based on which stimulus is perceived to be of greatest importance 
to the individual or that which is perceived as most salient. Salience, from this perspective, may relate 
to distinctiveness as well as emotional valence (Le., threat relevance). In some circumstances, filtering 
out peripheral cues is beneficial to performance and in other instances it is detrimental. From the 
perspective of this framework, attentional processing has been positioned as a conduit between 
cognitive appraisal and the direct effects of stress on information processing and later processes such 
as memory and decision making. 
The basic mechanism by which stress affects memory performance is posited as the siphoning of 
attentional resources (Berntsen, 2002; Christianson, 1992). The extent to which a given memory 
process is affected is determined by the extent to which that memory process is attention-demanding 
(and the extent to which a stressor is attention-demanding). Encoding, rehearsal, and effortful 
retrieval of memory are all impaired under conditions of stress while well-learned behaviors and 
retrieval of information from long-term memory remain relatively intact. 
It seems obvious that all information processing requires some amount of mental resources to occur. 
This allocation and use of resources begins at the appraisal process itself. Once a situation has been 
identified as threatening, rumination may begin to intrude upon an individual’s thoughts. These 
worries occupy attentional resources that are necessary for other cognitive processing (Metzger, 
Miller, Cohen, & Sofka, 1990). In particular, it seems that worry intrudes on processing of verbal 
information (Ikeda, Iwanaga, & Seiwa, 1996; Rapee, 1993). Further, such negative thoughts 
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perpetuate themselves by supporting involuntary retrieval of other anxious thoughts through their 
association in memory (Bower, 1981). Some individuals in certain situations may feel compelled to 
suppress an expression of their emotional response to stress. This activity, like rumination, requires 
the involvement of cognitive resources, leaving fewer resources available for other information 
processing (Richards & Gross, 2000; Richards, Butler & Gross, 2003). The amount of resources pre- 
empted by each action is believed to be quite variable. For instance, proceduralized tasks require few 
limited resources while novel or complex tasks require many more (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & 
Starkes, 2002). 
The allocation of remaining available resources means that there are fewer left to devote to the 
processing of other stimuli. Working memory capacity is therefore effectively reduced (Burrows, 
2002). Attentional resources are required to maintain information in working memory through 
rehearsal. As mentioned above, it seems to be the case that rumination interferes with phonological 
rehearsal of information in particular, leaving verbal information particularly vulnerable. Encoding 
and rehearsal of long-term memory are also negatively affected, as both are resource-demanding 
activities. Thus, information, other than that considered most salient, is not encoded as deeply or 
rehearsed as frequently. Subsequently, its recollection and recognition is likely to be reduced in both 
quantity and quality. 
Retrieval from long-term memory should be relatively unaffected as it is not generally resource- 
demanding. Well-learned information, such as that associated with procedures or skills, is retrieved 
relatively automatically. However, several researchers have made a distinction between the processes 
involved in familiarity and recollection (Jacoby, 1991; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Familiarity 
occurs automatically, while recollection involves a more effortful process. Retrieval of ingrained 
knowledge from long-term memory should not be diminished under conditions of stress. However, 
more involved retrieval from long-term memory, that which requires an active search of memory, 
should show deficits in stressful situations. 
Once accounting for diminished capacity, the direct effects of stress on attentional processing, and the 
subsequent effect on working memory, it is not difficult to understand why decision making is often 
compromised and concurrent task management degraded. As resources are ultimately used to 
capacity individuals must voluntarily or involuntarily shift strategies.< Such shifts include the shedding 
of tasks as well as their simplification. 
Appendices A through E provide a schematic representation of each component part among the three 
phases of processing, sense making, resource management, and performance. Appendix A presents 
an overview of cognitive appraisal processing elements while appendix B provides a review of a 
cognitive stress intervention model. Appendix C details the processing framework associated with 
attention and memory while appendices D and E integrate the framework's component parts in both 
simplified and in detailed arrangement. 
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